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Arrependimento de agir vs. não agir

Recorrer de uma decisão judicial vs. aceitar a sentença original

Se você agir

Recorrer da decisão judicial

86%

Se você não agir

Aceitar a decisão original sem recorrer

60%

Porcentagem de quem mais tarde se arrepende de cada escolha. As barras e o registro completo aparecem abaixo.


Financeiro

Última revisão 2026-05-09

Qualidade das evidências 3.63/5

Pontuação de revisão em oito dimensões segundo a grelha de qualidade . Cada dimensão pontuada de 1 a 5.

D1 Verificação das fontes
4/5
D2 Autoridade e independência das fontes
4/5
D3 Precisão da taxa de arrependimento
1/5
D4 Comparabilidade das fontes
2/5
D5 Padrão de Gilovich
5/5
D6 Qualidade da prosa
4/5
D7 Completude das ressalvas
5/5
D8 Qualidade da amostra
4/5
Média 3.63/5
A courthouse with a split path: one leading upward to a higher court, the other leading back to a street-level exit.
Dados proxy — não existe nenhuma pesquisa direta sobre arrependimento para esta decisão. As taxas são derivadas de pontuações de satisfação e dados de barreiras de acesso em vez de perguntas que perguntavam diretamente sobre arrependimento. Veja advertências abaixo.

Arrependimento por ação

Recorrer da decisão judicial

86%

~86% dos recursos cíveis em tribunal federal não resultam em reversão do julgamento de primeira instância

Partes privadas em ações cíveis nos tribunais federais de apelação dos EUA

ano civil 2021, decisões de mérito

Arrependimento por omissão

Aceitar a decisão original sem recorrer

60%

~30% proxy: parcela de perdedores em primeira instância que não recorrem apesar de fundamentos potencialmente meritórios (estimativa de acesso à justiça)

Partes em ações cíveis que receberam sentenças desfavoráveis em primeira instância em tribunais dos EUA

proxy transversal, 2022

% se arrependem desta escolha

action dominates — A acção domina — a maioria arrepende-se de ter agido.

Decisões relacionadas

Decisões semanticamente semelhantes — mesmo terreno, compromissos diferentes.

Financeiro

Litigar vs. chegar a um acordo

% se arrependem desta escolha

A inação predomina

Arrependimento de inação 1.5× maior

Financeiro

Recurso contra negação do plano de saúde

% se arrependem desta escolha

A inação predomina

Arrependimento de inação 3.1× maior

Financeiro

Advogado para reivindicação de lesão de auto

% se arrependem desta escolha

A ação predomina

Arrependimento de ação 2.2× maior

Financeiro

Negociação do aluguel

% se arrependem desta escolha

A inação predomina

Arrependimento de inação 1.9× maior

Financeiro

Negociar o preço do carro

% se arrependem desta escolha

A inação predomina

Arrependimento de inação 1.6× maior

Financeiro

Negociação de conta hospitalar

% se arrependem desta escolha

A inação predomina

Arrependimento de inação 7.6× maior

Financeiro

Renovação da casa

% se arrependem desta escolha

A ação predomina

Arrependimento de ação 2.3× maior

Financeiro

Empréstimo à família

% se arrependem desta escolha

A ação predomina

Arrependimento de ação 1.3× maior

Across all case types in US federal courts, roughly 86% of civil appellants do not achieve reversal of the lower court’s judgment — the figure is most favorable for private civil disputes (approximately 14% reversal rate), worse across the overall caseload (8.2%). Spending the time and money to appeal results in the original ruling standing in the vast majority of cases. On the inaction side, federal appellate-filing data suggests a majority of civil litigants who lose at trial never appeal at all: an analysis of federal civil cases found a 39.6% appeal rate among tried cases, implying that roughly 60% go uncontested — for some out of cost, lack of counsel, or low awareness of appellate rights, and for others because they correctly judge their odds of reversal are poor — leaving many with outcomes they believed were wrong but never contested.

The decision to appeal sits in a distinctive position among legal choices: it is almost always made after an already costly first proceeding, the odds are quantifiably long before the filing is made, and the costs of the action are immediate while potential benefits are speculative. Appeals courts are explicitly deferential to trial courts — the “any reasonable trier of fact” standard in civil cases means that many judgments that appear wrong to the losing party are legally unreviewable. The anti-plaintiff pattern in appellate outcomes shows up clearly in the available data: one Cornell Law/Journal of Empirical Legal Studies analysis found plaintiff appellants achieved reversal in about 4% of adverse trial judgments, versus about 10% for defendants — a pattern that analysis found held across case types — meaning individuals bringing claims may face steeper uphill odds than institutional defendants with experienced appellate counsel.

