Während des Masernausbruchs 2025 als Erwachsener einen MMR-Titer bestimmen lassen oder eine Auffrischimpfung machen – oder darauf verzichten?
Wenn du handelst
MMR-Titer oder Auffrischimpfung machen lassen
0,001%
Wenn du nicht handelst
Auffrischung weglassen, auf Kindheitsimmunität vertrauen
6,0%
Anteil derer, die jede Entscheidung später bereuen. Balken und vollständige Datengrundlage erscheinen unten.
Gesundheit
Zuletzt überprüft 2026-06-13
Evidenzqualität 4.1/5
Bewertungsergebnis nach acht Dimensionen gemäß der
Qualitätsrubrik
. Jede Dimension wird mit 1–5 bewertet.
D1 Quellenüberprüfung
5/5
D2 Quellenautorität & Unabhängigkeit
5/5
D3 Genauigkeit der Bedauernsrate
3/5
D4 Vergleichbarkeit der Quellen
3/5
D5 Gilovich-Muster
4/5
D6 Prosaqualität
4/5
D7 Vollständigkeit der Einschränkungen
4/5
D8 Stichprobenqualität
5/5
Durchschnitt4.1/5
Stellvertretende Daten — für diese Entscheidung gibt es keine direkte Bedauernsstudie. Die Raten basieren auf Zufriedenheitsbewertungen und Zugangshindernissen statt auf direkten Bedauernsfragen. Siehe Vorbehalte unten.
Reue fürs Handeln
MMR-Titer oder Auffrischimpfung machen lassen
0,001%
<0.001% — proxy: a serious adverse event (anaphylaxis) is the only material downside; redundancy in an already-immune adult is not a regret-worthy outcome
US adults who seek an MMR titer or a precautionary MMR dose (1963-67 killed-vaccine cohort, healthcare personnel, immunocompromised contacts) during the 2025 resurgence
Per dose administered
Reue fürs Unterlassen
Auffrischung weglassen, auf Kindheitsimmunität vertrauen
6,0%
~6% — proxy: share of a US healthcare-worker serosurvey lacking a measles immunity marker (seronegative + equivocal); an upper bound on who carries an immunity gap, not a measured regret rate
US adults in the named higher-risk cohorts (1963-67 killed-vaccine recipients, healthcare personnel, immunocompromised) who skip serologic check or revaccination during the 2025 resurgence
Cross-sectional immunity gap during the 2025 resurgence
% bereuen diese Entscheidung
MMR-Titer oder Auffrischimpfung machen lassenAuffrischung weglassen, auf Kindheitsimmunität vertrauen
0,001%6,0%
inaction dominates — Nichthandeln dominiert — die meisten bereuen, nicht gehandelt zu haben.
Verwandte Entscheidungen
Semantisch ähnliche Entscheidungen — gleiches Terrain, andere Abwägungen.
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No survey asks adults whether they regret getting, or skipping, a measles booster during the 2025 resurgence. The few documented post-outbreak interviews run the other way: the parents of the Texas child who died in 2025 told reporters they stood by their decision not to vaccinate. So this pair is a proxy. The action side is anchored on the probability of a serious adverse event from the shot itself, and the inaction side on the share of the relevant cohort that carries no measurable measles immunity. Neither number is a regret rate; both are stand-ins, and the gap between them is wide.
The action downside is small and well-characterized. Anaphylaxis after an MMR-containing vaccine was reported to VAERS at 0.6 per million doses over 1990 to 2016, and the CDC’s Vaccine Information Statement describes a serious reaction as a “very remote chance.” The common outcomes — a sore arm, a brief fever, a mild rash — are not the kind of thing people later regret. The subtler point is that for the large majority of adults who turn out to have been immune already, the booster was redundant rather than harmful, and a redundant-but-protective dose tends to read as reassurance, not as a mistake. That is why the action proxy sits near the floor: the only genuinely regret-worthy action outcome is the rare serious event, on the order of one in a hundred thousand or rarer.
The inaction side is where the cohorts in the question matter. A US healthcare-worker serosurvey found 4% seronegative and 2% equivocal for measles IgG — a roughly 6% immunity gap — and a 2025 meta-analysis of 23,236 vaccinated people pooled seropositivity at 87.8%, falling to 84.3% among single-dose recipients. The 1963-67 killed-vaccine cohort is a separate, smaller group that ACIP explicitly tells to revaccinate, because the inactivated product conferred little durable protection. The catch is that an immunity gap is not the same as realized regret: with 2,288 confirmed US cases in 2025 against a population of roughly 340 million, the national attack rate stayed near 0.0007%, so most seronegative adults were never exposed at all. What gives the gap its weight is the severity tail — 11% of 2025 cases were hospitalized and there were deaths — so the rare intersection of “no immunity” and “exposed” is consequential. The honest reading: skipping leaves a measurable hole in protection for a minority of these cohorts, getting the dose closes it at trivial cost, and the realized-regret asymmetry favors acting even though almost no one in either group will ever face the outcome that would make the choice matter.
