Skip to content
Likelier

Action vs. inaction: figure for each choice

Proactively retraining for an AI-disrupted career vs. waiting to see how the market evolves

If you act

Proactively retraining for an AI-adjacent or AI-resilient role

No direct measurement

If you don't

Waiting to see how AI disruption plays out before retraining

56%

At least one figure is an indirect estimate, not a measured regret rate. How each figure was built is shown below.


Career

Last reviewed 2026-05-14

Evidence quality 3.75/5

Eight-dimension review score against the quality rubric . Each dimension scored 1–5.

D1 Source verification
4/5
D2 Source authority & independence
4/5
D3 Regret-rate accuracy
2/5
D4 Source comparability
2/5
D5 Gilovich pattern
4/5
D6 Prose quality
5/5
D7 Caveat completeness
5/5
D8 Sample quality
4/5
Average 3.75/5
A person's desk split between an old job task stack and a new training certificate beside a robot icon
Indirect data: for this decision at least one figure comes from an indirect measure, such as outcomes, satisfaction or intent, or from an editorial estimate, rather than from a direct regret survey. The notes for each side below say how its figure was built.

If you act

Proactively retraining for an AI-adjacent or AI-resilient role

No direct measurement

No source states a figure for this side, so none is shown.

Workers who have proactively pursued AI-related upskilling or retraining (US and OECD data)

2024-2025

If you don't

Waiting to see how AI disruption plays out before retraining

56%

56% of US adults are extremely or very concerned about AI-driven job loss — the primary forward-looking proxy for inaction regret in AI-disrupted careers (Pew 2025, n=5,410)

US adults who have not yet pursued AI-related retraining or upskilling

August 2024, published April 2025

Figure for each choice (the measure is named on the page)

Related decisions

Semantically similar decisions — same territory, different trade-offs.

career

Midlife retraining vs stay put

Figure for each choice (the measure is named on the page)

career

Career change

% who regret this choice

Inaction dominates

Inaction regret 1.5× higher

career

Asking for a raise

Figure for each choice (the measure is named on the page)

career

AI-written schoolwork

Figure for each choice (the measure is named on the page)

career

Quitting a job

Figure for each choice (the measure is named on the page)

career

Career vs balance

Figure for each choice (the measure is named on the page)

career

Chase promotion vs accept role

Figure for each choice (the measure is named on the page)

career

College decision

Figure for each choice (the measure is named on the page)

On the side of waiting, 56% of US adults are extremely or very concerned about AI-driven job loss, according to a Pew Research Center survey of 5,410 US adults fielded in August 2024. In the same survey 64% believe AI will lead to fewer jobs over the next 20 years. Only 23% think it will have a positive impact on how people do their jobs. No direct regret survey exists for proactive AI retraining decisions. The rates here are therefore proxies built from forward-looking concern and aspiration, not retrospective measurements.

The risk is concentrated. Approximately 19% of the US workforce works in the most AI-exposed roles, by Pew’s 2023 occupational analysis, and these workers face the highest structural risk. Their jobs tend to pay more ($33/hour on average, against $20/hour in the least-exposed jobs), so for them the displacement stakes of waiting are significant.

Waiting is a bet that the disruption fails to materialise, and also a bet on timing, because retraining carries its own risk. The AI tools and skills most valuable today, such as prompt engineering, workflow automation on a particular platform or specific coding assistants, evolve faster than most training curricula. A worker who retrains now for one AI application may find parts of that skill set superseded within a few product cycles. Given the pace of AI capability change this is a plausible obsolescence risk, but no study has yet tracked how often it actually happens to early retrainers. Early retrainers may find that a one-time credential is not enough, and that the real choice is between starting continuous learning earlier or later.

Most of them would also be doing it alone. Only 36% of organisations operate as career development champions with structured learning programs (LinkedIn 2025 Workplace Learning Report). The majority of workers who retrain therefore do so without employer support.

Sources: action

Claim ledger

Every number below is what each source reported, with the verbatim quote we relied on and how we arrived at our figure. Click any link to verify directly.

2/2 sources independently verified verbatim against the cited source

  1. [1] Pew Research Center — How the U.S. Public and AI Experts View Artificial Intelligence Verified
    How the U.S. Public and AI Experts View Artificial Intelligence
    Statistic
    73% of AI experts surveyed say AI will have a very or somewhat positive impact on how people do their jobs over the next 20 years — versus only 23% of the US public; 56% of the public is extremely or very concerned about job loss from AI
    Excerpt
    “"While 73% of AI experts surveyed say AI will have a very or somewhat positive impact on how people do their jobs over the next 20 years, that share drops to 23% among U.S. adults." ”
    Source data from
    2025-04-03
    Accessed
    2026-05-14
    Verification
    Excerpt independently re-fetched and confirmed word-for-word against the cited source during our grounding audit.
    Calculation
    Pew Research Center, n=5,410 US adults + 1,013 US-based AI experts, fielded August 2024, published April 2025. This source measures optimism about AI's job impact (73% of experts vs 23% of the public say AI will be positive) — it does NOT measure retraining regret, and no such survey exists for AI-disruption retraining as of 2026. No action-side regret figure is shown. The direction reflects one structural regularity from the regret literature: Gilovich and Medvec find that short-term action regrets run well below inaction regrets in career decisions, especially when the action is future-oriented rather than a reversal of a valued identity. The substantive action-side concern is obsolescence risk: AI capabilities shift faster than most training curricula, so skills acquired in one generation of tools may require updating within 2-4 years. This source is retained as authoritative context for the optimism gap, not as the basis for the rate.
  2. [2] LinkedIn Learning — LinkedIn 2025 Workplace Learning Report Verified
    LinkedIn 2025 Workplace Learning Report
    Statistic
    49% of executives agree employees lack the right skills to execute business strategy; only 36% of organizations qualify as career development champions with robust learning programs
    Excerpt
    “"Today nearly half of learning and talent development professionals see a skills crisis, with 49% agreeing, 'My executives are concerned that employees do not have the right skills to execute our business strategy.' … The upshot: Only 36% of organizations fall into the career development champions category with robust programs that yield business results." ”
    Source data from
    2025-01-01
    Accessed
    2026-05-14
    Verification
    Excerpt independently re-fetched and confirmed word-for-word against the cited source during our grounding audit.
    Calculation
    LinkedIn 2025 Workplace Learning Report. The 49% executive concern figure and the 36% career-development-champion rate together establish that the majority of workers who do retrain are doing so in organisations without structured support programs. This is the mechanism for action-side regret: self-directed retraining in the absence of institutional support has a substantially higher skill- mismatch rate than employer-sponsored, structured programs. It is not used for any figure; it contextualises the obsolescence risk and program-quality disparity.