The regret calculus here is complicated by the multiple functions an appeal can serve. Some appellants file to force a settlement renegotiation, not because they expect to win at the appellate level — in those cases, even an unsuccessful appeal may achieve the desired outcome and generate no regret. The inaction side is equally ambiguous: many litigants who accept an adverse judgment have correctly assessed that their grounds for appeal are thin, and acceptance is a rational response rather than resigned defeat. The Gilovich temporal model predicts that regret about inaction grows over time — people who never fought a ruling they thought unjust may carry that grievance for years — while the disappointment of a failed appeal fades as appellants adapt to the outcome. The point estimates here are the weakest in this dataset and should be read as directional rather than quantitative.

Fontes: acção

Registro de evidências

Cada número abaixo é o que cada fonte relatou, com a citação literal em que nos baseamos e como chegamos ao nosso valor. Clique em qualquer link para verificar diretamente.

  1. [1] Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts — Just the Facts: U.S. Courts of Appeals
    Just the Facts: U.S. Courts of Appeals
    Estatística
    Fewer than 9% of total appeals in 2015 resulted in reversals; private civil cases saw the highest civil reversal rate at 14.2%
    Trecho
    “"Fewer than 9 percent of total appeals resulted in reversals of lower court decisions in 2015." [Paraphrase from the article's Table 2, a statistical table:] Bankruptcy appeals had the highest reversal rate of any category, at 24.4 percent. Among civil categories specifically, private civil cases had the highest reversal rate at 14.2 percent, followed by U.S. civil appeals at 4.2 percent. Prisoner petition appeals had a 4.6 percent reversal rate, and the overall reversal rate across all categories was 8.6 percent. ”
    Dados da fonte de
    2016-12-20
    Acessado
    2026-07-07
    Cálculo
    US Courts administrative data for 2015. The 14.2% reversal rate for private civil cases is the highest civil reversal category and is used as the most favorable benchmark. Under this rate, approximately 86% of private civil appellants do not obtain a reversal. More recent data (calendar year 2021, ~28,000 merits dispositions) confirms the overall reversal rate at approximately 8.2%, making the 14.2% for private civil cases an upper bound. The action regret proxy rate of 0.86 = 1 - 0.14 (using the most favorable category). It represents the share of appellants who spend money and time on appeal and do not achieve reversal. This is outcome inferiority rather than felt regret, but it is the closest available proxy.
  2. [2] Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts — Table B-5. U.S. Courts of Appeals—Decisions in Cases Terminated on the Merits (12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2021)
    Table B-5. U.S. Courts of Appeals—Decisions in Cases Terminated on the Merits (12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2021)
    Estatística
    Of more than 28,000 cases terminated on the merits in the 12-month period ending December 31, 2021, about 2,300 resulted in reversal — an overall reversal rate of 8.2%
    Trecho
    “[Paraphrase from Table B-5, a statistical table.] Table B-5 reports "U.S. Courts of Appeals—Decisions in Cases Terminated on the Merits, by Nature of Proceeding—During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2021." The total row shows roughly 28,000 cases decided on the merits with the reversed column totaling about 2,300 cases, yielding the "8.2" percent overall reversal rate reported in the table's reversed- percentage column. ”
    Dados da fonte de
    2021-12-31
    Acessado
    2026-05-09
    Cálculo
    2021 data from Table B-5 of the Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary (12-month period ending December 31, 2021). The 8.2% overall reversal rate (all case types, ~2,300 reversals out of ~28,000 merits terminations) confirms that most appeals fail. Private civil cases fare better than average (14.2% per 2015 data), so we use 14.2% as the reversal rate, giving an implied 85.8% non-reversal rate, rounded to 0.86 for the action regret proxy.

Fontes: inacção

Registro de evidências

Cada número abaixo é o que cada fonte relatou, com a citação literal em que nos baseamos e como chegamos ao nosso valor. Clique em qualquer link para verificar diretamente.

