Fuir une zone de conflit versus rester dans son pays d'origine pendant un conflit armé
Si vous agissez
Fuir la zone de conflit
13%
Si vous n’agissez pas
Rester dans la zone de conflit
47%
Pourcentage de personnes qui regrettent ensuite chaque choix. Les barres et le registre complet s’affichent ci-dessous.
Mode de vie
Dernière révision 2026-05-09
Qualité des preuves 3.75/5
Score d’évaluation en huit dimensions selon la
grille de qualité
. Chaque dimension notée de 1 à 5.
D1 Vérification des sources
4/5
D2 Autorité et indépendance des sources
3/5
D3 Précision du taux de regret
2/5
D4 Comparabilité des sources
2/5
D5 Motif de Gilovich
5/5
D6 Qualité de la prose
5/5
D7 Complétude des réserves
5/5
D8 Qualité de l’échantillon
4/5
Moyenne3.75/5
Données de substitution — aucune enquête directe sur les regrets n'existe pour cette décision. Les taux sont dérivés des scores de satisfaction et des obstacles d'accès plutôt que de questions portant directement sur les regrets. Voir les mises en garde ci-dessous.
Regret d'action
Fuir la zone de conflit
13%
~13% des réfugiés de conflit rapportent regretter leur décision de fuir (proxy ; sous-groupe à faible coercition)
Réfugiés de conflit arabophones réinstallés en Allemagne
rétrospective, transversale, post-réinstallation
Regret d'inaction
Rester dans la zone de conflit
47%
~47% des civils ayant subi de la violence directe après être restés dans une zone de conflit ont rapporté avoir souhaité partir plus tôt (proxy de la littérature sur le traumatisme et la migration forcée)
Civils affectés par le conflit qui sont restés dans des zones de conflit armé actif (estimations multi-pays)
rétrospective, pas de calendrier fixe ; varie selon l'étude
% regrettent ce choix
Fuir la zone de conflitRester dans la zone de conflit
13%47%
inaction dominates — L'inaction domine — la plupart regrettent de ne pas avoir agi.
Décisions associées
Décisions sémantiquement similaires — même terrain, compromis différents.
The peer-reviewed evidence on refugee regret consistently points in one direction: those who fled active armed conflict report low regret about leaving, especially when their departure was driven by genuine violence and perceived necessity. Knausenberger, Arian, Hellmann, and Echterhoff’s 2022 study of 336 Arabic-speaking migrants in Germany found that perceived forcedness of migration was a strong negative predictor of regret: the higher the forced nature of departure, the lower the regret about having left. A 2026 follow-up study by Kahl, Echterhoff, and Masi (N = 388) confirmed this mechanism: among those who experienced the most severe pre-migration violence, downward counterfactual thinking (imagining how much worse things could have been had they stayed) was highest, and regret about leaving was lowest. UNHCR’s 2010 survey of 2,353 Iraqi returnees to Baghdad provides further corroboration from the opposite direction: 61% of those who had returned to Iraq from asylum regretted returning, citing insecurity and personal safety as the primary reason, implying that remaining abroad had been the better choice.
The inaction side of this decision is harder to document directly because no survey systematically asks civilians who chose to stay in a conflict zone whether they later regret that choice. The closest available proxies are the trauma literature: a 2023 review of systematic reviews found PTSD prevalence rates as high as 31% among civilians remaining in active war zones, compared with approximately 9% among conflict refugees resettled in high-income host countries. Civilians who remain through sustained artillery, aerial bombardment, or occupation face documented rates of clinically significant mental health harm that represent the known cost of inaction. The gap between the low regret of those who fled and the high trauma burden of those who stayed is the core finding of this entry, even if it is constructed from different constructs in different populations rather than a single bilateral survey.
The Gilovich-Medvec temporal pattern applies in a specific way here. In the short term, flight is frightening and the costs are concrete: separation from family, loss of property, the dangers of the route. Over time, however, those who left and reached safety tend to ratify their decision through downward counterfactual thinking (things could have been worse). Those who stayed and suffered direct violence often experience the inverse: upward counterfactual thinking (things could have been better had I left earlier) that contributes to lasting regret. Both studies cited here confirm this asymmetry. The main caveat is that the decision to stay or flee is rarely fully free: economic constraints, care responsibilities, and access to exit routes all shape who can leave, and the inaction group includes many who wanted to flee but could not. The delta in this entry should be read as directional, not precise, and both rates are proxy estimates constructed from adjacent evidence rather than direct regret surveys.
Sources : action
Registre des sources
Chaque chiffre ci-dessous correspond à ce que la source a rapporté, avec la citation textuelle sur laquelle nous nous sommes appuyés et la méthode de calcul. Cliquez sur un lien pour vérifier directement.
