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Regret d’agir vs. de ne pas agir

Rester dans un pays après l'expiration de son visa vs. partir à temps

Si vous agissez

Rester après l'expiration du visa (dépassement de séjour)

44%

Si vous n’agissez pas

Partir à temps (en respectant les conditions du visa)

9,0%

Pourcentage de personnes qui regrettent ensuite chaque choix. Les barres et le registre complet s’affichent ci-dessous.


Mode de vie

Dernière révision 2026-05-09

Qualité des preuves 3.88/5

Score d’évaluation en huit dimensions selon la grille de qualité . Chaque dimension notée de 1 à 5.

D1 Vérification des sources
5/5
D2 Autorité et indépendance des sources
4/5
D3 Précision du taux de regret
1/5
D4 Comparabilité des sources
2/5
D5 Motif de Gilovich
5/5
D6 Qualité de la prose
5/5
D7 Complétude des réserves
5/5
D8 Qualité de l’échantillon
4/5
Moyenne 3.88/5
A split scene: on the left, a city apartment with a view of a familiar skyline; on the right, an airplane ticket and a closing door.
Données de substitution — aucune enquête directe sur les regrets n'existe pour cette décision. Les taux sont dérivés des scores de satisfaction et des obstacles d'accès plutôt que de questions portant directement sur les regrets. Voir les mises en garde ci-dessous.

Regret d'action

Rester après l'expiration du visa (dépassement de séjour)

44%

~44% d'indicateur indirect de « le referaient » (NON un regret spécifique au dépassement de visa) : 56% des immigrants probablement sans papiers disent qu'ils choisiraient encore de s'installer aux États-Unis s'ils pouvaient revenir en arrière (en baisse par rapport à 72% en 2023), donc 44% ne le feraient pas — une mesure de regret d'immigration sous l'application renforcée de 2025, non un regret de dépassement de visa spécifiquement

Immigrants probablement sans papiers aux États-Unis (inclut les dépassements de visa)

enquête rétrospective, août-octobre 2025

Regret d'inaction

Partir à temps (en respectant les conditions du visa)

9,0%

~35% d'indicateur indirect modélisé (aucune enquête directe n'existe) : déduit de la recherche sur la migration de retour, dans laquelle environ un tiers des migrants de retour décrivent leur retour comme involontaire ou regretté, combiné au constat de la KFF selon lequel 70% des immigrants disent qu'ils s'installeraient encore aux États-Unis. Aucune enquête ne mesure le regret parmi les personnes ayant effectivement quitté les États-Unis à l'expiration de leur visa

Ressortissants étrangers qui ont quitté les États-Unis à l'expiration du visa et auraient souhaité pouvoir rester

proxy rétrospectif, 2025

% regrettent ce choix

action dominates — L'action domine — la plupart regrettent d'avoir agi.

Décisions associées

Décisions sémantiquement similaires — même terrain, compromis différents.

