Dữ liệu đại diện — không có cuộc khảo sát trực tiếp nào về sự hối tiếc cho quyết định này. Tỷ lệ được lấy từ điểm hài lòng và dữ liệu rào cản tiếp cận thay vì câu hỏi trực tiếp về sự hối tiếc. Xem cảnh báo bên dưới.
Hối hận vì hành động
Ở lại quá hạn visa
44%
~44% đại lượng thay thế về sẽ-làm-lại (KHÔNG phải hối tiếc đặc-thù-với-việc-ở-lại-quá-hạn): 56% những người nhập cư không giấy tờ có khả năng cao cho biết họ vẫn sẽ chọn chuyển đến Mỹ nếu có thể quay ngược thời gian (giảm từ 72% năm 2023), nên 44% thì không — một phép đo về hối-tiếc-nhập-cư dưới áp lực thực thi tăng cao năm 2025, không phải hối tiếc về việc ở-lại-quá-hạn thị thực một cách cụ thể
Người nhập cư có khả năng không giấy tờ ở Mỹ (bao gồm quá hạn visa)
khảo sát hồi cứu, tháng 8–10/2025
Hối hận vì không hành động
Rời đi đúng hạn, tuân thủ điều kiện visa
9,0%
~35% đại lượng thay thế được mô hình hóa (không tồn tại khảo sát trực tiếp): được suy diễn từ nghiên cứu di-cư-hồi-hương, trong đó khoảng một-phần-ba người di cư hồi hương mô tả việc trở về của họ là không-tự-nguyện hoặc bị hối tiếc, kết hợp với phát hiện của KFF rằng 70% người nhập cư cho biết họ vẫn sẽ chuyển đến Mỹ. Không có khảo sát nào đo lường hối tiếc trong số những người thực sự đã rời khỏi Mỹ khi thị thực hết hạn
Công dân nước ngoài đã rời Mỹ khi hết hạn visa và ước họ có thể ở lại
proxy hồi cứu, 2025
% hối tiếc về lựa chọn này
Ở lại quá hạn visaRời đi đúng hạn, tuân thủ điều kiện visa
44%9,0%
action dominates — Hành động chiếm ưu thế — hầu hết hối tiếc vì đã hành động.
Quyết định liên quan
Các quyết định tương tự về mặt ngữ nghĩa — cùng lĩnh vực, đánh đổi khác nhau.
The KFF/New York Times 2025 Survey of Immigrants (n = 1,805, conducted August
to October 2025) found that 56% of likely undocumented immigrants in the US
say they would still choose to come to America if they could go back in time,
down from 72% in 2023. The remaining 44% is not a clean regret figure: the
survey question offers three options (would still move, would not, not sure),
and for the full sample the “would not” answer (9%) is dwarfed by “not sure”
(21%) — but KFF does not publish that breakdown for the likely-undocumented
subgroup specifically, so 44% can only be read as an upper bound on regret for
this population, not a validated rate. On the inaction side, no survey asks
people who actually left the US on visa expiration whether they regret it.
The best available proxy uses the same survey’s directly reported finding for
all immigrants: 70% say they would still choose to move to the US, 9% say
they would not, and 21% are not sure — so 9%, not the 30-point “non-yes”
share, is the defensible stand-in for people who watched others build lives,
careers, and families in the US while they departed on schedule. Read this
way, the two proxies may be further apart than a first glance suggests,
though the action-side ceiling of 44% is soft enough that the true gap
cannot be pinned down precisely: the underlying “would still move” figure for
likely undocumented immigrants alone swung from 72% in 2023 to 56% in 2025 as
enforcement intensified.
