Evidence quality 4.88/5
Eight-dimension review score against the quality rubric . Each dimension scored 1–5.
- D1 Source grounding
- 5/5
- D2 Source authority
- 5/5
- D3 Arithmetic
- 5/5
- D4 Uncertainty
- 4/5
- D5 Scope
- 5/5
- D6 Prose
- 5/5
- D7 Perception honesty
- 5/5
- D8 Caveat completeness
- 5/5
How the risk varies
The headline figure averages across very different situations. Here’s how the probability varies by scenario or context:
1 in 2.0 · 50%
Highest-exposure category across all studies; Frey & Osborne assign >90% automation probability to many of these roles. But 'high exposure' ≠ 'job eliminated' — partial automation is far more common than full replacement.
1 in 5.0 · 20%
Moderate task exposure per Eloundou et al., but augmentation (AI as tool) is the dominant pattern so far, not replacement. Historical analogies: spreadsheets did not eliminate accountants.
1 in 6.7 · 15%
Generative AI has high task exposure here, but commercial adoption for full replacement remains low. Copyright and quality-control constraints limit substitution.
1 in 20 · 5.0%
Lowest AI exposure. Robotics advances lag software AI by a wide margin. These roles also face strong demographic tailwinds (aging population, labor shortages).
Bar length and shade rank these scenarios against each other, not against other risks. The exact odds are shown beside each.
Decisions this risk informs
Choices that turn on this risk — how people weigh the trade-off.
No single number answers the question “what are the odds AI takes your job?” because no study has produced one. The most-cited figure, Frey and Osborne’s 47% of US jobs at high risk, describes task-level susceptibility to automation, not a prediction of unemployment. When the OECD re-ran the analysis using individual-level data instead of occupation-level aggregates, the high-risk share dropped to 9-14%. The 2023 GPTs-are-GPTs paper found 80% of workers have at least some task exposure to LLMs, but only 19% have half or more of their tasks exposed. Meanwhile, the Bureau of Labor Statistics projects net job growth of 6.7 million through 2033. These numbers are not contradictory; they are measuring different things.
The gap between “tasks that AI can perform” and “jobs that cease to exist” is where most of the uncertainty lives. ATMs were supposed to eliminate bank tellers; instead, cheaper branch operations led to more branches, and teller employment rose for two decades. Whether generative AI follows the same augmentation pattern or breaks it is the central empirical question, and the honest answer as of early 2026 is that nobody knows. The studies agree on the direction of exposure: routine-cognitive work (data entry, basic document review, bookkeeping) faces the highest displacement pressure, while manual-physical work (construction, plumbing, elder care) faces the least. But exposure is not destiny.
Individual risk varies by at least an order of magnitude across occupations, industries, and
geographies. A data-entry clerk and a plumber live in different risk universes, and neither is
well-described by a population average. The time horizon matters just as much: the five-year
outlook is dominated by augmentation; the thirty-year outlook is genuinely uncertain. Given
the range of published estimates, the absence of any observed mass displacement so far, and
the fundamental gap between task exposure and job elimination, this entry carries a
no_reliable_estimate flag. The fear is real; a defensible lifetime probability is not.
Related tidbits
No reliable estimate exists for AI replacing your specific job. Economic recessions are 99% certain over a lifetime (~9 per career). The threat with no probability estimate gets the headlines. The certainty gets a shrug.
About 60% of students who use AI for schoolwork agreed it harms critical thinking, yet usage kept climbing. A Wharton field trial found AI-assisted students later scored 17% lower on a no-AI exam, and did not notice the loss.
Claim ledger
Every number below is what each source reported, with the verbatim quote we relied on and how we arrived at our figure. Click any link to verify directly.
-
[1] Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford — The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?
The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?- Statistic
47% of US employment is in the high-risk category for computerisation over the next decade or two- Excerpt
“"We examine how susceptible jobs are to computerisation. … According to our estimate, 47 percent of total US employment is in the high risk category, meaning that associated occupations are potentially automatable over some unspecified number of years, perhaps a decade or two." ”
- Source data from
- 2013-09-17
- Accessed
- 2026-04-18 · archived copy
- Calculation
- Frey & Osborne (2017, published in Technological Forecasting and Social Change 114:254-280) classified 702 occupations by automation probability using O*NET task descriptors. The 47% figure refers to jobs whose constituent tasks are technically automatable, not a prediction that 47% of workers will be unemployed. The authors explicitly note this is a measure of task susceptibility, not a forecast of job losses. The paper predates the LLM era and does not account for generative AI capabilities. No conversion to a per-worker lifetime displacement probability is attempted because the study does not model job creation, reallocation, or partial automation.
