Lasciare il Venezuela durante la crisi economica e politica vs. restare
Se agisci
Emigrare dal Venezuela
26%
Se non agisci
Restare in Venezuela durante la crisi
53%
Percentuale di chi poi rimpiange ciascuna scelta. Le barre e il registro completo dei dati compaiono sotto.
Stile di vita
Ultima revisione 2026-05-13
Qualità delle prove 4.5/5
Punteggio di revisione su otto dimensioni rispetto alla
griglia di qualità
. Ogni dimensione valutata da 1 a 5.
D1 Verifica delle fonti
4/5
D2 Autorità e indipendenza delle fonti
5/5
D3 Precisione del tasso di rimpianto
5/5
D4 Comparabilità delle fonti
5/5
D5 Schema di Gilovich
4/5
D6 Qualità della prosa
4/5
D7 Completezza degli avvertimenti
4/5
D8 Qualità del campione
5/5
Media4.5/5
Dati proxy — non esiste alcun sondaggio diretto sul rimpianto per questa decisione. I tassi sono derivati da punteggi di soddisfazione e dati sulle barriere di accesso piuttosto che da domande che chiedevano direttamente del rimpianto. Vedi avvertenze di seguito.
Rimpianto per azione
Emigrare dal Venezuela
26%
circa il 26% dei migranti venezuelani rientrati non riusciva a guadagnarsi da vivere nel Paese ospitante -- un proxy dell'esito di difficoltà all'estero, non un tasso di rammarico auto-riferito per essere partiti
Emigranti venezuelani in Colombia, Perù, Cile ed Ecuador
retrospettivo, 2022-2023
Rimpianto per inazione
Restare in Venezuela durante la crisi
53%
circa il 53% dei venezuelani rimasti viveva in povertà estrema nel 2022 (reddito troppo basso per un paniere alimentare di base) -- un proxy dell'esito di difficoltà, non un tasso di rammarico auto-riferito
Venezuelani rimasti in Venezuela durante la crisi economica e politica 2016-2023
annuale, 2016-2023; stima primaria da sondaggio 2022
% rimpiange questa scelta
Emigrare dal VenezuelaRestare in Venezuela durante la crisi
26%53%
inaction dominates — L'inazione domina — la maggior parte si pente di non aver agito.
Decisioni correlate
Decisioni semanticamente simili — stesso terreno, compromessi diversi.
Lasciare la propria città d'origineRestare vicino a dove si è cresciuti
20%30%
L'inazione prevale
Rimpianto per l'inazione 1.5× maggiore
Venezuela’s post-2015 economic collapse produced the largest displacement in Western Hemisphere history outside of armed conflict: 7.7 million Venezuelans had left by 2023, driven by hyperinflation, food insecurity, and political instability. ENCOVI’s 2022 National Survey of Living Conditions — the principal independent social measurement instrument in Venezuela — found that 53.3 percent of the population was living in extreme poverty (income too low to buy a basic food basket), down from 68 percent in 2021, with income poverty at 81.5 percent. The extreme-poverty rate constitutes the inaction-side harm proxy: the share of the staying population experiencing outcomes severe enough that, given counterfactual access to emigration, most would plausibly retrospectively have preferred to leave. It is an outcome proxy, not a measured regret rate — no survey directly asks Venezuelans who stayed whether they regret not emigrating. The Mixed Migration Centre’s 4Mi returnee data add circumstantial support: even returnees who reached Venezuela expect to struggle for an income (76 percent) and worry about access to food and water (57 percent).
The action side captures a real and significant cost. In the Mixed Migration Centre’s 4Mi survey of Venezuelan returnees (n=269), 71 percent said their return was partly driven by problems in the host country — including 26 percent who could not generate enough income to settle there — while only 18 percent returned because they had achieved their goals abroad. That 26 percent hardship-abroad figure is the action-side proxy: it measures difficulty making a living among people who gave up on emigration, not a self-reported “I should not have left” regret rate. The leading stated motivation for return was actually family reunification (81 percent) and homesickness (63 percent), with failure to integrate into the host country (23 percent) and inability to regularise status (22 percent) among the structural push factors. Most Venezuelan emigrants who remain abroad do not return at all, so the proxy captures a hardship subset rather than population-wide regret.
The regret_delta of -0.273 captures a genuine asymmetry: the documented harm rate of staying (53.3 percent extreme poverty) exceeds the documented hardship rate among returnees who left (26 percent unable to make a living abroad), consistent with the Gilovich inaction-dominance pattern and the temporal logic of crisis migration. In the short term, emigration is costly: the route is arduous, early months abroad are disorienting, and social status often drops sharply. Over time, however, those who left and established themselves in receiving countries typically ratify the decision through downward counterfactual thinking — imagining the extreme poverty, food insecurity, and institutional collapse they avoided. Those who stayed and experienced those conditions face the inverse. Both proxies carry uncertainty of approximately plus or minus 10 percentage points, and the crisis has evolved since the 2022 reference year; Venezuelan economic conditions in 2025 are materially different from 2019. The entry describes the crisis period and should not be applied as a forward-looking assessment.