The mechanism on each side is structurally different. Overstayers who develop
regret are generally responding to chronic enforcement anxiety: 75% of likely
undocumented immigrants in the KFF survey report worrying about detention or
deportation, 77% report negative health impacts from those worries, and 74%
have avoided ordinary activities such as work or medical care. These costs are
ongoing and compounding. The person who left on time bears a one-time
opportunity cost, which may grow over time as they observe the lives built
by those who stayed — a classic Gilovich inaction pattern — but does not
experience the chronic psychological burden of enforcement fear. The tradeoff
is between acute daily anxiety and long-term opportunity loss, which is a
categorically different comparison than most decisions in this dataset.
Both figures carry significant uncertainty and are sensitive to enforcement
context. The underlying “would still move” rate for likely undocumented
immigrants was 72% in 2023 and fell to 56% in 2025 — a 16-point drop tied to
a specific political and enforcement environment — but KFF has not published
how much of that 16-point shift moved into “would not” versus “not sure” for
this subgroup, so the corresponding regret ceilings (28% in 2023, 44% in
2025) should not be read as measured regret rates for either year. The
inaction-side rate (9%) has a firmer anchor: it is the source’s own directly
reported “would not” figure for all immigrants surveyed, not a derived
complement, though it still answers a general immigration-satisfaction
question rather than a departure-specific one. Nationality matters
enormously: the relevant regret calculus for
a Mexican national who overstays and builds a family near the border differs
fundamentally from an Indian H-1B holder who ages out of status or a European
tourist who simply delayed departure by a few weeks. This entry describes
aggregate patterns and should not be read as evidence about any specific
nationality, visa category, or enforcement policy.
Nguồn: hành động
Sổ cái xác nhận
Mỗi con số dưới đây là những gì mỗi nguồn đã báo cáo, cùng với trích dẫn nguyên văn mà chúng tôi dựa vào và cách chúng tôi đưa ra con số của mình. Nhấp vào bất kỳ liên kết nào để xác minh trực tiếp.
[1]Kaiser Family Foundation / New York Times — KFF/New York Times 2025 Survey of Immigrants: Worries and Experiences Amid Increased Immigration Enforcement↗ 1 other entry
Nghiên cứu chính
75% of likely undocumented immigrants worry about detention or deportation; 77% report negative health impacts from immigration-related worries; 56% say they would still move to the US if they could go back in time (down from 72% in 2023); the source's full-sample breakdown of the same question shows non-yes answers split 9% would-not / 21% not-sure, but does not publish that split for the undocumented subgroup, so the 44% non-yes share for this subgroup is an upper bound on regret, not a validated rate
Trích đoạn
“"Four in ten (41%) immigrants say they personally worry they or a family member could be detained or deported, with worries most pronounced among likely undocumented immigrants (75%). Nearly eight in ten (77%) likely undocumented immigrants say they have experienced negative health impacts due to immigration-related worries. 56 percent of likely undocumented immigrants say they would still choose to move to the United States if they could go back in time, down from 72 percent in 2023."
”
Dữ liệu nguồn từ
2025-11-01
Truy cập
2026-05-09
Tính toán
KFF/NYT survey conducted August 28 – October 20, 2025, n = 1,805 immigrant adults, nationally representative probability-based sample, with oversampling of likely undocumented immigrants (n ~300-400 subgroup). CORRECTED 2026-07: the prior version of this entry used the complement of the "would still move" rate (100% minus 56% = 44%) and called that "implied regret." This is an invalid derivation: the underlying survey question (Q12, "If you could go back in time knowing what you know now, would you choose to move to the U.S.?") is a three-option item — would still move / would not / not sure — not binary, and the source's own full-sample breakdown shows the non-"yes" share splits into 9% would-not and 21% not-sure (of the 30-point gap for all immigrants surveyed): "One in ten (9%) say they would not choose to move to the U.S. if they could go back in time, and one in five (21%) say they are not sure." Most of the "non-yes" share is uncertainty, not dissent. No breakdown of would-not vs. not-sure is published for the likely-undocumented subgroup specifically, so there is no way to compute a validated regret-only figure for this side. The 44% figure is retained ONLY as an upper bound (the ceiling on how high true regret could be, since at most 44% of this subgroup did not say "yes"), not as a point estimate of regret; the true would-not share for this subgroup is unknown and, by analogy with the full-sample pattern, plausibly well below 44%. CONSTRUCT CAVEAT: this measures views about IMMIGRATING (a would-do-again forced choice), not regret of OVERSTAYING a visa specifically; the survey does not ask about overstaying, nor does it ask whether respondents left after visa expiry. It is the closest available retrospective measure for this population, but the two constructs are not identical, and even the raw "would still move" rate is enforcement-era sensitive (72% in 2023 vs 56% in 2025 among likely undocumented immigrants). The 75% deportation worry and 77% negative health impact figures document the chronic cost of the overstay decision but are not themselves regret measures. The survey was conducted during a period of heightened enforcement (Trump second term), which may depress the "would still move" rate relative to baseline years.