- Independence
- Seminal academic study using O*NET occupational data. Independent methodology from the OECD and Goldman Sachs estimates below.
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[2] OECD — The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis
The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis- Statistic
9% of jobs across the 21 OECD countries are highly automatable; an additional ~25% face significant task change- Excerpt
“"Overall, we find that, on average across the 21 OECD countries, 9 % of jobs are automatable. [...] For instance, while the share of automatable jobs is 6 % in Korea, the corresponding share is 12 % in Austria." ”
- Source data from
- 2016-05-14
- Accessed
- 2026-04-18 · archived copy
- Calculation
- Arntz, Gregory & Zierahn (2016) re-analysed Frey & Osborne's methodology using PIAAC individual-level survey data rather than occupation-level aggregates. By accounting for within-occupation task variation, the high-risk share drops from 47% to ~9-14%. The OECD updated this to 14% in its 2019 Employment Outlook using newer PIAAC data. Neither figure is a probability of displacement for an individual worker; it describes the share of jobs with >70% automatable task content. No lifetime probability is derivable from this study because it does not model transition rates or job creation.
- Independence
- Uses PIAAC microdata, a different data source and unit of analysis (individual workers vs occupations) from Frey & Osborne. Methodologically independent.
-
[3] OpenAI / University of Pennsylvania — GPTs are GPTs: An Early Look at the Labor Market Impact Potential of Large Language Models
GPTs are GPTs: An Early Look at the Labor Market Impact Potential of Large Language Models- Statistic
~80% of the US workforce could have at least 10% of their tasks affected by LLMs; ~19% could have 50%+ of tasks affected- Excerpt
“"Our findings reveal that around 80% of the U.S. workforce could have at least 10% of their work tasks affected by the introduction of LLMs, while approximately 19% of workers may see at least 50% of their tasks impacted." ”
- Source data from
- 2023-03-17
- Accessed
- 2026-04-18 · archived copy
- Calculation
- Eloundou, Manning, Mishkin & Rock (2023) assessed task-level exposure to LLMs across 1,016 occupations using O*NET. "Exposure" means the task could be completed significantly faster with LLM access, not that the job would be eliminated. The 80% headline describes partial task exposure (>=10% of tasks), not full job replacement. The 19% figure for >=50% task exposure is closer to a displacement signal but still measures task content, not employment outcomes. Converting task exposure to a lifetime job-loss probability requires assumptions about employer adoption rates, augmentation vs replacement decisions, and labor market adjustment speeds that the paper does not provide.
- Independence
- Uses O*NET task data (shared with Frey & Osborne) but applies a GPT-specific exposure rubric developed by both human annotators and GPT-4 classification. Partially independent.
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[4] Goldman Sachs — The Potentially Large Effects of Artificial Intelligence on Economic Growth
The Potentially Large Effects of Artificial Intelligence on Economic Growth- Statistic
Two-thirds of US occupations are exposed to some degree of AI automation; generative AI could substitute up to 25% of current work tasks globally- Excerpt
“"our economists estimate that roughly two-thirds of U.S. occupations are exposed to some degree of automation by AI. They further estimate that, of those occupations that are exposed, roughly a quarter to as much as half of their workload could be replaced." ”
- Source data from
- 2023-03-26
- Accessed
- 2026-04-18 · archived copy
- Calculation
- Hatzius et al. (2023) estimate that generative AI could expose 300 million full-time jobs globally to automation, with roughly 25% of work tasks substitutable. The report simultaneously projects a 7% increase in global GDP over a 10-year period from AI adoption, implying substantial job creation alongside displacement. The 300M figure describes exposure, not net job loss, and the report explicitly models offsetting job creation from new industries and increased productivity. No per-worker lifetime displacement probability can be extracted.
- Independence
- Goldman Sachs proprietary analysis drawing on O*NET, European ISCO data, and internal economic modelling. Partially independent from academic studies above.