Fonti: azione
Registro delle fonti
Ogni numero qui sotto è ciò che ciascuna fonte ha riportato, con la citazione testuale su cui ci siamo basati e come siamo arrivati alla nostra cifra. Clicca su qualsiasi link per verificare direttamente.
1/2 fonti verificate in modo indipendente e alla lettera rispetto alla fonte citata
[1]USA for UNHCR / United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) — UNHCR Survey Shows a Third of Displaced Venezuelans in Latin America Could Consider Return
Verificato
Studio primario
In a UNHCR survey of 1,288 Venezuelans across six host countries (Jan-Mar 2026), just over a third indicated a possible intention to return home, with 9% considering it within a year. Nearly 60% cited insufficient reliable information about conditions on return as a barrier.
Estratto
“[Verbatim from USA for UNHCR, 2026-04-17.] "Between January and March 2026, UNHCR interviewed 1,288 Venezuelans in Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala." "Just over one third surveyed indicated a possible intention to return home, with 9 per cent considering it within a year." "Nearly 60 per cent of respondents identified insufficient reliable information about what to expect upon return as a barrier, alongside uncertainty about how returning could affect their legal status in host countries."
”
Dati originali da
2026-04-17
Consultato
2026-05-13
Verifica
Estratto recuperato in modo indipendente e confermato parola per parola rispetto alla fonte citata durante il nostro audit di attendibilità.
Calcolo
UNHCR return-intentions survey, n=1,288 across six host countries (Jan-Mar 2026), reported via USA for UNHCR. This source measures the share of displaced Venezuelans who would CONSIDER returning (just over one third) -- a return-intention construct, NOT a self-reported regret-about-leaving rate. It is cited here for context: a sizeable minority remain open to return, but the headline action-side proxy (26%) is taken from the MMC 4Mi returnee survey -- the 26% of returnees who "have not been able to generate enough income to settle in their host country" -- which is the most directly verifiable hardship-abroad figure. The previously cited UNHCR figures (n=7,200+, a "26% regret" and "34% would return" breakdown) could not be verified against any published UNHCR survey and were replaced with this verified return-intentions survey.
[2]Mixed Migration Centre — Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions
Fonte di riferimento
In MMC's 4Mi survey of Venezuelan returnees (n=269), 71% said their return was partly driven by problems in the host country -- including 26% who could not make a living there and 23% who were not integrated into the host country -- while only 18% returned because they had achieved their goals abroad. Family reunification (81%) was the leading stated motivation for return.
Estratto
“[Verbatim from Mixed Migration Centre (2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi data, n=269.] "Only 18% of them reported voluntarily returning to Venezuela because they have achieved their goals in the host country, while 71% mentioned that their return to Venezuela was partly driven by at least one of the following factors: insufficient access to services (27% of all respondents), the impossibility of making a living (26%), [not being] integrated into the host country (23%) or [inability to] regularize their migratory status (22%)." The report adds that "26% of respondents reported that they have not been able to generate enough income to settle in their host country", confirming that hardship abroad -- not recovery in Venezuela -- was the dominant push factor in return.
”
Dati originali da
2022-12-01
Consultato
2026-05-13
Calcolo
Mixed Migration Centre (December 2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi survey, n=269 (illustrative, not representative). Cited as corroborating evidence for the action-side hardship mechanism: 71% of returnees were pushed by problems in the host country and only 18% returned because they had achieved their goals there, so the people who give up on emigration are mostly those experiencing worse-than-expected outcomes abroad while conditions at origin remain poor. Note the report's principal STATED motivation for return is family reunification (81%) and homesickness (63%); the economic/structural difficulties are the dominant push factors but are reported alongside, not in place of, those pull factors. The original cite ("Mixed Migration in South America", resource/mixed-migration-in- south-america) 404s and did not match any MMC resource; this is the on-topic MMC report with the verified figures.
Fonti: inazione
Registro delle fonti
Ogni numero qui sotto è ciò che ciascuna fonte ha riportato, con la citazione testuale su cui ci siamo basati e come siamo arrivati alla nostra cifra. Clicca su qualsiasi link per verificare direttamente.
[1]Universidad Andres Bello / UCAB / Universidad Central de Venezuela — Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) 2022
Studio primario
ENCOVI 2022 found extreme poverty (income insufficient to buy a basic food basket) at 53.3% of the population, down from 68% in 2021; income poverty stood at 81.5%. ENCOVI is Venezuela's principal independent living-conditions survey.