lifestyle

S’expatrier

% regrettent ce choix

L'inaction domine

Regret d'inaction 5.7× plus élevé

lifestyle

Migration économique vs. rester chez soi

% regrettent ce choix

L'action domine

Regret d'action 1.1× plus élevé

lifestyle

Venezuela : partir vs. rester pendant la crise

% regrettent ce choix

L'inaction domine

Regret d'inaction 2.0× plus élevé

lifestyle

Inde : émigrer à l'étranger vs. rester

% regrettent ce choix

L'inaction domine

Regret d'inaction 1.2× plus élevé

lifestyle

Quitter un groupe à fort contrôle vs. rester

% regrettent ce choix

L'inaction domine

Regret d'inaction 3.3× plus élevé

lifestyle

Quitter sa religion

% regrettent ce choix

L'inaction domine

Regret d'inaction 2.9× plus élevé

lifestyleDirecte

Vietnam : migrer en ville vs. rester au village

% regrettent ce choix

L'action domine

Regret d'action 2.1× plus élevé

lifestyle

Fuite de zone de conflit

% regrettent ce choix

L'inaction domine

Regret d'inaction 3.6× plus élevé

The KFF/New York Times 2025 Survey of Immigrants (n = 1,805, conducted August to October 2025) found that 56% of likely undocumented immigrants in the US say they would still choose to come to America if they could go back in time, down from 72% in 2023. The remaining 44% is not a clean regret figure: the survey question offers three options (would still move, would not, not sure), and for the full sample the “would not” answer (9%) is dwarfed by “not sure” (21%) — but KFF does not publish that breakdown for the likely-undocumented subgroup specifically, so 44% can only be read as an upper bound on regret for this population, not a validated rate. On the inaction side, no survey asks people who actually left the US on visa expiration whether they regret it. The best available proxy uses the same survey’s directly reported finding for all immigrants: 70% say they would still choose to move to the US, 9% say they would not, and 21% are not sure — so 9%, not the 30-point “non-yes” share, is the defensible stand-in for people who watched others build lives, careers, and families in the US while they departed on schedule. Read this way, the two proxies may be further apart than a first glance suggests, though the action-side ceiling of 44% is soft enough that the true gap cannot be pinned down precisely: the underlying “would still move” figure for likely undocumented immigrants alone swung from 72% in 2023 to 56% in 2025 as enforcement intensified.

The mechanism on each side is structurally different. Overstayers who develop regret are generally responding to chronic enforcement anxiety: 75% of likely undocumented immigrants in the KFF survey report worrying about detention or deportation, 77% report negative health impacts from those worries, and 74% have avoided ordinary activities such as work or medical care. These costs are ongoing and compounding. The person who left on time bears a one-time opportunity cost, which may grow over time as they observe the lives built by those who stayed — a classic Gilovich inaction pattern — but does not experience the chronic psychological burden of enforcement fear. The tradeoff is between acute daily anxiety and long-term opportunity loss, which is a categorically different comparison than most decisions in this dataset.

Both figures carry significant uncertainty and are sensitive to enforcement context. The underlying “would still move” rate for likely undocumented immigrants was 72% in 2023 and fell to 56% in 2025 — a 16-point drop tied to a specific political and enforcement environment — but KFF has not published how much of that 16-point shift moved into “would not” versus “not sure” for this subgroup, so the corresponding regret ceilings (28% in 2023, 44% in 2025) should not be read as measured regret rates for either year. The inaction-side rate (9%) has a firmer anchor: it is the source’s own directly reported “would not” figure for all immigrants surveyed, not a derived complement, though it still answers a general immigration-satisfaction question rather than a departure-specific one. Nationality matters enormously: the relevant regret calculus for a Mexican national who overstays and builds a family near the border differs fundamentally from an Indian H-1B holder who ages out of status or a European tourist who simply delayed departure by a few weeks. This entry describes aggregate patterns and should not be read as evidence about any specific nationality, visa category, or enforcement policy.

Sources : action

Registre des sources

Chaque chiffre ci-dessous correspond à ce que la source a rapporté, avec la citation textuelle sur laquelle nous nous sommes appuyés et la méthode de calcul. Cliquez sur un lien pour vérifier directement.

  1. [1] Kaiser Family Foundation / New York Times — KFF/New York Times 2025 Survey of Immigrants: Worries and Experiences Amid Increased Immigration Enforcement
    KFF/New York Times 2025 Survey of Immigrants: Worries and Experiences Amid Increased Immigration Enforcement

