Dữ liệu đại diện — không có cuộc khảo sát trực tiếp nào về sự hối tiếc cho quyết định này. Tỷ lệ được lấy từ điểm hài lòng và dữ liệu rào cản tiếp cận thay vì câu hỏi trực tiếp về sự hối tiếc. Xem cảnh báo bên dưới.
Hối hận vì hành động
Di cư khỏi Venezuela
26%
~26% người di cư Venezuela đã trở về không thể kiếm sống ở nước sở tại -- một proxy về kết quả khó khăn ở nước ngoài, không phải tỷ lệ tự khai báo hối tiếc về việc ra đi
Người Venezuela di cư ở Colombia, Peru, Chile và Ecuador
hồi cứu, 2022-2023
Hối hận vì không hành động
Ở lại Venezuela trong khủng hoảng
53%
~53% người Venezuela ở lại sống trong cảnh nghèo cùng cực năm 2022 (thu nhập quá thấp để mua một giỏ thực phẩm cơ bản) -- một proxy về kết quả khó khăn ở nước ngoài, không phải tỷ lệ tự khai báo hối tiếc
Người Venezuela ở lại Venezuela trong cuộc khủng hoảng kinh tế và chính trị 2016-2023
hàng năm, 2016-2023; ước tính chính từ khảo sát 2022
% hối tiếc về lựa chọn này
Di cư khỏi VenezuelaỞ lại Venezuela trong khủng hoảng
26%53%
inaction dominates — Không hành động chiếm ưu thế — hầu hết hối tiếc vì đã không hành động.
Quyết định liên quan
Các quyết định tương tự về mặt ngữ nghĩa — cùng lĩnh vực, đánh đổi khác nhau.
Venezuela’s post-2015 economic collapse produced the largest displacement in Western Hemisphere history outside of armed conflict: 7.7 million Venezuelans had left by 2023, driven by hyperinflation, food insecurity, and political instability. ENCOVI’s 2022 National Survey of Living Conditions — the principal independent social measurement instrument in Venezuela — found that 53.3 percent of the population was living in extreme poverty (income too low to buy a basic food basket), down from 68 percent in 2021, with income poverty at 81.5 percent. The extreme-poverty rate constitutes the inaction-side harm proxy: the share of the staying population experiencing outcomes severe enough that, given counterfactual access to emigration, most would plausibly retrospectively have preferred to leave. It is an outcome proxy, not a measured regret rate — no survey directly asks Venezuelans who stayed whether they regret not emigrating. The Mixed Migration Centre’s 4Mi returnee data add circumstantial support: even returnees who reached Venezuela expect to struggle for an income (76 percent) and worry about access to food and water (57 percent).
The action side captures a real and significant cost. In the Mixed Migration Centre’s 4Mi survey of Venezuelan returnees (n=269), 71 percent said their return was partly driven by problems in the host country — including 26 percent who could not generate enough income to settle there — while only 18 percent returned because they had achieved their goals abroad. That 26 percent hardship-abroad figure is the action-side proxy: it measures difficulty making a living among people who gave up on emigration, not a self-reported “I should not have left” regret rate. The leading stated motivation for return was actually family reunification (81 percent) and homesickness (63 percent), with failure to integrate into the host country (23 percent) and inability to regularise status (22 percent) among the structural push factors. Most Venezuelan emigrants who remain abroad do not return at all, so the proxy captures a hardship subset rather than population-wide regret.
The regret_delta of -0.273 captures a genuine asymmetry: the documented harm rate of staying (53.3 percent extreme poverty) exceeds the documented hardship rate among returnees who left (26 percent unable to make a living abroad), consistent with the Gilovich inaction-dominance pattern and the temporal logic of crisis migration. In the short term, emigration is costly: the route is arduous, early months abroad are disorienting, and social status often drops sharply. Over time, however, those who left and established themselves in receiving countries typically ratify the decision through downward counterfactual thinking — imagining the extreme poverty, food insecurity, and institutional collapse they avoided. Those who stayed and experienced those conditions face the inverse. Both proxies carry uncertainty of approximately plus or minus 10 percentage points, and the crisis has evolved since the 2022 reference year; Venezuelan economic conditions in 2025 are materially different from 2019. The entry describes the crisis period and should not be applied as a forward-looking assessment.
Nguồn: hành động
Sổ cái xác nhận
Mỗi con số dưới đây là những gì mỗi nguồn đã báo cáo, cùng với trích dẫn nguyên văn mà chúng tôi dựa vào và cách chúng tôi đưa ra con số của mình. Nhấp vào bất kỳ liên kết nào để xác minh trực tiếp.
