Einen Kurzzeitkredit aufnehmen vs. ohne das Geld auskommen
Wenn du handelst
Den Kurzzeitkredit aufnehmen
37%
Wenn du nicht handelst
Ohne den Kredit auskommen
81%
Anteil derer, die jede Entscheidung später bereuen. Balken und vollständige Datengrundlage erscheinen unten.
Finanzen
Zuletzt überprüft 2026-05-14
Evidenzqualität 4.75/5
Bewertungsergebnis nach acht Dimensionen gemäß der
Qualitätsrubrik
. Jede Dimension wird mit 1–5 bewertet.
D1 Quellenüberprüfung
5/5
D2 Quellenautorität & Unabhängigkeit
5/5
D3 Genauigkeit der Bedauernsrate
4/5
D4 Vergleichbarkeit der Quellen
4/5
D5 Gilovich-Muster
5/5
D6 Prosaqualität
5/5
D7 Vollständigkeit der Einschränkungen
5/5
D8 Stichprobenqualität
5/5
Durchschnitt4.75/5
Stellvertretende Daten — für diese Entscheidung gibt es keine direkte Bedauernsstudie. Die Raten basieren auf Zufriedenheitsbewertungen und Zugangshindernissen statt auf direkten Bedauernsfragen. Siehe Vorbehalte unten.
Reue fürs Handeln
Den Kurzzeitkredit aufnehmen
37%
37 % der Payday-Kreditnehmer sagen, sie seien in einer so schwierigen finanziellen Lage gewesen, dass sie einen Payday-Kredit zu jeglichen angebotenen Konditionen aufgenommen hätten
US-Payday-Kreditnehmer, national repräsentative Umfrage
retrospektiv, während aktiver Kreditaufnahme bewertet
Reue fürs Unterlassen
Ohne den Kredit auskommen
81%
81 % der Payday-Kreditnehmer in Filialen sagen, sie würden Ausgaben wie Essen und Kleidung kürzen, wenn Payday-Kredite nicht verfügbar wären
US-Payday-Kreditnehmer in Filialen, die angeben, wie sie zurechtkämen, wenn der Kredit nicht verfügbar wäre (national repräsentative Umfrage)
retrospektiv, hypothetische Alternative zur Kreditaufnahme
% bereuen diese Entscheidung
Den Kurzzeitkredit aufnehmenOhne den Kredit auskommen
37%81%
inaction dominates — Nichthandeln dominiert — die meisten bereuen, nicht gehandelt zu haben.
Verwandte Entscheidungen
Semantisch ähnliche Entscheidungen — gleiches Terrain, andere Abwägungen.
Ersparnisse in Kryptowährung anlegenBei klassischen Anlagen bleiben
46%16%
Handlung überwiegt
Reue über Handlung 2.9× höher
A Pew Charitable Trusts survey of more than 33,000 US adults found that 37% of payday loan borrowers say they were in such a difficult financial situation that they would take a loan on any terms offered — desperation, not free choice, drives a large share of the borrowing. Pew separately found that a majority of borrowers say the loans take advantage of them. The same research documented why the harm runs deep: the average borrower spends five months repaying what is marketed as a two-week product, paying $520 in fees to repeatedly service a $375 principal. That fee-to-principal ratio of 139% explains the harm — the product routinely transforms a short-term cash shortfall into a multi-month debt spiral before the borrower can exit.
Independent analysis by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, drawing on 12 million storefront payday loans, found that four out of five loans are rolled over or renewed within two weeks. Only 15% of borrowers repay without re-borrowing within 14 days; over 60% of all loans go to borrowers in sequences of seven or more consecutive loans. The gap between the marketed product (a short-term bridge) and the actual product (a recurring fee mechanism) is the structural reason harm rates are as high as they are.
The inaction side carries real costs. Pew asked borrowers what they would do if payday loans were unavailable: 81% said they would cut back on expenses such as food and clothing, and majorities said they would delay paying some bills, borrow from family or friends, or sell possessions. In other words, the underlying cash shortfall does not disappear when the loan is off the table — it gets shifted onto other necessities and bills. That is the hardship going without imposes. But it is the same shortfall that borrowers who take the loan also carry: Pew separately reports that a majority of borrowers say the loans take advantage of them. Going without the money produces hardship for a large share of people in that position, yet without adding the fee-driven debt spiral that the loan brings. The two figures shown here are proxies drawn from different survey questions — the 37% is Pew’s desperation measure (would borrow on any terms), the 81% is Pew’s coping measure (would cut back on necessities without the loan) — so the raw gap between them is not a clean regret comparison. The signal that survives is severity: CFPB’s rollover data show the harm from taking the loan, when it lands, is deep and prolonged, whereas going without shifts the same shortfall onto other bills without the debt trap.
Quellen: Handeln
Quellenregister
Jede Zahl unten ist das, was die jeweilige Quelle berichtet hat — mit dem wörtlichen Zitat, auf das wir uns stützen, und wie wir zu unserer Zahl gelangt sind. Klicke auf einen Link, um direkt zu prüfen.
1/2 Quellen unabhängig wortwörtlich mit der zitierten Quelle abgeglichen
[1]Pew Charitable Trusts — Payday Lending in America: How Borrowers Choose and Repay Payday Loans (Overview)
Primärstudie
37% of borrowers say they have been in such a difficult financial situation that they would take a payday loan on any terms offered; a majority of borrowers say payday loans take advantage of them
Auszug
“"Desperation also influences the choice of 37 percent of borrowers who say they have been in such a difficult financial situation that they would take a payday loan on any terms offered." ... "A majority of borrowers say payday loans take advantage of them, and a majority also say they provide relief."
