Venezuela verlaten tijdens de economische en politieke crisis vs. blijven
Als je handelt
Emigreren uit Venezuela
26%
Als je niets doet
In Venezuela blijven tijdens de crisis
53%
Percentage dat later spijt heeft van elke keuze. De balken en het volledige overzicht staan hieronder.
Levensstijl
Laatst beoordeeld 2026-05-13
Kwaliteit van bewijs 4.5/5
Beoordelingsscore op acht dimensies volgens de
kwaliteitsrubriek
. Elke dimensie krijgt een score van 1 tot 5.
D1 Bronverificatie
4/5
D2 Autoriteit en onafhankelijkheid van bronnen
5/5
D3 Nauwkeurigheid van spijtcijfer
5/5
D4 Vergelijkbaarheid van bronnen
5/5
D5 Gilovich-patroon
4/5
D6 Prozakwaliteit
4/5
D7 Volledigheid van voorbehouden
4/5
D8 Steekproefkwaliteit
5/5
Gemiddelde4.5/5
Proxygegevens — er bestaat geen directe spijtenquête voor deze beslissing. De percentages zijn afgeleid van tevredenheidsscores en toegangsdrempelgegevens in plaats van vragen die direct naar spijt vroegen. Zie opmerkingen hieronder.
Spijt van handelen
Emigreren uit Venezuela
26%
~26% van de Venezolaanse migranten die terugkeerden kon geen inkomen verwerven in hun gastland -- een proxy voor de uitkomst van ontbering in het buitenland, geen zelfgerapporteerd spijt-over-vertrek-percentage
Venezolaanse emigranten in Colombia, Peru, Chili en Ecuador
retrospectief, 2022-2023
Spijt van nalaten
In Venezuela blijven tijdens de crisis
53%
~53% van de Venezolanen die bleven leefde in 2022 in extreme armoede (inkomen te laag voor een basisvoedselpakket) -- een proxy voor de uitkomst van ontbering, geen zelfgerapporteerd spijtpercentage
Venezolanen die in Venezuela bleven tijdens de 2016-2023 economische en politieke crisis
jaarlijks, 2016-2023; primaire schatting uit 2022 enquête
% betreurt deze keuze
Emigreren uit VenezuelaIn Venezuela blijven tijdens de crisis
26%53%
inaction dominates — Niets doen domineert — de meesten hebben spijt dat ze niet handelden.
Gerelateerde keuzes
Semantisch vergelijkbare keuzes — zelfde terrein, andere afwegingen.
Je geboorteplaats verlatenDicht bij waar je opgroeide blijven
20%30%
Niet-handelen overheerst
Spijt over niet-handelen 1.5× hoger
Venezuela’s post-2015 economic collapse produced the largest displacement in Western Hemisphere history outside of armed conflict: 7.7 million Venezuelans had left by 2023, driven by hyperinflation, food insecurity, and political instability. ENCOVI’s 2022 National Survey of Living Conditions — the principal independent social measurement instrument in Venezuela — found that 53.3 percent of the population was living in extreme poverty (income too low to buy a basic food basket), down from 68 percent in 2021, with income poverty at 81.5 percent. The extreme-poverty rate constitutes the inaction-side harm proxy: the share of the staying population experiencing outcomes severe enough that, given counterfactual access to emigration, most would plausibly retrospectively have preferred to leave. It is an outcome proxy, not a measured regret rate — no survey directly asks Venezuelans who stayed whether they regret not emigrating. The Mixed Migration Centre’s 4Mi returnee data add circumstantial support: even returnees who reached Venezuela expect to struggle for an income (76 percent) and worry about access to food and water (57 percent).
The action side captures a real and significant cost. In the Mixed Migration Centre’s 4Mi survey of Venezuelan returnees (n=269), 71 percent said their return was partly driven by problems in the host country — including 26 percent who could not generate enough income to settle there — while only 18 percent returned because they had achieved their goals abroad. That 26 percent hardship-abroad figure is the action-side proxy: it measures difficulty making a living among people who gave up on emigration, not a self-reported “I should not have left” regret rate. The leading stated motivation for return was actually family reunification (81 percent) and homesickness (63 percent), with failure to integrate into the host country (23 percent) and inability to regularise status (22 percent) among the structural push factors. Most Venezuelan emigrants who remain abroad do not return at all, so the proxy captures a hardship subset rather than population-wide regret.
The regret_delta of -0.273 captures a genuine asymmetry: the documented harm rate of staying (53.3 percent extreme poverty) exceeds the documented hardship rate among returnees who left (26 percent unable to make a living abroad), consistent with the Gilovich inaction-dominance pattern and the temporal logic of crisis migration. In the short term, emigration is costly: the route is arduous, early months abroad are disorienting, and social status often drops sharply. Over time, however, those who left and established themselves in receiving countries typically ratify the decision through downward counterfactual thinking — imagining the extreme poverty, food insecurity, and institutional collapse they avoided. Those who stayed and experienced those conditions face the inverse. Both proxies carry uncertainty of approximately plus or minus 10 percentage points, and the crisis has evolved since the 2022 reference year; Venezuelan economic conditions in 2025 are materially different from 2019. The entry describes the crisis period and should not be applied as a forward-looking assessment.