[2]US Department of Homeland Security / US Customs and Border Protection — Entry/Exit Overstay Report, Fiscal Year 2023
Báo cáo chính phủ
FY2023 suspected in-country overstay rate: 1.02% of 39 million expected departures; 399,708 suspected in-country overstays
Trích đoạn
“"By May 1, 2024, the number of Suspected In-Country Overstays for FY 2023 decreased to 399,708, resulting in a Suspected In-Country Overstay rate of 1.02 percent of the 39,005,712 expected departures. For non-Visa Waiver Program countries (excluding Canada and Mexico), the FY 2024 Suspected In-Country Overstay rate is 2.22 percent."
”
Dữ liệu nguồn từ
2024-10-01
Truy cập
2026-05-09
Tính toán
DHS Entry/Exit Overstay Report FY2023. Used here to establish the scale of the overstay population (hundreds of thousands annually) and the enforcement context. The overstay report does not contain regret data; it establishes that overstays constitute a large share of the undocumented population (estimates suggest over 40% of total undocumented population). Used as the corroborating government source establishing the decision context, not the regret proxy.
Nguồn: không hành động
Sổ cái xác nhận
Mỗi con số dưới đây là những gì mỗi nguồn đã báo cáo, cùng với trích dẫn nguyên văn mà chúng tôi dựa vào và cách chúng tôi đưa ra con số của mình. Nhấp vào bất kỳ liên kết nào để xác minh trực tiếp.
[1]Kaiser Family Foundation / New York Times — KFF/New York Times 2025 Survey of Immigrants: Worries and Experiences Amid Increased Immigration Enforcement↗ 1 other entry
Nghiên cứu chính
Among all immigrants surveyed, large majorities say key aspects of their lives are better as a result of moving to the US (educational opportunities 74%, financial situation 70%, employment 65%); on whether they would still choose to move to the US if they could go back in time, 70% say yes, 9% say no, and 21% are not sure — the 9% figure is the source's directly reported would-not rate, not a derived complement
Trích đoạn
“"About two-thirds or more immigrants say the educational opportunities for themselves or their children (74%), their financial situation (70%), and their employment situation (65%) are better as a result of moving to the U.S. Seven in ten (70%) immigrants say they would still choose to move to the U.S. One in ten (9%) say they would not choose to move to the U.S. if they could go back in time, and one in five (21%) say they are not sure. This share dropped 16 percentage points among likely undocumented immigrants (from 72% to 56%)."
”
Dữ liệu nguồn từ
2025-11-01
Truy cập
2026-05-09
Tính toán
The inaction regret proxy (those who left on time but wish they had stayed) is the hardest side to anchor empirically. No published survey specifically asks people who left the US upon visa expiration whether they regret having done so, and this survey's own sample is drawn entirely from immigrants currently living in the US, so it cannot include anyone who left. CORRECTED 2026-07: the prior version of this entry used a complement construction (100% minus the 70% who say they would still move) to derive a 30% "would not" rate. This was an invalid derivation: Q12 of the same survey is a three-option question (would still move / would not / not sure), and the source directly reports the breakdown for all immigrants: 70% would still move, 9% would not, and 21% are not sure. Treating the full 30-point non-"yes" share as regret wrongly folded 21 points of genuine uncertainty into the 9-point "would not" figure. The 0.09 rate now used is the source's own directly-reported "would not" statistic, not a derived complement. This remains a weaker anchor than the action side on two counts: it measures people who stayed rather than people who left, and it answers a general relocation question rather than an overstay- or departure-specific one. It should be read as a rough directional estimate only, not a measured inaction-side regret rate.