    See all 2 Likelier entries citing this source →

    Statistique
    75% of likely undocumented immigrants worry about detention or deportation; 77% report negative health impacts from immigration-related worries; 56% say they would still move to the US if they could go back in time (down from 72% in 2023); the source's full-sample breakdown of the same question shows non-yes answers split 9% would-not / 21% not-sure, but does not publish that split for the undocumented subgroup, so the 44% non-yes share for this subgroup is an upper bound on regret, not a validated rate
    Extrait
    “"Four in ten (41%) immigrants say they personally worry they or a family member could be detained or deported, with worries most pronounced among likely undocumented immigrants (75%). Nearly eight in ten (77%) likely undocumented immigrants say they have experienced negative health impacts due to immigration-related worries. 56 percent of likely undocumented immigrants say they would still choose to move to the United States if they could go back in time, down from 72 percent in 2023." ”
    Données source de
    2025-11-01
    Consulté le
    2026-05-09
    Calcul
    KFF/NYT survey conducted August 28 – October 20, 2025, n = 1,805 immigrant adults, nationally representative probability-based sample, with oversampling of likely undocumented immigrants (n ~300-400 subgroup). CORRECTED 2026-07: the prior version of this entry used the complement of the "would still move" rate (100% minus 56% = 44%) and called that "implied regret." This is an invalid derivation: the underlying survey question (Q12, "If you could go back in time knowing what you know now, would you choose to move to the U.S.?") is a three-option item — would still move / would not / not sure — not binary, and the source's own full-sample breakdown shows the non-"yes" share splits into 9% would-not and 21% not-sure (of the 30-point gap for all immigrants surveyed): "One in ten (9%) say they would not choose to move to the U.S. if they could go back in time, and one in five (21%) say they are not sure." Most of the "non-yes" share is uncertainty, not dissent. No breakdown of would-not vs. not-sure is published for the likely-undocumented subgroup specifically, so there is no way to compute a validated regret-only figure for this side. The 44% figure is retained ONLY as an upper bound (the ceiling on how high true regret could be, since at most 44% of this subgroup did not say "yes"), not as a point estimate of regret; the true would-not share for this subgroup is unknown and, by analogy with the full-sample pattern, plausibly well below 44%. CONSTRUCT CAVEAT: this measures views about IMMIGRATING (a would-do-again forced choice), not regret of OVERSTAYING a visa specifically; the survey does not ask about overstaying, nor does it ask whether respondents left after visa expiry. It is the closest available retrospective measure for this population, but the two constructs are not identical, and even the raw "would still move" rate is enforcement-era sensitive (72% in 2023 vs 56% in 2025 among likely undocumented immigrants). The 75% deportation worry and 77% negative health impact figures document the chronic cost of the overstay decision but are not themselves regret measures. The survey was conducted during a period of heightened enforcement (Trump second term), which may depress the "would still move" rate relative to baseline years.
  2. [2] US Department of Homeland Security / US Customs and Border Protection — Entry/Exit Overstay Report, Fiscal Year 2023
    Entry/Exit Overstay Report, Fiscal Year 2023
    Statistique
    FY2023 suspected in-country overstay rate: 1.02% of 39 million expected departures; 399,708 suspected in-country overstays
    Extrait
    “"By May 1, 2024, the number of Suspected In-Country Overstays for FY 2023 decreased to 399,708, resulting in a Suspected In-Country Overstay rate of 1.02 percent of the 39,005,712 expected departures. For non-Visa Waiver Program countries (excluding Canada and Mexico), the FY 2024 Suspected In-Country Overstay rate is 2.22 percent." ”
    Données source de
    2024-10-01
    Consulté le
    2026-05-09
    Calcul
    DHS Entry/Exit Overstay Report FY2023. Used here to establish the scale of the overstay population (hundreds of thousands annually) and the enforcement context. The overstay report does not contain regret data; it establishes that overstays constitute a large share of the undocumented population (estimates suggest over 40% of total undocumented population). Used as the corroborating government source establishing the decision context, not the regret proxy.

Sources : inaction

Registre des sources

Chaque chiffre ci-dessous correspond à ce que la source a rapporté, avec la citation textuelle sur laquelle nous nous sommes appuyés et la méthode de calcul. Cliquez sur un lien pour vérifier directement.

  1. [1] Kaiser Family Foundation / New York Times — KFF/New York Times 2025 Survey of Immigrants: Worries and Experiences Amid Increased Immigration Enforcement
    KFF/New York Times 2025 Survey of Immigrants: Worries and Experiences Amid Increased Immigration Enforcement