Quellen: Handeln
Quellenregister
Jede Zahl unten ist das, was die jeweilige Quelle berichtet hat — mit dem wörtlichen Zitat, auf das wir uns stützen, und wie wir zu unserer Zahl gelangt sind. Klicke auf einen Link, um direkt zu prüfen.
1/2 Quellen unabhängig wortwörtlich mit der zitierten Quelle abgeglichen
[1]Journal of Allergy and Clinical Immunology / NCBI PMC — Anaphylaxis after vaccination reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, 1990–2016
Verifiziert
Peer-Review
MMR-containing vaccine anaphylaxis reporting rate of 0.6 per 1 million doses distributed (overall vaccine rate 1.3 per million).
Auszug
“The estimated rate of anaphylaxis reported to VAERS during 1990 to 2016 after MMR was 0.6 per 1 million doses distributed.”
Quelldaten von
2019-01-01
Abgerufen
2026-06-13
Verifizierung
Der Auszug wurde bei unserer Grounding-Prüfung unabhängig erneut abgerufen und Wort für Wort mit der zitierten Quelle abgeglichen.
Berechnung
Anaphylaxis is the canonical serious adverse event of MMR. 0.6 per 1,000,000 doses = 6e-7. The action regret_rate is set conservatively above that floor (1e-5) to absorb other rare serious events (febrile seizure, transient thrombocytopenia) the VIS lists. The dominant 'downside' of acting for an already-immune adult is a redundant dose, which yields peace of mind rather than regret, so it is not counted as regret. This is the matched-severity proxy: action's regret-worthy outcome is a serious AE, not 'the shot turned out unnecessary'.
[2]U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention — MMR Vaccine Information Statement (VIS)
Regierungsbericht
Serious adverse events from MMR are characterized as a very remote chance; common effects are minor (sore arm, fever, mild rash).
Auszug
“As with any medicine, there is a very remote chance of a vaccine causing a severe allergic reaction, other serious injury, or death.”
Quelldaten von
2025-01-31
Abgerufen
2026-06-13
Berechnung
Qualitative confirmation that the action side's serious downside is 'very remote.' Establishes that the regret-worthy outcome of acting is rare and severe (an AE), distinct from the common, non-regret outcome of a redundant-but-protective dose. No numeric rate on this page; the numeric anchor is PMC6580415.
Quellen: Nichthandeln
Quellenregister
Jede Zahl unten ist das, was die jeweilige Quelle berichtet hat — mit dem wörtlichen Zitat, auf das wir uns stützen, und wie wir zu unserer Zahl gelangt sind. Klicke auf einen Link, um direkt zu prüfen.
3/6 Quellen unabhängig wortwörtlich mit der zitierten Quelle abgeglichen
[1]Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology (PubMed) — Measles immunity in a population of healthcare workers
Verifiziert
Peer-Review
Among 2,473 US healthcare workers tested for anti-measles IgG, 4% were seronegative and 2% equivocal — a ~6% immunity gap.
Auszug
“Ninety-three workers (4%) were seronegative, and 56 (2%) were equivocal.”
Quelldaten von
1994-01-01
Abgerufen
2026-06-13
Verifizierung
Der Auszug wurde bei unserer Grounding-Prüfung unabhängig erneut abgerufen und Wort für Wort mit der zitierten Quelle abgeglichen.
Berechnung
Population-matched anchor: US healthcare workers, one of the named higher-risk cohorts. Seronegative (4%) + equivocal (2%) = 6% lacking a measles immunity marker → inaction proxy 0.06. This is an immunity-gap upper bound, not a realized-regret rate: most seronegative people are never exposed (2025 national attack rate ~ 2,288 / ~340M ~ 0.0007%). The proxy measures who is even eligible for potential regret if exposed.
[2]eClinicalMedicine (The Lancet Discovery Science) — Measles seropositivity in previously vaccinated individuals: a systematic review and meta-analysis
Peer-Review
Pooled seropositivity among vaccinated individuals was 87.8% (so ~12.2% seronegative); single-dose recipients 84.3% seropositive (~15.7% seronegative), across 23,236 individuals from 10 countries.
Auszug
“Pooled seropositivity was 87·8% (95% CI, 83·9%–91·2%) across 23,236 vaccinated individuals”
Quelldaten von
2025-01-01
Abgerufen
2026-06-13
Berechnung
Current (2025) pooled anchor confirming waning: ~12% of vaccinated adults are below seropositivity thresholds, rising to ~16% for single-dose recipients. Verified verbatim via Playwright (Lancet 403s WebFetch). Used to frame the spread; the 6% HCW figure is kept as the population-matched headline rather than the 12-16% pooled (mixed-country, assay-threshold) number to avoid overstating realized susceptibility.
