Quitter le Venezuela pendant la crise économique et politique vs. rester
Si vous agissez
Émigrer du Venezuela
26%
Si vous n’agissez pas
Rester au Venezuela pendant la crise
53%
Pourcentage de personnes qui regrettent ensuite chaque choix. Les barres et le registre complet s’affichent ci-dessous.
Mode de vie
Dernière révision 2026-05-13
Qualité des preuves 4.5/5
Score d’évaluation en huit dimensions selon la
grille de qualité
. Chaque dimension notée de 1 à 5.
D1 Vérification des sources
4/5
D2 Autorité et indépendance des sources
5/5
D3 Précision du taux de regret
5/5
D4 Comparabilité des sources
5/5
D5 Motif de Gilovich
4/5
D6 Qualité de la prose
4/5
D7 Complétude des réserves
4/5
D8 Qualité de l’échantillon
5/5
Moyenne4.5/5
Données de substitution — aucune enquête directe sur les regrets n'existe pour cette décision. Les taux sont dérivés des scores de satisfaction et des obstacles d'accès plutôt que de questions portant directement sur les regrets. Voir les mises en garde ci-dessous.
Regret d'action
Émigrer du Venezuela
26%
~26% des migrants vénézuéliens qui sont retournés au pays ne parvenaient pas à gagner leur vie dans leur pays d'accueil — une approximation de résultat de difficultés à l'étranger, et non un taux autodéclaré de regret d'avoir quitté
Émigrants vénézuéliens en Colombie, Pérou, Chili et Équateur
rétrospective, 2022-2023
Regret d'inaction
Rester au Venezuela pendant la crise
53%
~53% des Vénézuéliens restés au pays vivaient dans l'extrême pauvreté en 2022 (revenu trop bas pour un panier alimentaire de base) — une approximation de résultat de difficultés, et non un taux de regret autodéclaré
Vénézuéliens restés au Venezuela pendant la crise économique et politique 2016-2023
annuel, 2016-2023 ; estimation principale de l'enquête 2022
% regrettent ce choix
Émigrer du VenezuelaRester au Venezuela pendant la crise
26%53%
inaction dominates — L'inaction domine — la plupart regrettent de ne pas avoir agi.
Décisions associées
Décisions sémantiquement similaires — même terrain, compromis différents.
Quitter sa ville nataleRester près de l'endroit où l'on a grandi
20%30%
L'inaction domine
Regret d'inaction 1.5× plus élevé
Venezuela’s post-2015 economic collapse produced the largest displacement in Western Hemisphere history outside of armed conflict: 7.7 million Venezuelans had left by 2023, driven by hyperinflation, food insecurity, and political instability. ENCOVI’s 2022 National Survey of Living Conditions — the principal independent social measurement instrument in Venezuela — found that 53.3 percent of the population was living in extreme poverty (income too low to buy a basic food basket), down from 68 percent in 2021, with income poverty at 81.5 percent. The extreme-poverty rate constitutes the inaction-side harm proxy: the share of the staying population experiencing outcomes severe enough that, given counterfactual access to emigration, most would plausibly retrospectively have preferred to leave. It is an outcome proxy, not a measured regret rate — no survey directly asks Venezuelans who stayed whether they regret not emigrating. The Mixed Migration Centre’s 4Mi returnee data add circumstantial support: even returnees who reached Venezuela expect to struggle for an income (76 percent) and worry about access to food and water (57 percent).
The action side captures a real and significant cost. In the Mixed Migration Centre’s 4Mi survey of Venezuelan returnees (n=269), 71 percent said their return was partly driven by problems in the host country — including 26 percent who could not generate enough income to settle there — while only 18 percent returned because they had achieved their goals abroad. That 26 percent hardship-abroad figure is the action-side proxy: it measures difficulty making a living among people who gave up on emigration, not a self-reported “I should not have left” regret rate. The leading stated motivation for return was actually family reunification (81 percent) and homesickness (63 percent), with failure to integrate into the host country (23 percent) and inability to regularise status (22 percent) among the structural push factors. Most Venezuelan emigrants who remain abroad do not return at all, so the proxy captures a hardship subset rather than population-wide regret.
The regret_delta of -0.273 captures a genuine asymmetry: the documented harm rate of staying (53.3 percent extreme poverty) exceeds the documented hardship rate among returnees who left (26 percent unable to make a living abroad), consistent with the Gilovich inaction-dominance pattern and the temporal logic of crisis migration. In the short term, emigration is costly: the route is arduous, early months abroad are disorienting, and social status often drops sharply. Over time, however, those who left and established themselves in receiving countries typically ratify the decision through downward counterfactual thinking — imagining the extreme poverty, food insecurity, and institutional collapse they avoided. Those who stayed and experienced those conditions face the inverse. Both proxies carry uncertainty of approximately plus or minus 10 percentage points, and the crisis has evolved since the 2022 reference year; Venezuelan economic conditions in 2025 are materially different from 2019. The entry describes the crisis period and should not be applied as a forward-looking assessment.