”
Quelldaten von
2013-02-20
Abgerufen
2026-06-30
Berechnung
Pew Charitable Trusts "Payday Lending in America" series, drawn from the same nationally representative survey of 33,576 US adults. The 37% figure is Pew's exact, directly reported measure of borrowers who say they were so financially desperate they would accept a payday loan on any terms — a desperation/harm-sentiment construct, NOT a self-report that the loan "made their finances worse" (no such Pew statistic exists). It is used as the action-side rate to label the share of borrowers who took the loan out of acute desperation rather than genuine choice; Pew separately finds a majority say the loans take advantage of them. This is a relabeled sentiment proxy, not a direct regret survey.
[2]Consumer Financial Protection Bureau — CFPB Finds Four Out of Five Payday Loans Are Rolled Over or Renewed
Verifiziert
Regierungsbericht
80% of payday loans are rolled over or renewed within 14 days; over 60% of loans go to borrowers in sequences of 7 or more loans; only 15% of borrowers repay without re-borrowing
Auszug
“"Four out of five payday loans are rolled over or renewed within two weeks. Over 60 percent of loans are made to borrowers in the course of loan sequences lasting seven or more loans. Only 15 percent of borrowers repay all of their payday debts when due without re-borrowing within 14 days."
”
Quelldaten von
2014-03-25
Abgerufen
2026-05-14
Verifizierung
Der Auszug wurde bei unserer Grounding-Prüfung unabhängig erneut abgerufen und Wort für Wort mit der zitierten Quelle abgeglichen.
Berechnung
CFPB analysis of 12 million storefront payday loans over a 12-month period, published March 2014. The 80% rollover rate and the finding that only 15% of borrowers escape without re-borrowing corroborate the action-side harm framing: the debt-trap structure makes the loan more harmful and prolonged than most borrowers anticipate at origination, consistent with Pew's finding that desperation, not free choice, drives a large share of borrowing. These figures are from the CFPB press release, which cites the full study: https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_cfpb_report_payday-lending.pdf
Quellen: Nichthandeln
Quellenregister
Jede Zahl unten ist das, was die jeweilige Quelle berichtet hat — mit dem wörtlichen Zitat, auf das wir uns stützen, und wie wir zu unserer Zahl gelangt sind. Klicke auf einen Link, um direkt zu prüfen.
[1]Pew Charitable Trusts — Payday Lending in America: Who Borrows, Where They Borrow, and Why
Primärstudie
If payday loans were unavailable, 81% of borrowers say they would cut back on expenses such as food and clothing, and majorities say they would delay paying some bills — the shortfall the loan was meant to cover is not resolved but shifted
Auszug
“"If faced with a cash shortfall and payday loans were unavailable, 81 percent of borrowers say they would cut back on expenses. Many also would delay paying some bills, rely on friends and family, or sell personal possessions." ... "Eighty-one percent of those who have used a storefront payday loan would cut back on expenses such as food and clothing. Majorities also would delay paying bills, borrow from family or friends, or sell or pawn possessions."
”
Quelldaten von
2012-07-19
Abgerufen
2026-05-14
Berechnung
The 0.81 inaction-side rate is Pew's exact, directly reported figure: 81% of those who have used a storefront payday loan say they would cut back on expenses such as food and clothing if payday loans were unavailable. It is used here as a hardship proxy for the inaction side — the share who, without the loan, absorb the cash shortfall by cutting back on necessities (and, for majorities, delaying bills, borrowing from family or friends, or selling possessions). This is a coping-response proxy, NOT a direct regret survey of people who went without a payday loan (no such survey exists); "would cut back on food and clothing" is disclosed as a hardship-sentiment stretch rather than a self-reported regret measure. The number itself is taken verbatim from Pew's stated 81%; it is not adjusted or derived downward, because no source states any intermediate value and inventing one would be ungrounded.
Einschränkungen
This is a proxy_only entry: neither side has a direct regret-framed survey, so the two rates measure different things and are not directly comparable as precise regret magnitudes (though they are directionally indicative). The 37% action-side rate is Pew's exact measure of borrowers who say they were so financially desperate they would take a payday loan on any terms offered — a desperation/harm-sentiment figure, not a self-report that the loan "made their finances worse" (no such Pew statistic exists). It is from the "Payday Lending in America" series' nationally representative survey of 33,576 US adults; Pew separately reports a majority of borrowers say the loans take advantage of them. The 81% inaction-side rate is Pew's exact, directly reported figure that 81% of storefront payday borrowers would cut back on expenses such as food and clothing if payday loans were unavailable — used here as a hardship proxy for going without, not a direct regret survey of people who declined a payday loan (no such survey exists). Because the two proxies rest on different questions (desperation to borrow on any terms vs. cutting back on necessities if the loan is gone), the gap between them (delta = -0.44) is an indicative proxy comparison, not a precise regret delta: it points directionally to going without being the costlier path — 81% cutting back on necessities is a broader hardship signal than the narrower 37% desperation-to-borrow measure — but the magnitude is not a calibrated difference. The more reliable signal is severity, not rate: on the action side, CFPB analysis of 12 million loans found more than 80% roll over within 14 days and only 15% of borrowers escape without re-borrowing — indicating the harm when it occurs is deep and prolonged. Going without the loan shifts hardship onto other bills and necessities but avoids the fee-driven debt spiral, suggesting short-term pain without a loan is typically less severe than the debt-trap harm of taking one. The Pew 2012 data predate the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's 2017 payday lending rule (subsequently scaled back in 2020), meaning the structural fee dynamics may differ from current products. The comparison populations across the two sides are not identical — action-side data covers confirmed borrowers who took the loan while inaction-side data is inferred from the same borrowers' hypothesized alternatives to borrowing — introducing a matching limitation.
