Meninggalkan Venezuela selama krisis ekonomi dan politik vs. bertahan
Jika Anda bertindak
Beremigrasi dari Venezuela
26%
Jika Anda tidak bertindak
Tetap di Venezuela selama krisis
53%
Persentase orang yang kemudian menyesali setiap pilihan. Diagram batang dan catatan lengkap ditampilkan di bawah.
Lifestyle
Terakhir ditinjau 2026-05-13
Kualitas bukti 4.5/5
Skor tinjauan delapan dimensi terhadap
rubrik kualitas
. Setiap dimensi dinilai 1–5.
D1 Verifikasi sumber
4/5
D2 Otoritas & independensi sumber
5/5
D3 Akurasi tingkat penyesalan
5/5
D4 Keterbandingan sumber
5/5
D5 Pola Gilovich
4/5
D6 Kualitas prosa
4/5
D7 Kelengkapan peringatan
4/5
D8 Kualitas sampel
5/5
Rata-rata4.5/5
Data proksi — tidak ada survei penyesalan langsung untuk keputusan ini. Tingkat diturunkan dari skor kepuasan dan data hambatan akses daripada pertanyaan yang langsung menanyakan tentang penyesalan. Lihat peringatan di bawah.
Penyesalan atas tindakan
Beremigrasi dari Venezuela
26%
~26% migran Venezuela yang kembali tidak dapat mencari nafkah di negara tuan rumah -- proksi hasil kesulitan di luar negeri, bukan tingkat penyesalan-tentang-kepergian yang dilaporkan sendiri
Emigran Venezuela di Kolombia, Peru, Chili, dan Ekuador
retrospektif, 2022-2023
Penyesalan atas kelambanan
Tetap di Venezuela selama krisis
53%
~53% warga Venezuela yang bertahan hidup dalam kemiskinan ekstrem pada 2022 (pendapatan terlalu rendah untuk keranjang pangan pokok) -- proksi hasil kesulitan, bukan tingkat penyesalan yang dilaporkan sendiri
Orang Venezuela yang tetap di Venezuela selama krisis ekonomi dan politik 2016-2023
tahunan, 2016-2023; perkiraan utama dari survei 2022
% menyesal dengan pilihan ini
Beremigrasi dari VenezuelaTetap di Venezuela selama krisis
26%53%
inaction dominates — Tidak bertindak mendominasi — sebagian besar menyesali karena tidak bertindak.
Keputusan terkait
Keputusan yang serupa secara semantik — area yang sama, kompromi yang berbeda.
Meninggalkan kampung halamanTetap dekat tempat asal
20%30%
Ketidakaktifan mendominasi
Penyesalan tidak bertindak 1.5× lebih tinggi
Venezuela’s post-2015 economic collapse produced the largest displacement in Western Hemisphere history outside of armed conflict: 7.7 million Venezuelans had left by 2023, driven by hyperinflation, food insecurity, and political instability. ENCOVI’s 2022 National Survey of Living Conditions — the principal independent social measurement instrument in Venezuela — found that 53.3 percent of the population was living in extreme poverty (income too low to buy a basic food basket), down from 68 percent in 2021, with income poverty at 81.5 percent. The extreme-poverty rate constitutes the inaction-side harm proxy: the share of the staying population experiencing outcomes severe enough that, given counterfactual access to emigration, most would plausibly retrospectively have preferred to leave. It is an outcome proxy, not a measured regret rate — no survey directly asks Venezuelans who stayed whether they regret not emigrating. The Mixed Migration Centre’s 4Mi returnee data add circumstantial support: even returnees who reached Venezuela expect to struggle for an income (76 percent) and worry about access to food and water (57 percent).
The action side captures a real and significant cost. In the Mixed Migration Centre’s 4Mi survey of Venezuelan returnees (n=269), 71 percent said their return was partly driven by problems in the host country — including 26 percent who could not generate enough income to settle there — while only 18 percent returned because they had achieved their goals abroad. That 26 percent hardship-abroad figure is the action-side proxy: it measures difficulty making a living among people who gave up on emigration, not a self-reported “I should not have left” regret rate. The leading stated motivation for return was actually family reunification (81 percent) and homesickness (63 percent), with failure to integrate into the host country (23 percent) and inability to regularise status (22 percent) among the structural push factors. Most Venezuelan emigrants who remain abroad do not return at all, so the proxy captures a hardship subset rather than population-wide regret.
The regret_delta of -0.273 captures a genuine asymmetry: the documented harm rate of staying (53.3 percent extreme poverty) exceeds the documented hardship rate among returnees who left (26 percent unable to make a living abroad), consistent with the Gilovich inaction-dominance pattern and the temporal logic of crisis migration. In the short term, emigration is costly: the route is arduous, early months abroad are disorienting, and social status often drops sharply. Over time, however, those who left and established themselves in receiving countries typically ratify the decision through downward counterfactual thinking — imagining the extreme poverty, food insecurity, and institutional collapse they avoided. Those who stayed and experienced those conditions face the inverse. Both proxies carry uncertainty of approximately plus or minus 10 percentage points, and the crisis has evolved since the 2022 reference year; Venezuelan economic conditions in 2025 are materially different from 2019. The entry describes the crisis period and should not be applied as a forward-looking assessment.