Bronnen: handelen
Bronnenverantwoording
Elk getal hieronder is wat elke bron rapporteerde, met het letterlijke citaat waarop we ons baseerden en hoe we tot ons cijfer kwamen. Klik op een link om rechtstreeks te verifiëren.
1/2 bronnen onafhankelijk woordelijk geverifieerd tegenover de geciteerde bron
[1]USA for UNHCR / United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) — UNHCR Survey Shows a Third of Displaced Venezuelans in Latin America Could Consider Return
Geverifieerd
Primaire studie
In a UNHCR survey of 1,288 Venezuelans across six host countries (Jan-Mar 2026), just over a third indicated a possible intention to return home, with 9% considering it within a year. Nearly 60% cited insufficient reliable information about conditions on return as a barrier.
Fragment
“[Verbatim from USA for UNHCR, 2026-04-17.] "Between January and March 2026, UNHCR interviewed 1,288 Venezuelans in Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala." "Just over one third surveyed indicated a possible intention to return home, with 9 per cent considering it within a year." "Nearly 60 per cent of respondents identified insufficient reliable information about what to expect upon return as a barrier, alongside uncertainty about how returning could affect their legal status in host countries."
”
Brongegevens van
2026-04-17
Geraadpleegd
2026-05-13
Verificatie
Fragment onafhankelijk opnieuw opgehaald en woord voor woord bevestigd tegenover de geciteerde bron tijdens onze onderbouwingsaudit.
Berekening
UNHCR return-intentions survey, n=1,288 across six host countries (Jan-Mar 2026), reported via USA for UNHCR. This source measures the share of displaced Venezuelans who would CONSIDER returning (just over one third) -- a return-intention construct, NOT a self-reported regret-about-leaving rate. It is cited here for context: a sizeable minority remain open to return, but the headline action-side proxy (26%) is taken from the MMC 4Mi returnee survey -- the 26% of returnees who "have not been able to generate enough income to settle in their host country" -- which is the most directly verifiable hardship-abroad figure. The previously cited UNHCR figures (n=7,200+, a "26% regret" and "34% would return" breakdown) could not be verified against any published UNHCR survey and were replaced with this verified return-intentions survey.
[2]Mixed Migration Centre — Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions
Gerenommeerde referentie
In MMC's 4Mi survey of Venezuelan returnees (n=269), 71% said their return was partly driven by problems in the host country -- including 26% who could not make a living there and 23% who were not integrated into the host country -- while only 18% returned because they had achieved their goals abroad. Family reunification (81%) was the leading stated motivation for return.
Fragment
“[Verbatim from Mixed Migration Centre (2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi data, n=269.] "Only 18% of them reported voluntarily returning to Venezuela because they have achieved their goals in the host country, while 71% mentioned that their return to Venezuela was partly driven by at least one of the following factors: insufficient access to services (27% of all respondents), the impossibility of making a living (26%), [not being] integrated into the host country (23%) or [inability to] regularize their migratory status (22%)." The report adds that "26% of respondents reported that they have not been able to generate enough income to settle in their host country", confirming that hardship abroad -- not recovery in Venezuela -- was the dominant push factor in return.
”
Brongegevens van
2022-12-01
Geraadpleegd
2026-05-13
Berekening
Mixed Migration Centre (December 2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi survey, n=269 (illustrative, not representative). Cited as corroborating evidence for the action-side hardship mechanism: 71% of returnees were pushed by problems in the host country and only 18% returned because they had achieved their goals there, so the people who give up on emigration are mostly those experiencing worse-than-expected outcomes abroad while conditions at origin remain poor. Note the report's principal STATED motivation for return is family reunification (81%) and homesickness (63%); the economic/structural difficulties are the dominant push factors but are reported alongside, not in place of, those pull factors. The original cite ("Mixed Migration in South America", resource/mixed-migration-in- south-america) 404s and did not match any MMC resource; this is the on-topic MMC report with the verified figures.
Bronnen: niet handelen
Bronnenverantwoording
Elk getal hieronder is wat elke bron rapporteerde, met het letterlijke citaat waarop we ons baseerden en hoe we tot ons cijfer kwamen. Klik op een link om rechtstreeks te verifiëren.
[1]Universidad Andres Bello / UCAB / Universidad Central de Venezuela — Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) 2022
Primaire studie
ENCOVI 2022 found extreme poverty (income insufficient to buy a basic food basket) at 53.3% of the population, down from 68% in 2021; income poverty stood at 81.5%. ENCOVI is Venezuela's principal independent living-conditions survey.