[3]U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention — Measles Vaccination for Specific Groups
Regierungsbericht
ACIP recommends revaccinating recipients of killed/inactivated or unknown-type measles vaccine from 1963-1967; healthcare personnel without presumptive immunity need 2 doses.
Auszug
“The ACIP recommends re-vaccinating anyone who received measles vaccine of unknown type, inactivated measles vaccine, or further attenuated measles vaccine accompanied by immunoglobulin or high-titer measles immune globulin (no longer available in the United States) during these years with 1 or 2 doses.”
Quelldaten von
2024-07-15
Abgerufen
2026-06-13
Berechnung
Establishes that the 1963-67 killed-vaccine cohort is functionally unprotected per ACIP and explicitly advised to revaccinate — the qualitative basis for why skipping carries downside for this cohort. This cohort is <5% of adults and overlaps the pre-1957 presumed-immune group, so it informs but does not set the numeric anchor.
[4]CDC MMWR / NCBI PMC — Measles Update — United States, January 1–April 17, 2025
Verifiziert
Regierungsbericht
Of 800 confirmed 2025 cases through April 17, 96% were unvaccinated or unknown status, 11% hospitalized, 3 deaths.
Auszug
“Overall, 771 (96%) patients have been unvaccinated or had unknown vaccination status”
Quelldaten von
2025-04-24
Abgerufen
2026-06-13
Verifizierung
Der Auszug wurde bei unserer Grounding-Prüfung unabhängig erneut abgerufen und Wort für Wort mit der zitierten Quelle abgeglichen.
Berechnung
Establishes the severity tail that makes the immunity gap consequential: 11% of measles cases hospitalized, 3 deaths in the period, 96% of cases in the unvaccinated/unknown. The realized harm to someone in the immunity gap who is exposed is severe; this is what gives the inaction proxy its weight.
[5]U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention — Measles Cases and Outbreaks — 2025 Data Summary
Verifiziert
Regierungsbericht
Full-year 2025: 2,288 confirmed US measles cases — the largest annual count since 1992.
Auszug
“For the full year of 2025, a total of 2,288 confirmed* measles cases were reported in the United States.”
Quelldaten von
2026-06-12
Abgerufen
2026-06-13
Verifizierung
Der Auszug wurde bei unserer Grounding-Prüfung unabhängig erneut abgerufen und Wort für Wort mit der zitierten Quelle abgeglichen.
Berechnung
Sets the exposure backdrop: 2,288 cases / ~340M US population ~ 0.0007% national attack rate. This is why the 6% immunity-gap proxy is explicitly an upper bound on potential regret, not realized regret — exposure remained geographically concentrated and rare nationally even in the worst year since 1992.
[6]The Texas Tribune — Texas measles victim's parents stand by decision to not vaccinate
Nachrichtenartikel
After their unvaccinated 6-year-old daughter died of measles in Gaines County, Texas in February 2025, the parents said in a recorded statement that the death did not change their opposition to the MMR vaccine.
Auszug
“"We would absolutely not take the MMR," the mother said, adding that her stance on vaccination has not changed after her daughter's death.”
Quelldaten von
2025-03-20
Abgerufen
2026-07-03
Berechnung
Illustrative real-world counterpoint, not a numeric input to the 0.06 inaction proxy: a parent's decision about a child's routine MMR dose amid a measles death is a different population and decision from the adult titer/booster question this entry covers, and one family's account is not a survey. Cited to support the body-text point that documented post-outbreak reactions do not uniformly run toward regretting non-vaccination.
Einschränkungen
proxy_only: there is no direct "regret getting/skipping an MMR booster" survey; both rates are stand-ins. The inaction rate (6%) is the share of a US healthcare-worker serosurvey lacking an immunity marker (seronegative + equivocal), i.e. an upper bound on who is even eligible for regret, NOT a measured regret rate — most seronegative people are never exposed (2025 national attack rate ~0.0007%). The susceptibility spread is wide and assay-dependent: 6% (US HCW IgG), 12.2% (2025 pooled meta-analysis), up to ~37.6% in one Olmsted County, MN commercial-assay study whose high figure is largely a below-titer-threshold artifact (titer below cutoff does not equal susceptible, because anamnestic memory-B-cell immunity is not captured) and is therefore excluded from the anchor. The 1963-67 killed-vaccine cohort is <5% of adults and overlaps the pre-1957 presumed-immune group, so it is a qualitative ACIP-revaccinate flag rather than the numeric anchor. The action anaphylaxis figure (0.6/million) is a passive-surveillance VAERS reporting rate, not a measured incidence. The meta-analysis pools 10 countries, not US-only. CDC publishes immunity and case data, not regret; this entry should not be read as advice to get or skip a dose.