Sources : action
Registre des sources
Chaque chiffre ci-dessous correspond à ce que la source a rapporté, avec la citation textuelle sur laquelle nous nous sommes appuyés et la méthode de calcul. Cliquez sur un lien pour vérifier directement.
1/2 sources vérifiées de manière indépendante, mot pour mot, par rapport à la source citée
[1]USA for UNHCR / United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) — UNHCR Survey Shows a Third of Displaced Venezuelans in Latin America Could Consider Return
Vérifié
Étude primaire
In a UNHCR survey of 1,288 Venezuelans across six host countries (Jan-Mar 2026), just over a third indicated a possible intention to return home, with 9% considering it within a year. Nearly 60% cited insufficient reliable information about conditions on return as a barrier.
Extrait
“[Verbatim from USA for UNHCR, 2026-04-17.] "Between January and March 2026, UNHCR interviewed 1,288 Venezuelans in Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala." "Just over one third surveyed indicated a possible intention to return home, with 9 per cent considering it within a year." "Nearly 60 per cent of respondents identified insufficient reliable information about what to expect upon return as a barrier, alongside uncertainty about how returning could affect their legal status in host countries."
”
Données source de
2026-04-17
Consulté le
2026-05-13
Vérification
Extrait récupéré et confirmé de manière indépendante, mot pour mot, par rapport à la source citée lors de notre audit de vérification.
Calcul
UNHCR return-intentions survey, n=1,288 across six host countries (Jan-Mar 2026), reported via USA for UNHCR. This source measures the share of displaced Venezuelans who would CONSIDER returning (just over one third) -- a return-intention construct, NOT a self-reported regret-about-leaving rate. It is cited here for context: a sizeable minority remain open to return, but the headline action-side proxy (26%) is taken from the MMC 4Mi returnee survey -- the 26% of returnees who "have not been able to generate enough income to settle in their host country" -- which is the most directly verifiable hardship-abroad figure. The previously cited UNHCR figures (n=7,200+, a "26% regret" and "34% would return" breakdown) could not be verified against any published UNHCR survey and were replaced with this verified return-intentions survey.
[2]Mixed Migration Centre — Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions
Source de référence
In MMC's 4Mi survey of Venezuelan returnees (n=269), 71% said their return was partly driven by problems in the host country -- including 26% who could not make a living there and 23% who were not integrated into the host country -- while only 18% returned because they had achieved their goals abroad. Family reunification (81%) was the leading stated motivation for return.
Extrait
“[Verbatim from Mixed Migration Centre (2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi data, n=269.] "Only 18% of them reported voluntarily returning to Venezuela because they have achieved their goals in the host country, while 71% mentioned that their return to Venezuela was partly driven by at least one of the following factors: insufficient access to services (27% of all respondents), the impossibility of making a living (26%), [not being] integrated into the host country (23%) or [inability to] regularize their migratory status (22%)." The report adds that "26% of respondents reported that they have not been able to generate enough income to settle in their host country", confirming that hardship abroad -- not recovery in Venezuela -- was the dominant push factor in return.
”
Données source de
2022-12-01
Consulté le
2026-05-13
Calcul
Mixed Migration Centre (December 2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi survey, n=269 (illustrative, not representative). Cited as corroborating evidence for the action-side hardship mechanism: 71% of returnees were pushed by problems in the host country and only 18% returned because they had achieved their goals there, so the people who give up on emigration are mostly those experiencing worse-than-expected outcomes abroad while conditions at origin remain poor. Note the report's principal STATED motivation for return is family reunification (81%) and homesickness (63%); the economic/structural difficulties are the dominant push factors but are reported alongside, not in place of, those pull factors. The original cite ("Mixed Migration in South America", resource/mixed-migration-in- south-america) 404s and did not match any MMC resource; this is the on-topic MMC report with the verified figures.
Sources : inaction
Registre des sources
Chaque chiffre ci-dessous correspond à ce que la source a rapporté, avec la citation textuelle sur laquelle nous nous sommes appuyés et la méthode de calcul. Cliquez sur un lien pour vérifier directement.
[1]Universidad Andres Bello / UCAB / Universidad Central de Venezuela — Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) 2022
Étude primaire
ENCOVI 2022 found extreme poverty (income insufficient to buy a basic food basket) at 53.3% of the population, down from 68% in 2021; income poverty stood at 81.5%. ENCOVI is Venezuela's principal independent living-conditions survey.
Extrait
“[Verbatim Spanish from ENCOVI 2022, UCAB, as reported by elucabista.com, 2022-11-10.] "La pobreza extrema, en la que se encuentran aquellos con ingresos insuficientes para adquirir los alimentos basicos, bajo de 68% en 2021 a 53,3% en 2022." The same survey reported that, measured by income level, poverty affected 81.5% of the population in 2022 ("la pobreza afecta a 81,5% de la poblacion"). These figures describe the conditions of those who remained in Venezuela after 2015, when large-scale emigration began. ENCOVI is the primary independent social measurement instrument in Venezuela, conducted by Venezuelan universities led by UCAB.