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[5] Bureau of Labor Statistics — Employment Projections: 2023-2033
Employment Projections: 2023-2033See all 2 Likelier entries citing this source →
- Statistic
Total US employment projected to grow by 6.7 million jobs from 2023 to 2033, to 174.6 million (0.4 percent a year)- Excerpt
“"The U.S. economy is projected to add 6.7 million jobs from 2023 to 2033, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported today. Total employment is projected to increase to 174.6 million and grow 0.4 percent annually, which is slower than the 1.3 percent annual growth recorded over the 2013-23 decade." ”
- Source data from
- 2024-09-04
- Accessed
- 2026-04-18 · archived copy
- Calculation
- BLS decennial projections are the baseline measure of actual expected employment outcomes. The 2023-2033 outlook projects net job growth of 6.7 million, not net loss. BLS does not separately model AI-driven displacement; its projections incorporate historical trends in technology adoption, productivity growth, and sectoral shifts. The fact that net employment is projected to grow does not preclude significant churn within occupations, but it provides a counterweight to headline claims of mass job elimination. No per-worker lifetime displacement probability is published.
- Independence
- Official US government statistical agency using proprietary macroeconomic modelling. Fully independent from the academic and private-sector studies above.
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[6] Stanford Digital Economy Lab — Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence- Statistic
Early-career workers (ages 22-25) in the most AI-exposed occupations experienced a 16 percent relative decline in employment since late 2022, while employment for more experienced workers in the same occupations and for workers in less-exposed fields remained stable or continued to grow- Excerpt
“"early-career workers (ages 22-25) in the most AI-exposed occupations have experienced a 16 percent relative decline in employment even after controlling for firm-level shocks. In contrast, employment for workers in less exposed fields and more experienced workers in the same occupations has remained stable or continued to grow." ”
- Source data from
- 2025-11-13
- Accessed
- 2026-06-14 · archived copy
- Calculation
- Brynjolfsson, Chandar & Chen (2025) analyse high-frequency payroll records from ADP, the largest US payroll processor, covering millions of workers. They document a 16% relative decline in headcount for the 22-25 age band in occupations most exposed to generative AI (software developers, customer-service representatives) measured against pre-2023 trend, with no comparable decline for workers 30+ in the same occupations or for workers in low-exposure fields. The 16% is a cohort-level relative employment differential, not a per-worker probability of job loss; the paper does not convert it into an individual displacement hazard, and AI attribution remains contested (a Feb 2026 follow-up by the same authors examines interest-rate and timing confounds). It is used here only to populate the early-career age x AI-exposure personal factor, not to derive a headline number. The earlier August 2025 preprint reported ~13%; the published version reports 16%.
- Independence
- First large-scale payroll-based (ADP administrative records) evidence, methodologically independent from the O*NET task-exposure studies and BLS macroeconomic projections above. Measures realised employment, not task susceptibility.
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[7] Proskauer (Law and the Workplace) — AI Bias Lawsuit Against Workday Reaches Next Stage as Court Grants Conditional Certification of ADEA Claim
AI Bias Lawsuit Against Workday Reaches Next Stage as Court Grants Conditional Certification of ADEA Claim- Statistic
On May 16, 2025 a federal court conditionally certified Mobley v. Workday as a nationwide ADEA collective covering job applicants aged 40+; Workday's filings disclosed roughly 1.1 billion applications rejected through its AI screening tools during the relevant period- Excerpt
“"1.1 billion applications were rejected [...] Notice will be issued to the allegedly affected job applicants, in what could be one of the largest collectives ever certified." ”
- Source data from
- 2025-06-03
- Accessed
- 2026-06-14 · archived copy
- Calculation
- Mobley v. Workday (N.D. Cal. 3:23-cv-00770) alleges Workday's AI applicant-recommendation system produced a disparate impact by age, race, and disability at the hiring gate. On 2025-05-16 the court granted conditional (preliminary) certification of a nationwide ADEA collective of applicants aged 40+ screened since September 2020. The ~1.1 billion figure is the volume of applications Workday disclosed were rejected through its tools, not a number of confirmed biased rejections; the case is unresolved and the disparate-impact claim is untested at trial. No per-applicant probability of a bias-tainted auto-rejection is derivable, so this source supports a caveat only, not a number.
- Independence
- Legal-developments analysis of court filings; non-authoritative reference used only to document the algorithmic-exclusion-at-the-hiring-gate dimension absent from the displacement-by-automation studies above.