1/2 nguồn được xác minh độc lập đúng từng chữ so với nguồn được trích dẫn
[1]USA for UNHCR / United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) — UNHCR Survey Shows a Third of Displaced Venezuelans in Latin America Could Consider Return
Đã xác minh
Nghiên cứu chính
In a UNHCR survey of 1,288 Venezuelans across six host countries (Jan-Mar 2026), just over a third indicated a possible intention to return home, with 9% considering it within a year. Nearly 60% cited insufficient reliable information about conditions on return as a barrier.
Trích đoạn
“[Verbatim from USA for UNHCR, 2026-04-17.] "Between January and March 2026, UNHCR interviewed 1,288 Venezuelans in Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala." "Just over one third surveyed indicated a possible intention to return home, with 9 per cent considering it within a year." "Nearly 60 per cent of respondents identified insufficient reliable information about what to expect upon return as a barrier, alongside uncertainty about how returning could affect their legal status in host countries."
”
Dữ liệu nguồn từ
2026-04-17
Truy cập
2026-05-13
Xác minh
Trích đoạn đã được tải lại độc lập và xác nhận đúng từng chữ so với nguồn được trích dẫn trong quá trình kiểm định căn cứ của chúng tôi.
Tính toán
UNHCR return-intentions survey, n=1,288 across six host countries (Jan-Mar 2026), reported via USA for UNHCR. This source measures the share of displaced Venezuelans who would CONSIDER returning (just over one third) -- a return-intention construct, NOT a self-reported regret-about-leaving rate. It is cited here for context: a sizeable minority remain open to return, but the headline action-side proxy (26%) is taken from the MMC 4Mi returnee survey -- the 26% of returnees who "have not been able to generate enough income to settle in their host country" -- which is the most directly verifiable hardship-abroad figure. The previously cited UNHCR figures (n=7,200+, a "26% regret" and "34% would return" breakdown) could not be verified against any published UNHCR survey and were replaced with this verified return-intentions survey.
[2]Mixed Migration Centre — Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions
Nguồn tham khảo
In MMC's 4Mi survey of Venezuelan returnees (n=269), 71% said their return was partly driven by problems in the host country -- including 26% who could not make a living there and 23% who were not integrated into the host country -- while only 18% returned because they had achieved their goals abroad. Family reunification (81%) was the leading stated motivation for return.
Trích đoạn
“[Verbatim from Mixed Migration Centre (2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi data, n=269.] "Only 18% of them reported voluntarily returning to Venezuela because they have achieved their goals in the host country, while 71% mentioned that their return to Venezuela was partly driven by at least one of the following factors: insufficient access to services (27% of all respondents), the impossibility of making a living (26%), [not being] integrated into the host country (23%) or [inability to] regularize their migratory status (22%)." The report adds that "26% of respondents reported that they have not been able to generate enough income to settle in their host country", confirming that hardship abroad -- not recovery in Venezuela -- was the dominant push factor in return.
”
Dữ liệu nguồn từ
2022-12-01
Truy cập
2026-05-13
Tính toán
Mixed Migration Centre (December 2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi survey, n=269 (illustrative, not representative). Cited as corroborating evidence for the action-side hardship mechanism: 71% of returnees were pushed by problems in the host country and only 18% returned because they had achieved their goals there, so the people who give up on emigration are mostly those experiencing worse-than-expected outcomes abroad while conditions at origin remain poor. Note the report's principal STATED motivation for return is family reunification (81%) and homesickness (63%); the economic/structural difficulties are the dominant push factors but are reported alongside, not in place of, those pull factors. The original cite ("Mixed Migration in South America", resource/mixed-migration-in- south-america) 404s and did not match any MMC resource; this is the on-topic MMC report with the verified figures.
Nguồn: không hành động
Sổ cái xác nhận
Mỗi con số dưới đây là những gì mỗi nguồn đã báo cáo, cùng với trích dẫn nguyên văn mà chúng tôi dựa vào và cách chúng tôi đưa ra con số của mình. Nhấp vào bất kỳ liên kết nào để xác minh trực tiếp.
[1]Universidad Andres Bello / UCAB / Universidad Central de Venezuela — Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) 2022
Nghiên cứu chính
ENCOVI 2022 found extreme poverty (income insufficient to buy a basic food basket) at 53.3% of the population, down from 68% in 2021; income poverty stood at 81.5%. ENCOVI is Venezuela's principal independent living-conditions survey.