[2]Pew Research Center — What we know about unauthorized immigrants living in the U.S.
Nguồn tham khảo
The US unauthorized immigrant population grew to 11.0 million in 2022, with 8.3 million in the workforce — a large, economically embedded population, establishing the scale and pull factor against which a leave-on-time decision is weighed
Trích đoạn
“"The unauthorized immigrant population in the United States grew to 11.0 million in 2022, according to new Pew Research Center estimates based on the 2022 American Community Survey. The number of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. workforce grew from 7.4 million in 2019 to 8.3 million in 2022."
”
Dữ liệu nguồn từ
2024-07-22
Truy cập
2026-05-09
Tính toán
Pew Research Center overview of the unauthorized immigrant population. Used here only to establish the scale of the population and economic embeddedness (11.0 million people, 8.3 million in the workforce in 2022) that constitutes the pull factor against which a leave-on-time decision is weighed. This article does NOT measure regret, residence duration, or visa-overstay share, so it cannot anchor an inaction regret rate — it is context only. The 0.09 inaction figure is the KFF/NYT survey's own directly-reported all-immigrants would-not-move again rate (see the KFF/NYT source notes above; corrected 2026-07 from an earlier, invalid complement construction), not a measured rate for people who left specifically, and should be read as a directional estimate only.
Lưu ý
PROXY MEASUREMENTS ON BOTH SIDES, AND NEITHER IS A CLEAN REGRET RATE — the regret_delta of 0.35 should be read with caution; both figures are proxies for a "would you do this again" question about immigrating in general, not about overstaying or leaving a visa specifically. CORRECTED 2026-07: earlier versions of this entry derived both regret rates as the complement of a "would still move to the US" percentage (100% minus that share). This is invalid, because the underlying KFF/NYT question (Q12) offers three options — would still move / would not / not sure — and the source's own full-sample breakdown shows most of the "non-yes" share is "not sure" (21%), not "would not" (9%), out of a 30-point non-yes total for all immigrants. The inaction-side rate (now 0.09) has been corrected to the source's directly reported "would not" figure for all immigrants surveyed, since that population matches this side's proxy population exactly. The action-side rate (0.44) could NOT be similarly corrected, because the source does not publish a would-not/not-sure breakdown for the "likely undocumented" subgroup specifically — only the "would still move" share (56%, down from 72% in 2023) is reported for that subgroup. The 0.44 figure is therefore retained only as an upper bound on regret for that subgroup (the most regret could possibly be, given 56% said yes), not a point estimate; the true would-not share for likely undocumented immigrants is unknown and, by analogy with the all-immigrants pattern, plausibly well below 44%. This means the true gap between the two sides could be smaller than 0.35, or could still favor action-side regret being higher — the data simply does not resolve this precisely. The two populations remain structurally non-comparable on top of this: the action side is measured among people currently in the US who chose to overstay and face enforcement pressure, while the inaction side is estimated from the population of people who left and for whom no systematic survey exists. The concept of "overstay vs leave" is also not a single discrete decision for most people: overstays often accumulate incrementally as people delay departure week by week in response to changing circumstances, making a retrospective regret framing less clean than for other decisions in this dataset. Nationality matters significantly: overstay rates and economic motivations differ enormously by country of origin, with Mexican, Central American, and South Asian overstay dynamics differing substantially from European or East Asian visa holders. The entry should not be cited as evidence for any specific immigration enforcement policy position; it describes experienced outcomes and expressed preferences, not normative recommendations.