  1. [1] Legal Services Corporation / NORC at the University of Chicago — The Justice Gap: The Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans (2022)
    The Justice Gap: The Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans (2022)

    See all 2 Likelier entries citing this source →

    Estatística
    92% of civil legal problems of low-income Americans receive no or inadequate legal help; legal aid organizations must decline approximately half of all requests due to resource constraints
    Trecho
    “"For 92% of their substantial civil legal problems, low-income Americans do not get the legal help they need. Legal aid organizations receiving LSC funding must decline approximately half of all requests due to insufficient resources, leaving an estimated 1.4 million problems annually without adequate assistance." ”
    Dados da fonte de
    2022-04-01
    Acessado
    2026-05-09
    Cálculo
    Retained as background context only. This report documents severe access-to-justice constraints in US civil legal aid generally, but it contains no statistic on appeal rates or on litigants who forgo appealing a judgment specifically, so it is not used to derive the inaction-side regret_rate. It supports the qualitative point that cost barriers and lack of counsel are real and large, which may explain part of why civil litigants who lose at trial do not appeal — see the Eisenberg & Clermont source below for the actual regret_rate derivation.
  2. [2] Cornell Law School / Journal of Empirical Legal Studies — Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes
    Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes
    Estatística
    The appeal rate is 39.6% in tried civil cases (versus 10.0% in nontried cases); the complement implies about 60% of tried-case losers do not appeal at all
    Trecho
    “"Federal data sets covering district court and appellate court civil cases for cases terminating in fiscal years 1988 through 2000 are analyzed. Appeals are filed in 10.9 percent of filed cases, and 21.0 percent of cases if one limits the sample to cases with a definitive judgment for plaintiff or defendant. The appeal rate is 39.6 percent in tried cases compared to 10.0 percent of nontried cases. Defendants achieve reversal of adverse trial court judgments in about 10 percent of filed cases and suffer affirmance in about 15 percent of such cases. Plaintiffs achieve reversal in about 4 percent of adverse trial court judgments and suffer affirmance in about 16 percent of such cases." ”
    Dados da fonte de
    2004-11-01
    Acessado
    2026-07-07
    Cálculo
    Eisenberg & Clermont's Cornell study of federal civil cases terminating FY1988-2000 (Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2004). The paper reports a 39.6% appeal rate in tried cases — cases that reached a trial-level judgment, matching this decision's "adverse judgment at trial" population. Because appeals are filed overwhelmingly by the losing or aggrieved side, this appeal rate is used as a proxy for the share of trial losers who contest the judgment; its complement, 1 - 0.396 = 0.604, rounded to 0.60, is the inaction-side regret proxy — the share who do not appeal at all. This replaces a prior "roughly one-third" estimate that this entry's own calculation_notes previously admitted had no traceable derivation from any cited source; that figure has been removed as unsupported. This remains a non-appeal rate, not a felt-regret rate — it does not separate rational acceptance (correctly assessed low odds, cost) from genuine regret, and the underlying data is federal, 1988-2000 vintage, not a current nationally representative sample. The reversal figures above (4% plaintiffs, ~10% defendants) corroborate the anti-plaintiff pattern discussed elsewhere in this entry but are not used in the regret_rate calculation.

Ressalvas

MEDIDAS POR PROXY EM AMBOS OS LADOS — o regret_delta de 0,56 deve ser tratado com cautela significativa. A taxa do lado da ação (0,86) é o complemento da taxa de reversão para ações cíveis privadas (14,2%), a categoria cível de maior reversão. Ela mede a inferioridade do resultado, não o arrependimento sentido: muitos recorrentes sabiam que tinham baixas chances e recorreram mesmo assim por atraso, alavancagem em negociações de acordo ou para preservar direitos — eles podem não se arrepender de ter recorrido mesmo após perder. A taxa do lado da inação (0,30) é um proxy conservador de acesso à justiça com ampla incerteza; é a âncora mais fraca nesta entrada e a verdadeira taxa de arrependimento por inação entre os que aceitaram sentenças desfavoráveis é desconhecida. A grande delta aparente (predomínio da ação) pode ser um artefato do descompasso proxy: o proxy de ação está ancorado em 86% de falha em reverter, enquanto o proxy de inação está ancorado em não-recurso por barreira de custo em 30%, e eles medem coisas inteiramente diferentes. Na prática, o modelo temporal de Gilovich preveria que o arrependimento por inação cresce ao longo do tempo (pessoas que aceitaram sentenças injustas podem se arrepender cada vez mais de não ter lutado) enquanto o arrependimento por ação desvanece (recorrentes que perderam eventualmente aceitam), tornando esta entrada consistente com domínio eventual da inação em horizontes temporais mais longos — o oposto do que as estimativas pontuais sugerem. Recursos cíveis e criminais têm dinâmicas muito diferentes. Padrões de recurso de tribunais estaduais diferem dos federais. A entrada descreve apenas recursos cíveis federais.

Dados brutos: /api/decisions.json

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