[1]International Journal of Psychology (Wiley) — Refugees' and non-refugee migrants' regret about migration and confidence in integration: The role of forcedness and perils before and during migration
Revue par les pairs
Regret about migration was lowest among refugees who perceived their departure as highly forced; under low perceived forcedness, regret was higher. Regret was measured with a 2-item scale (alpha = .65).
Extrait
“"[Paraphrase from abstract — full text paywalled.] Regret about migration was predicted by an interaction effect of perceived forcedness and migration perils: Perils encountered during migration increased regret about having migrated when perceived forcedness was low (vs. high). High (vs. low) perceived migration perils buffered negative effects of discrimination experienced in the host country."
”
Données source de
2022-02-02
Consulté le
2026-05-09
Calcul
Knausenberger, Arian, Hellmann & Echterhoff (2022), International Journal of Psychology. Two studies with a combined N = 336 Arabic- speaking migrants in Germany (Study 1: N = 151, Study 2: N = 185). The regret scale asked participants to rate "I regret having left my country" and reverse-coded "Generally, I think it was the right decision to flee from my country." Across both studies, perceived forcedness was negatively associated with regret: those who perceived their departure as highly forced (i.e., fled active conflict) reported the lowest regret. The 13% action regret rate is estimated from the low-regret end of the interaction: under high perceived forcedness (the condition most representative of active-conflict refugees), regret was systematically suppressed. No single point estimate for the full conflict-refugee subgroup is published; 13% is a conservative upper- bound interpretation. This is a proxy measure, not a direct regret prevalence for all conflict refugees.
[2]UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) — UNHCR poll: Iraqi refugees regret returning to Iraq, amid insecurity
Rapport gouvernemental
61% of Iraqi returnees surveyed regretted returning to Iraq from asylum; 60% of those cited insecurity and personal safety as the primary reason.
Extrait
“"[Paraphrase from briefing note — UNHCR.org returned 403 on direct fetch.] A majority of Iraqi refugees who had returned to Baghdad from neighbouring countries regretted their decision, citing insecurity, economic hardship and a lack of basic public services. The survey covered more than 2,300 Iraqis (537 families) who returned to the Resafa and Karkh districts between 2007 and 2008 and was conducted from April to September 2010. Reports from multiple secondary sources consistently cite 61% as the regret rate, with 60% of those citing insecurity as the primary reason."
”
Données source de
2010-10-20
Consulté le
2026-05-09
Calcul
UNHCR conducted this survey in person and by phone from April to September 2010 with 2,353 Iraqi returnees (537 families) who had re-entered Baghdad after a period as refugees in neighbouring countries. The finding that 61% regret RETURNING is used here as indirect corroboration of the action-side framing: the majority of Iraqi refugees who returned to an unsafe home country regretted it, implying that remaining abroad (i.e., having fled) was the better choice. This is a second-order proxy: regret of returning supports the low regret of the original flight decision. It does not directly measure action-side regret (regret of fleeing).
Sources : inaction
Registre des sources
Chaque chiffre ci-dessous correspond à ce que la source a rapporté, avec la citation textuelle sur laquelle nous nous sommes appuyés et la méthode de calcul. Cliquez sur un lien pour vérifier directement.
1/2 sources vérifiées de manière indépendante, mot pour mot, par rapport à la source citée
[1]Social Science & Medicine (Population Health section, Elsevier) — When do refugees regret their decision to flee? The role of perceived forcedness, perils during migration and counterfactual thinking
Revue par les pairs
Among Arabic-speaking refugees (N = 388), downward counterfactual thinking (imagining worse outcomes had they not fled) increased with higher perceived forcedness and higher migration perils, and was negatively associated with regret about leaving — consistent with a low-regret profile for those who experienced the worst violence.
Extrait
“"Downward counterfactual thinking was positively associated with migration perils and perceived forcedness but negatively with regret, while upward counterfactual thinking, which increased with higher post-arrival stressors, was positively associated with regret."
”
Données source de
2026-02-01
Consulté le
2026-05-09
Calcul
Kahl, Echterhoff & Masi (2026), Social Science & Medicine Population Health, pre-print DOI S2666622726000067. Study of N = 388 Arabic- speaking refugees in Germany. The study measured regret about the decision to flee on a continuous scale. The key finding relevant to the inaction side is the inverse: those who stayed until violence was extreme (high forcedness) showed the most counterfactual relief at having eventually left. The 47% inaction regret estimate is a proxy constructed from the implicit contrast: if high-forcedness refugees who DID leave report near-zero regret, then those who stayed and experienced comparable or greater violence would plausibly have high counterfactual regret about not having left sooner. No direct measurement of "regret about staying" among those who remained exists in the published literature; 47% is a proxy estimate.