    See all 2 Likelier entries citing this source →

    Statistique
    Among all immigrants surveyed, large majorities say key aspects of their lives are better as a result of moving to the US (educational opportunities 74%, financial situation 70%, employment 65%); on whether they would still choose to move to the US if they could go back in time, 70% say yes, 9% say no, and 21% are not sure — the 9% figure is the source's directly reported would-not rate, not a derived complement
    Extrait
    “"About two-thirds or more immigrants say the educational opportunities for themselves or their children (74%), their financial situation (70%), and their employment situation (65%) are better as a result of moving to the U.S. Seven in ten (70%) immigrants say they would still choose to move to the U.S. One in ten (9%) say they would not choose to move to the U.S. if they could go back in time, and one in five (21%) say they are not sure. This share dropped 16 percentage points among likely undocumented immigrants (from 72% to 56%)." ”
    Données source de
    2025-11-01
    Consulté le
    2026-05-09
    Calcul
    The inaction regret proxy (those who left on time but wish they had stayed) is the hardest side to anchor empirically. No published survey specifically asks people who left the US upon visa expiration whether they regret having done so, and this survey's own sample is drawn entirely from immigrants currently living in the US, so it cannot include anyone who left. CORRECTED 2026-07: the prior version of this entry used a complement construction (100% minus the 70% who say they would still move) to derive a 30% "would not" rate. This was an invalid derivation: Q12 of the same survey is a three-option question (would still move / would not / not sure), and the source directly reports the breakdown for all immigrants: 70% would still move, 9% would not, and 21% are not sure. Treating the full 30-point non-"yes" share as regret wrongly folded 21 points of genuine uncertainty into the 9-point "would not" figure. The 0.09 rate now used is the source's own directly-reported "would not" statistic, not a derived complement. This remains a weaker anchor than the action side on two counts: it measures people who stayed rather than people who left, and it answers a general relocation question rather than an overstay- or departure-specific one. It should be read as a rough directional estimate only, not a measured inaction-side regret rate.
  2. [2] Pew Research Center — What we know about unauthorized immigrants living in the U.S.
    What we know about unauthorized immigrants living in the U.S.
    Statistique
    The US unauthorized immigrant population grew to 11.0 million in 2022, with 8.3 million in the workforce — a large, economically embedded population, establishing the scale and pull factor against which a leave-on-time decision is weighed
    Extrait
    “"The unauthorized immigrant population in the United States grew to 11.0 million in 2022, according to new Pew Research Center estimates based on the 2022 American Community Survey. The number of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. workforce grew from 7.4 million in 2019 to 8.3 million in 2022." ”
    Données source de
    2024-07-22
    Consulté le
    2026-05-09
    Calcul
    Pew Research Center overview of the unauthorized immigrant population. Used here only to establish the scale of the population and economic embeddedness (11.0 million people, 8.3 million in the workforce in 2022) that constitutes the pull factor against which a leave-on-time decision is weighed. This article does NOT measure regret, residence duration, or visa-overstay share, so it cannot anchor an inaction regret rate — it is context only. The 0.09 inaction figure is the KFF/NYT survey's own directly-reported all-immigrants would-not-move again rate (see the KFF/NYT source notes above; corrected 2026-07 from an earlier, invalid complement construction), not a measured rate for people who left specifically, and should be read as a directional estimate only.

Réserves

MESURES INDIRECTES DES DEUX CÔTÉS — le regret_delta de 0,09 se situe dans la marge d'incertitude des deux indicateurs et ne doit pas être traité comme une différence significative. L'indicateur du côté action (0,44) est dérivé de l'enquête KFF/NYT 2025 : le complément de « s'installerait encore aux États-Unis » parmi les immigrants probablement sans papiers. Cela a été mesuré durant une période de pression d'application inhabituellement élevée (second mandat de Trump), et la même question donnait 28% de regret implicite en 2023 — une hausse de 16 points de pourcentage en deux ans. Le taux de regret-action de référence (hors pic d'application) est probablement plus proche de 0,25-0,30. L'indicateur du côté inaction (0,35) est une inférence prudente issue de la littérature sur la migration de retour et du puissant facteur d'attraction persistant de l'opportunité économique américaine ; il n'a aucun ancrage d'enquête directe et porte une large incertitude. Les deux populations sont structurellement non comparables : le côté action est mesuré parmi des personnes actuellement aux États-Unis ayant choisi de dépasser leur visa et faisant face à la pression d'application, tandis que le côté inaction est estimé à partir de la population de personnes parties et pour lesquelles aucune enquête systématique n'existe. Le concept de « dépasser vs partir » n'est pas non plus une décision unique et discrète pour la plupart des gens : les dépassements s'accumulent souvent progressivement à mesure que les personnes retardent leur départ semaine après semaine en réponse à des circonstances changeantes, rendant un cadrage rétrospectif du regret moins net que pour d'autres décisions de cet ensemble de données. La nationalité importe significativement : les taux de dépassement et les motivations économiques diffèrent énormément selon le pays d'origine, les dynamiques de dépassement des Mexicains, des Centraméricains et des Sud-Asiatiques différant substantiellement de celles des détenteurs de visa européens ou est-asiatiques. L'entrée ne doit pas être citée comme preuve à l'appui d'une quelconque position spécifique de politique d'application de l'immigration ; elle décrit des résultats vécus et des préférences exprimées, non des recommandations normatives.

Données brutes : /api/decisions.json

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