Fragment
“[Verbatim Spanish from ENCOVI 2022, UCAB, as reported by elucabista.com, 2022-11-10.] "La pobreza extrema, en la que se encuentran aquellos con ingresos insuficientes para adquirir los alimentos basicos, bajo de 68% en 2021 a 53,3% en 2022." The same survey reported that, measured by income level, poverty affected 81.5% of the population in 2022 ("la pobreza afecta a 81,5% de la poblacion"). These figures describe the conditions of those who remained in Venezuela after 2015, when large-scale emigration began. ENCOVI is the primary independent social measurement instrument in Venezuela, conducted by Venezuelan universities led by UCAB.
”
Brongegevens van
2022-11-10
Geraadpleegd
2026-05-13
Berekening
ENCOVI (Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida) 2022, UCAB, Venezuela. The inaction-side proxy uses the extreme-poverty rate (53.3% in 2022, the survey's reference year) as an outcome anchor for the hardship of staying, NOT a measured regret rate. Extreme poverty -- income too low to buy a basic food basket -- is a crisis condition, but it is not the same as expressed regret about not emigrating; no direct "do you regret not having emigrated" survey of Venezuelans who stayed exists. The earlier draft used "61%", which does not appear in ENCOVI 2022; the verified 2022 extreme- poverty figure is 53.3% (down from 68% in 2021). Income poverty (81.5%) is reported for context but is a broader, less severe band.
[2]Mixed Migration Centre — Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions
Gerenommeerde referentie
Among Venezuelan returnees (MMC 4Mi, n=269), 57% returned while still concerned about access to basics such as food and water in Venezuela, and 28% perceived their return as a failure -- circumstantial evidence that conditions for those who stay remain harsh. Of returnees, 47% planned to stay in the next two years while 27% intended to migrate again.
Fragment
“[Verbatim from Mixed Migration Centre (2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi data, n=269.] "Most respondents (76%) report that securing an income will be the main challenge after their return. 57% are returning while still concerned about access to the very basics such as food and water, in Venezuela." "28% of Venezuelan refugees and migrants perceived their return to Venezuela as a failure and with shame." On future plans, "47% of respondents reported they will be staying in the place that they left [the next two years]. However, 27% said that they intend to migrate again."
”
Brongegevens van
2022-12-01
Geraadpleegd
2026-05-13
Berekening
Mixed Migration Centre (December 2022), 4Mi returnee survey, n=269. Used as second-order circumstantial evidence for the inaction-side proxy: even returnees who reached Venezuela expect to fight for an income (76%) and worry about food and water (57%), and a notable share (27%) already plan to leave again -- consistent with the inference that conditions for those who stay remain severe. The earlier draft cited a UNHCR figure ("only 20% planned to stay permanently; 80% planned to re-emigrate") that could not be verified against any published UNHCR report and is contradicted by the closest real returnee data (MMC: 47% intend to stay, 27% intend to re-migrate over the next two years); it was replaced with this verified MMC figure. This does not directly measure regret among those who never emigrated.
Kanttekeningen
PROXY-METINGEN AAN BEIDE KANTEN. De proxy_only-markering weerspiegelt de structurele belemmeringen voor tweezijdige spijtenquêtes in een crisiscontext: geen gepubliceerde studie vraagt Venezolanen die bleven rechtstreeks of ze spijt hebben dat ze niet zijn geëmigreerd, en geen gepubliceerde enquête rapporteert een zelfgerapporteerd "ik had niet moeten vertrekken"-percentage voor emigranten evenmin. De actiekant van 26% is het MMC 4Mi-aandeel van terugkeerders dat niet genoeg inkomen kon genereren om zich in hun gastland te vestigen -- een uitkomst van ontbering in het buitenland onder mensen die de emigratie opgaven, NIET een zelfgerapporteerd spijt-over-vertrek-percentage; de meeste emigranten die in het buitenland blijven, keren helemaal niet terug. De inactiekant van ~53% gebruikt Venezuela's ENCOVI 2022 extreme-armoedepercentage (53,3%) als proxy voor schade die ernstig genoeg is om aannemelijk retrospectieve spijt te genereren; extreme armoede is niet hetzelfde als geuite spijt. De MMC-terugkeerdersgegevens voegen indirecte ondersteuning toe: terugkeerders verwachten nog steeds moeite te hebben met een inkomen (76%) en maken zich zorgen over voedsel en water (57%) terug in Venezuela. De Venezolaanse crisis veranderde wezenlijk over de periode 2015 tot 2025: de omstandigheden in 2023 tot 2025 verschillen van 2016 tot 2019, en gedeeltelijke economische stabilisatie (dollarisering, verminderde hyperinflatie) heeft de schadeberekening aan de inactiekant enigszins gewijzigd. Het item is specifiek gekaderd rond de crisisperiode 2016 tot 2023 en mag niet worden gelezen als een uitspraak over de omstandigheden onder een specifieke lopende politieke situatie. Selectievertekening beïnvloedt de emigrantensteekproef: wie emigreerde was systematisch jonger, hoger opgeleid en beschikte over meer middelen dan wie bleef, waardoor directe uitkomstvergelijking tussen de twee groepen methodologisch onvolmaakt is. De regret_delta van -0,273 is richtinggevend in plaats van precies; beide proxy's dragen onzekerheidsmarges van ongeveer +/- 10 procentpunten.