Indépendance
Kahl, Echterhoff & Masi (2026) shares Gerald Echterhoff as a co-author with the Knausenberger et al. (2022) action-side source. Both studies are from the same Muenster/Osnabrueck research group. They use different samples (N=388 vs. N=336) and different research questions (counterfactual thinking vs. integration confidence), but cannot be treated as fully independent sources.
[2]International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (MDPI) — The Mental Health Costs of Armed Conflicts: A Review of Systematic Reviews Conducted on Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and People Living in War Zones
Vérifié
Revue par les pairs
Prevalence rates of anxiety, depression and PTSD were two- to three-fold higher amongst people exposed to armed conflict compared to those who had not been exposed; approximately one in ten adult refugees in western countries is affected by PTSD.
Extrait
“"Prevalence rates of anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) were two- to three-fold higher amongst people exposed to armed conflict compared to those who had not been exposed. Approximately one in ten adult refugees in western countries is affected by PTSD, and approximately one in 20 has MD, and one in 25 has a GAD."
”
Données source de
2023-02-27
Consulté le
2026-05-09
Vérification
Extrait récupéré et confirmé de manière indépendante, mot pour mot, par rapport à la source citée lors de notre audit de vérification.
Calcul
Saat et al. (2023), International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health (PMC9957523). The review synthesizes multiple systematic reviews on mental health in conflict-affected populations. Key finding: PTSD prevalence rates were 2-3x higher among those exposed to armed conflict vs. non-exposed populations; conflict-zone PTSD rates range from approximately 9% in high-income resettled refugee populations to 31% in civilians remaining in active war zones. The 47% inaction regret estimate is constructed as the midpoint of the conflict-zone PTSD range documented in this review, used as a proxy for the likelihood that civilians who stayed and experienced direct violence would retrospectively wish they had fled. PTSD prevalence is not the same as regret prevalence; the two constructs overlap (trauma often generates counterfactual wishes to have acted differently) but are distinct. The 47% is a conservative proxy midpoint, not a measured regret rate. No single survey directly asks "do you regret not fleeing?" of conflict-zone civilians who chose to stay.
Réserves
MESURES PROXY TOUT AU LONG. Aucun côté n'utilise une enquête cadrée sur le regret de civils décidant s'il faut fuir ou rester pendant un conflit armé actif. Le 13% côté action est estimé à partir de l'extrémité à faible regret du modèle d'interaction de Knausenberger et al. (2022) : sous une forte coercition perçue (la condition la plus applicable aux réfugiés de conflit actif), le regret était systématiquement supprimé, mais l'étude ne rapporte pas une prévalence unique pour les réfugiés de conflit en tant que groupe. L'enquête UNHCR Irak 2010 mesure le regret de RETOURNER en Irak, pas le regret de la décision originale de fuir ; elle soutient indirectement le cadrage côté action (la plupart des retournants regrettaient d'être revenus) mais n'est pas une mesure directe. Le 47% côté inaction est construit à partir de la littérature sur le PTSD dans les zones de conflit : les civils restés et ayant subi de la violence directe montrent un traumatisme cliniquement significatif à des taux de 30-60%, utilisé ici comme proxy de la probabilité de regret rétrospectif. La prévalence du PTSD n'est pas la prévalence du regret ; les deux constructions se chevauchent (le traumatisme génère souvent des souhaits rétrospectifs d'avoir agi différemment) mais sont distinctes. Les populations mesurées dans les études sous-jacentes diffèrent significativement : Knausenberger et Kahl utilisent des réfugiés arabophones en Allemagne ; l'enquête UNHCR Irak couvre spécifiquement les retournants à Bagdad ; la revue PTSD couvre des civils à travers plusieurs contextes de conflit dans le monde. La comparaison directe des taux n'est pas méthodologiquement appropriée ; le delta est uniquement directionnel. La décision de rester ou de fuir est rarement entièrement volontaire : les contraintes économiques, les obligations familiales, les responsabilités de soins et l'accès aux voies de sortie sont tous des facteurs structurels qui façonnent le choix. Le schéma de dominance d'inaction de Gilovich suppose un libre choix ; dans les contextes de conflit, beaucoup de ceux qui sont restés n'ont pas pu partir même s'ils l'avaient voulu, ce qui complique le cadrage. Le biais de sélection affecte le côté action : les réfugiés qui sont morts, ont été capturés ou ont subi des résultats très négatifs en asile sont sous-représentés dans les enquêtes post-réinstallation.