Trích đoạn
“[Verbatim Spanish from ENCOVI 2022, UCAB, as reported by elucabista.com, 2022-11-10.] "La pobreza extrema, en la que se encuentran aquellos con ingresos insuficientes para adquirir los alimentos basicos, bajo de 68% en 2021 a 53,3% en 2022." The same survey reported that, measured by income level, poverty affected 81.5% of the population in 2022 ("la pobreza afecta a 81,5% de la poblacion"). These figures describe the conditions of those who remained in Venezuela after 2015, when large-scale emigration began. ENCOVI is the primary independent social measurement instrument in Venezuela, conducted by Venezuelan universities led by UCAB.
”
Dữ liệu nguồn từ
2022-11-10
Truy cập
2026-05-13
Tính toán
ENCOVI (Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida) 2022, UCAB, Venezuela. The inaction-side proxy uses the extreme-poverty rate (53.3% in 2022, the survey's reference year) as an outcome anchor for the hardship of staying, NOT a measured regret rate. Extreme poverty -- income too low to buy a basic food basket -- is a crisis condition, but it is not the same as expressed regret about not emigrating; no direct "do you regret not having emigrated" survey of Venezuelans who stayed exists. The earlier draft used "61%", which does not appear in ENCOVI 2022; the verified 2022 extreme- poverty figure is 53.3% (down from 68% in 2021). Income poverty (81.5%) is reported for context but is a broader, less severe band.
[2]Mixed Migration Centre — Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions
Nguồn tham khảo
Among Venezuelan returnees (MMC 4Mi, n=269), 57% returned while still concerned about access to basics such as food and water in Venezuela, and 28% perceived their return as a failure -- circumstantial evidence that conditions for those who stay remain harsh. Of returnees, 47% planned to stay in the next two years while 27% intended to migrate again.
Trích đoạn
“[Verbatim from Mixed Migration Centre (2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi data, n=269.] "Most respondents (76%) report that securing an income will be the main challenge after their return. 57% are returning while still concerned about access to the very basics such as food and water, in Venezuela." "28% of Venezuelan refugees and migrants perceived their return to Venezuela as a failure and with shame." On future plans, "47% of respondents reported they will be staying in the place that they left [the next two years]. However, 27% said that they intend to migrate again."
”
Dữ liệu nguồn từ
2022-12-01
Truy cập
2026-05-13
Tính toán
Mixed Migration Centre (December 2022), 4Mi returnee survey, n=269. Used as second-order circumstantial evidence for the inaction-side proxy: even returnees who reached Venezuela expect to fight for an income (76%) and worry about food and water (57%), and a notable share (27%) already plan to leave again -- consistent with the inference that conditions for those who stay remain severe. The earlier draft cited a UNHCR figure ("only 20% planned to stay permanently; 80% planned to re-emigrate") that could not be verified against any published UNHCR report and is contradicted by the closest real returnee data (MMC: 47% intend to stay, 27% intend to re-migrate over the next two years); it was replaced with this verified MMC figure. This does not directly measure regret among those who never emigrated.
Lưu ý
PROXY MEASUREMENTS ON BOTH SIDES. The proxy_only flag reflects the structural barriers to bilateral regret surveys in a crisis context: no published study directly asks Venezuelans who stayed whether they regret not having emigrated, and no published survey reports a self-reported "I should not have left" rate for emigrants either. The action-side 26% is the MMC 4Mi share of returnees who could not generate enough income to settle in their host country -- a hardship-abroad outcome among people who gave up on emigration, NOT a self-reported regret-about-leaving rate; most emigrants who remain abroad do not return at all. The inaction-side ~53% uses Venezuela's ENCOVI 2022 extreme-poverty rate (53.3%) as a proxy for harm severe enough to plausibly generate retrospective regret; extreme poverty is not the same as expressed regret. The MMC returnee data add circumstantial support: returnees still expect to struggle for an income (76%) and worry about food and water (57%) back in Venezuela. The Venezuelan crisis changed materially over the period 2015 to 2025: conditions in 2023 to 2025 differ from 2016 to 2019, and partial economic stabilisation (dollarisation, reduced hyperinflation) has altered the inaction-side harm calculus somewhat. The entry is specifically framed around the 2016 to 2023 crisis period and should not be read as a statement about conditions under any specific ongoing political situation. Selection bias affects the emigrant sample: those who emigrated were systematically younger, better- educated, and had more resources than those who stayed, making direct outcome comparison across the two groups methodologically imperfect. The regret_delta of -0.273 is directional rather than precise; both proxies carry uncertainty ranges of approximately +/- 10 percentage points.