”
Données source de
2022-11-10
Consulté le
2026-05-13
Calcul
ENCOVI (Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida) 2022, UCAB, Venezuela. The inaction-side proxy uses the extreme-poverty rate (53.3% in 2022, the survey's reference year) as an outcome anchor for the hardship of staying, NOT a measured regret rate. Extreme poverty -- income too low to buy a basic food basket -- is a crisis condition, but it is not the same as expressed regret about not emigrating; no direct "do you regret not having emigrated" survey of Venezuelans who stayed exists. The earlier draft used "61%", which does not appear in ENCOVI 2022; the verified 2022 extreme- poverty figure is 53.3% (down from 68% in 2021). Income poverty (81.5%) is reported for context but is a broader, less severe band.
[2]Mixed Migration Centre — Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions
Source de référence
Among Venezuelan returnees (MMC 4Mi, n=269), 57% returned while still concerned about access to basics such as food and water in Venezuela, and 28% perceived their return as a failure -- circumstantial evidence that conditions for those who stay remain harsh. Of returnees, 47% planned to stay in the next two years while 27% intended to migrate again.
Extrait
“[Verbatim from Mixed Migration Centre (2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi data, n=269.] "Most respondents (76%) report that securing an income will be the main challenge after their return. 57% are returning while still concerned about access to the very basics such as food and water, in Venezuela." "28% of Venezuelan refugees and migrants perceived their return to Venezuela as a failure and with shame." On future plans, "47% of respondents reported they will be staying in the place that they left [the next two years]. However, 27% said that they intend to migrate again."
”
Données source de
2022-12-01
Consulté le
2026-05-13
Calcul
Mixed Migration Centre (December 2022), 4Mi returnee survey, n=269. Used as second-order circumstantial evidence for the inaction-side proxy: even returnees who reached Venezuela expect to fight for an income (76%) and worry about food and water (57%), and a notable share (27%) already plan to leave again -- consistent with the inference that conditions for those who stay remain severe. The earlier draft cited a UNHCR figure ("only 20% planned to stay permanently; 80% planned to re-emigrate") that could not be verified against any published UNHCR report and is contradicted by the closest real returnee data (MMC: 47% intend to stay, 27% intend to re-migrate over the next two years); it was replaced with this verified MMC figure. This does not directly measure regret among those who never emigrated.
Réserves
MESURES INDIRECTES DES DEUX CÔTÉS. Le drapeau proxy_only reflète les obstacles structurels aux enquêtes bilatérales sur le regret dans un contexte de crise : aucune étude publiée ne demande directement aux Vénézuéliens restés au pays s'ils regrettent de ne pas avoir émigré, et aucune enquête publiée ne rapporte non plus un taux autodéclaré du type « je n'aurais pas dû partir » pour les émigrants. Le 26% côté action est la part des personnes retournées au pays selon le MMC 4Mi qui ne parvenaient pas à générer un revenu suffisant pour s'établir dans leur pays d'accueil — un résultat de difficultés à l'étranger chez des personnes ayant renoncé à l'émigration, et NON un taux autodéclaré de regret d'avoir quitté ; la plupart des émigrants qui restent à l'étranger ne rentrent pas du tout. Le ~53% côté inaction utilise le taux d'extrême pauvreté de l'ENCOVI 2022 du Venezuela (53.3%) comme approximation d'un préjudice suffisamment grave pour générer de façon plausible un regret rétrospectif ; l'extrême pauvreté n'est pas la même chose qu'un regret exprimé. Les données du MMC sur les personnes retournées apportent un soutien circonstanciel : celles-ci s'attendent toujours à peiner pour obtenir un revenu (76%) et s'inquiètent de la nourriture et de l'eau (57%) de retour au Venezuela. La crise vénézuélienne a matériellement changé sur la période 2015 à 2025 : les conditions de 2023 à 2025 diffèrent de celles de 2016 à 2019, et une stabilisation économique partielle (dollarisation, hyperinflation réduite) a quelque peu modifié le calcul du préjudice côté inaction. L'entrée est spécifiquement cadrée autour de la période de crise 2016 à 2023 et ne doit pas être lue comme un énoncé sur les conditions d'une situation politique en cours spécifique. Un biais de sélection affecte l'échantillon des émigrants : ceux qui ont émigré étaient systématiquement plus jeunes, mieux éduqués et disposaient de plus de ressources que ceux qui sont restés, rendant la comparaison directe des résultats entre les deux groupes méthodologiquement imparfaite. Le regret_delta de -0.273 est directionnel plutôt que précis ; les deux approximations comportent des marges d'incertitude d'environ +/- 10 points de pourcentage.