Sumber: tindakan
Buku besar klaim
Setiap angka di bawah ini adalah apa yang dilaporkan masing-masing sumber, dengan kutipan kata demi kata yang kami andalkan dan bagaimana kami sampai pada angka kami. Klik tautan mana saja untuk memverifikasi langsung.
1/2 sumber diverifikasi secara independen kata demi kata terhadap sumber terkutip
[1]USA for UNHCR / United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) — UNHCR Survey Shows a Third of Displaced Venezuelans in Latin America Could Consider Return
Terverifikasi
Studi primer
In a UNHCR survey of 1,288 Venezuelans across six host countries (Jan-Mar 2026), just over a third indicated a possible intention to return home, with 9% considering it within a year. Nearly 60% cited insufficient reliable information about conditions on return as a barrier.
Kutipan
“[Verbatim from USA for UNHCR, 2026-04-17.] "Between January and March 2026, UNHCR interviewed 1,288 Venezuelans in Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala." "Just over one third surveyed indicated a possible intention to return home, with 9 per cent considering it within a year." "Nearly 60 per cent of respondents identified insufficient reliable information about what to expect upon return as a barrier, alongside uncertainty about how returning could affect their legal status in host countries."
”
Data sumber dari
2026-04-17
Diakses
2026-05-13
Verifikasi
Kutipan diambil ulang secara independen dan dikonfirmasi kata demi kata terhadap sumber terkutip selama audit pendasaran kami.
Perhitungan
UNHCR return-intentions survey, n=1,288 across six host countries (Jan-Mar 2026), reported via USA for UNHCR. This source measures the share of displaced Venezuelans who would CONSIDER returning (just over one third) -- a return-intention construct, NOT a self-reported regret-about-leaving rate. It is cited here for context: a sizeable minority remain open to return, but the headline action-side proxy (26%) is taken from the MMC 4Mi returnee survey -- the 26% of returnees who "have not been able to generate enough income to settle in their host country" -- which is the most directly verifiable hardship-abroad figure. The previously cited UNHCR figures (n=7,200+, a "26% regret" and "34% would return" breakdown) could not be verified against any published UNHCR survey and were replaced with this verified return-intentions survey.
[2]Mixed Migration Centre — Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions
Sumber referensi
In MMC's 4Mi survey of Venezuelan returnees (n=269), 71% said their return was partly driven by problems in the host country -- including 26% who could not make a living there and 23% who were not integrated into the host country -- while only 18% returned because they had achieved their goals abroad. Family reunification (81%) was the leading stated motivation for return.
Kutipan
“[Verbatim from Mixed Migration Centre (2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi data, n=269.] "Only 18% of them reported voluntarily returning to Venezuela because they have achieved their goals in the host country, while 71% mentioned that their return to Venezuela was partly driven by at least one of the following factors: insufficient access to services (27% of all respondents), the impossibility of making a living (26%), [not being] integrated into the host country (23%) or [inability to] regularize their migratory status (22%)." The report adds that "26% of respondents reported that they have not been able to generate enough income to settle in their host country", confirming that hardship abroad -- not recovery in Venezuela -- was the dominant push factor in return.
”
Data sumber dari
2022-12-01
Diakses
2026-05-13
Perhitungan
Mixed Migration Centre (December 2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi survey, n=269 (illustrative, not representative). Cited as corroborating evidence for the action-side hardship mechanism: 71% of returnees were pushed by problems in the host country and only 18% returned because they had achieved their goals there, so the people who give up on emigration are mostly those experiencing worse-than-expected outcomes abroad while conditions at origin remain poor. Note the report's principal STATED motivation for return is family reunification (81%) and homesickness (63%); the economic/structural difficulties are the dominant push factors but are reported alongside, not in place of, those pull factors. The original cite ("Mixed Migration in South America", resource/mixed-migration-in- south-america) 404s and did not match any MMC resource; this is the on-topic MMC report with the verified figures.
Sumber: tidak bertindak
Buku besar klaim
Setiap angka di bawah ini adalah apa yang dilaporkan masing-masing sumber, dengan kutipan kata demi kata yang kami andalkan dan bagaimana kami sampai pada angka kami. Klik tautan mana saja untuk memverifikasi langsung.
[1]Universidad Andres Bello / UCAB / Universidad Central de Venezuela — Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) 2022
Studi primer
ENCOVI 2022 found extreme poverty (income insufficient to buy a basic food basket) at 53.3% of the population, down from 68% in 2021; income poverty stood at 81.5%. ENCOVI is Venezuela's principal independent living-conditions survey.
Kutipan
“[Verbatim Spanish from ENCOVI 2022, UCAB, as reported by elucabista.com, 2022-11-10.] "La pobreza extrema, en la que se encuentran aquellos con ingresos insuficientes para adquirir los alimentos basicos, bajo de 68% en 2021 a 53,3% en 2022." The same survey reported that, measured by income level, poverty affected 81.5% of the population in 2022 ("la pobreza afecta a 81,5% de la poblacion"). These figures describe the conditions of those who remained in Venezuela after 2015, when large-scale emigration began. ENCOVI is the primary independent social measurement instrument in Venezuela, conducted by Venezuelan universities led by UCAB.