Sources: inaction

Claim ledger

Every number below is what each source reported, with the verbatim quote we relied on and how we arrived at our figure. Click any link to verify directly.

2/2 sources independently verified verbatim against the cited source

  1. [1] Pew Research Center — How the U.S. Public and AI Experts View Artificial Intelligence Verified
    How the U.S. Public and AI Experts View Artificial Intelligence
    Statistic
    56% of US adults are extremely or very concerned about job loss from AI; 64% think AI will lead to fewer jobs over the next 20 years; only 23% believe AI will have a positive impact on how people do their jobs
    Excerpt
    “"we find the public more anxious than experts about job loss (56% vs. 25% are extremely or very concerned). … In our current survey, 64% of the public thinks AI will lead to fewer jobs over the next 20 years. … While 73% of AI experts surveyed say AI will have a very or somewhat positive impact on how people do their jobs over the next 20 years, that share drops to 23% among U.S. adults." ”
    Source data from
    2025-04-03
    Accessed
    2026-05-14
    Verification
    Excerpt independently re-fetched and confirmed word-for-word against the cited source during our grounding audit.
    Calculation
    Pew Research Center, n=5,410 US adults, August 2024. The 56% "extremely or very concerned about job loss" figure is used as the inaction-side regret proxy. The construct validity is this: workers who are highly concerned about AI job displacement but have not yet acted on that concern by retraining or upskilling are in the condition most likely to generate eventual inaction regret — the canonical Gilovich pattern where "I wish I had done something sooner" accumulates as consequences become tangible. This is a forward-looking concern proxy, not a retrospective regret measurement. No longitudinal study has yet followed AI-worried non-retraining workers through to actual job loss and measured subsequent regret, because the AI displacement cycle is too recent. The 56% is an upper bound on eventual inaction regret: not all concerned workers will experience the displacement they fear, so actual regret will be lower. The 64% "expects fewer jobs" figure is noted as corroboration. The 23% positive-impact figure suggests that the majority who are not retraining are doing so without confidence that AI will benefit them — a stance that, if wrong, will generate minimal regret, but if correct will compound over time.
  2. [2] Pew Research Center — Which U.S. Workers Are More Exposed to AI on Their Jobs Verified
    Which U.S. Workers Are More Exposed to AI on Their Jobs
    Statistic
    19% of US workers are in jobs with the highest AI exposure; workers in most-exposed jobs earn $33/hour on average versus $20/hour in least-exposed jobs
    Excerpt
    “"In 2022, 19% of American workers were in jobs that are the most exposed to AI , in which the most important activities may be either replaced or assisted by AI. … In 2022, workers in the most exposed jobs earned $33 per hour, on average, compared with $20 in jobs with the least amount of exposure." ”
    Source data from
    2023-07-26
    Accessed
    2026-05-14
    Verification
    Excerpt independently re-fetched and confirmed word-for-word against the cited source during our grounding audit.
    Calculation
    Pew Research Center, July 2023. The 19% figure establishes that a substantial minority of US workers face the highest structural risk from AI disruption. The wage gap between most-exposed ($33/hr) and least-exposed ($20/hr) workers implies that the highest-stakes inaction decision falls on higher-earning workers who have more to lose from displacement and more resources to invest in retraining — but who may also face greater psychological resistance to career pivots. This source provides the structural denominator for inaction-side risk: approximately 1 in 5 US workers are in the highest-exposure tier where inaction carries the greatest long-term regret potential. Not used in rate arithmetic directly; anchors the population framing.

Caveats

PROXY MEASUREMENTS THROUGHOUT. No survey has directly asked workers "do you regret not retraining for AI disruption sooner?" Both sides are constructed from adjacent data: forward-looking concern measures (for inaction-side risk) and structural employment and program-quality data (for action-side obsolescence risk). The inaction-side rate of 0.56 is the Pew 2025 "extremely or very concerned about AI job loss" figure — a forward-looking concern proxy, not a measured retrospective regret rate. The action side has no direct survey anchor. AI-driven career disruption is historically novel: the compressed pace of AI capability change means there is no prior technology transition with comparable disruption speed from which to extrapolate retraining-regret rates. The stakes are highly field-dependent: workers in the most AI-exposed roles (data entry, basic coding, paralegal research, routine customer service) face substantially higher inaction costs than those in physically-present, interpersonally intensive, or creatively irregular roles that current AI handles poorly. This entry will require revision as longitudinal data on actual AI-displacement and retraining outcomes becomes available over the 2026-2030 period.

Raw data: /api/decisions.json

Recently viewed on this device