”
Data sumber dari
2022-11-10
Diakses
2026-05-13
Perhitungan
ENCOVI (Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida) 2022, UCAB, Venezuela. The inaction-side proxy uses the extreme-poverty rate (53.3% in 2022, the survey's reference year) as an outcome anchor for the hardship of staying, NOT a measured regret rate. Extreme poverty -- income too low to buy a basic food basket -- is a crisis condition, but it is not the same as expressed regret about not emigrating; no direct "do you regret not having emigrated" survey of Venezuelans who stayed exists. The earlier draft used "61%", which does not appear in ENCOVI 2022; the verified 2022 extreme- poverty figure is 53.3% (down from 68% in 2021). Income poverty (81.5%) is reported for context but is a broader, less severe band.
[2]Mixed Migration Centre — Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions
Sumber referensi
Among Venezuelan returnees (MMC 4Mi, n=269), 57% returned while still concerned about access to basics such as food and water in Venezuela, and 28% perceived their return as a failure -- circumstantial evidence that conditions for those who stay remain harsh. Of returnees, 47% planned to stay in the next two years while 27% intended to migrate again.
Kutipan
“[Verbatim from Mixed Migration Centre (2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi data, n=269.] "Most respondents (76%) report that securing an income will be the main challenge after their return. 57% are returning while still concerned about access to the very basics such as food and water, in Venezuela." "28% of Venezuelan refugees and migrants perceived their return to Venezuela as a failure and with shame." On future plans, "47% of respondents reported they will be staying in the place that they left [the next two years]. However, 27% said that they intend to migrate again."
”
Data sumber dari
2022-12-01
Diakses
2026-05-13
Perhitungan
Mixed Migration Centre (December 2022), 4Mi returnee survey, n=269. Used as second-order circumstantial evidence for the inaction-side proxy: even returnees who reached Venezuela expect to fight for an income (76%) and worry about food and water (57%), and a notable share (27%) already plan to leave again -- consistent with the inference that conditions for those who stay remain severe. The earlier draft cited a UNHCR figure ("only 20% planned to stay permanently; 80% planned to re-emigrate") that could not be verified against any published UNHCR report and is contradicted by the closest real returnee data (MMC: 47% intend to stay, 27% intend to re-migrate over the next two years); it was replaced with this verified MMC figure. This does not directly measure regret among those who never emigrated.
Catatan
PENGUKURAN PROKSI DI KEDUA SISI. Tanda proxy_only mencerminkan hambatan struktural terhadap survei penyesalan dua arah dalam konteks krisis: tidak ada studi terpublikasi yang secara langsung menanyakan kepada warga Venezuela yang bertahan apakah mereka menyesal tidak beremigrasi, dan tidak ada survei terpublikasi yang melaporkan tingkat "saya seharusnya tidak pergi" yang dilaporkan sendiri untuk para emigran pun. Angka sisi tindakan sebesar 26% adalah proporsi MMC 4Mi dari orang yang kembali yang tidak dapat menghasilkan pendapatan cukup untuk menetap di negara tuan rumah -- sebuah hasil kesulitan di luar negeri di kalangan orang yang menyerah dari emigrasi, BUKAN tingkat penyesalan-tentang-kepergian yang dilaporkan sendiri; sebagian besar emigran yang tetap tinggal di luar negeri sama sekali tidak kembali. Angka sisi kepasifan sebesar ~53% menggunakan tingkat kemiskinan ekstrem ENCOVI 2022 Venezuela (53,3%) sebagai proksi untuk kerugian yang cukup parah untuk secara masuk akal menimbulkan penyesalan retrospektif; kemiskinan ekstrem tidak sama dengan penyesalan yang diungkapkan. Data orang yang kembali dari MMC menambah dukungan tidak langsung: orang yang kembali masih memperkirakan akan kesulitan memperoleh pendapatan (76%) dan khawatir tentang pangan dan air (57%) sekembalinya ke Venezuela. Krisis Venezuela berubah secara material selama periode 2015 hingga 2025: kondisi pada 2023 hingga 2025 berbeda dari 2016 hingga 2019, dan stabilisasi ekonomi parsial (dolarisasi, penurunan hiperinflasi) telah sedikit mengubah perhitungan kerugian sisi kepasifan. Entri ini secara khusus dibingkai seputar periode krisis 2016 hingga 2023 dan tidak boleh dibaca sebagai pernyataan tentang kondisi di bawah situasi politik tertentu yang sedang berlangsung. Bias seleksi memengaruhi sampel emigran: mereka yang beremigrasi secara sistematis lebih muda, lebih berpendidikan, dan memiliki lebih banyak sumber daya daripada mereka yang bertahan, sehingga perbandingan hasil secara langsung antara kedua kelompok secara metodologis tidak sempurna. Angka regret_delta sebesar -0,273 bersifat arah, bukan presisi; kedua proksi membawa rentang ketidakpastian kira-kira +/- 10 poin persentase.