Estratto
“[Verbatim Spanish from ENCOVI 2022, UCAB, as reported by elucabista.com, 2022-11-10.] "La pobreza extrema, en la que se encuentran aquellos con ingresos insuficientes para adquirir los alimentos basicos, bajo de 68% en 2021 a 53,3% en 2022." The same survey reported that, measured by income level, poverty affected 81.5% of the population in 2022 ("la pobreza afecta a 81,5% de la poblacion"). These figures describe the conditions of those who remained in Venezuela after 2015, when large-scale emigration began. ENCOVI is the primary independent social measurement instrument in Venezuela, conducted by Venezuelan universities led by UCAB.
”
Dati originali da
2022-11-10
Consultato
2026-05-13
Calcolo
ENCOVI (Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida) 2022, UCAB, Venezuela. The inaction-side proxy uses the extreme-poverty rate (53.3% in 2022, the survey's reference year) as an outcome anchor for the hardship of staying, NOT a measured regret rate. Extreme poverty -- income too low to buy a basic food basket -- is a crisis condition, but it is not the same as expressed regret about not emigrating; no direct "do you regret not having emigrated" survey of Venezuelans who stayed exists. The earlier draft used "61%", which does not appear in ENCOVI 2022; the verified 2022 extreme- poverty figure is 53.3% (down from 68% in 2021). Income poverty (81.5%) is reported for context but is a broader, less severe band.
[2]Mixed Migration Centre — Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions
Fonte di riferimento
Among Venezuelan returnees (MMC 4Mi, n=269), 57% returned while still concerned about access to basics such as food and water in Venezuela, and 28% perceived their return as a failure -- circumstantial evidence that conditions for those who stay remain harsh. Of returnees, 47% planned to stay in the next two years while 27% intended to migrate again.
Estratto
“[Verbatim from Mixed Migration Centre (2022), "Returning to Venezuela: drivers, expectations, and intentions", 4Mi data, n=269.] "Most respondents (76%) report that securing an income will be the main challenge after their return. 57% are returning while still concerned about access to the very basics such as food and water, in Venezuela." "28% of Venezuelan refugees and migrants perceived their return to Venezuela as a failure and with shame." On future plans, "47% of respondents reported they will be staying in the place that they left [the next two years]. However, 27% said that they intend to migrate again."
”
Dati originali da
2022-12-01
Consultato
2026-05-13
Calcolo
Mixed Migration Centre (December 2022), 4Mi returnee survey, n=269. Used as second-order circumstantial evidence for the inaction-side proxy: even returnees who reached Venezuela expect to fight for an income (76%) and worry about food and water (57%), and a notable share (27%) already plan to leave again -- consistent with the inference that conditions for those who stay remain severe. The earlier draft cited a UNHCR figure ("only 20% planned to stay permanently; 80% planned to re-emigrate") that could not be verified against any published UNHCR report and is contradicted by the closest real returnee data (MMC: 47% intend to stay, 27% intend to re-migrate over the next two years); it was replaced with this verified MMC figure. This does not directly measure regret among those who never emigrated.
Avvertenze
MISURE PROXY SU ENTRAMBI I LATI. Il flag proxy_only riflette le barriere strutturali alle indagini bilaterali sul rammarico in un contesto di crisi: nessuno studio pubblicato chiede direttamente ai venezuelani rimasti se si rammaricano di non essere emigrati, e nessuna indagine pubblicata riporta un tasso auto-riferito di "non sarei dovuto partire" nemmeno per gli emigrati. Il 26% sul lato azione è la quota MMC 4Mi di rientrati che non riusciva a generare un reddito sufficiente per stabilirsi nel Paese ospitante -- un esito di difficoltà all'estero tra le persone che hanno rinunciato all'emigrazione, NON un tasso di rammarico auto-riferito per essere partiti; la maggior parte degli emigrati che restano all'estero non rientra affatto. Il circa 53% sul lato inazione usa il tasso di povertà estrema ENCOVI 2022 del Venezuela (53,3%) come proxy di un danno abbastanza grave da generare plausibilmente rammarico retrospettivo; la povertà estrema non è la stessa cosa del rammarico espresso. I dati MMC sui rientrati aggiungono un supporto circostanziale: i rientrati si aspettano comunque di faticare per un reddito (76%) e temono per cibo e acqua (57%) una volta tornati in Venezuela. La crisi venezuelana è cambiata materialmente nel periodo dal 2015 al 2025: le condizioni dal 2023 al 2025 differiscono da quelle del 2016-2019, e una parziale stabilizzazione economica (dollarizzazione, riduzione dell'iperinflazione) ha in qualche misura alterato il calcolo del danno sul lato inazione. La voce è specificamente inquadrata attorno al periodo di crisi dal 2016 al 2023 e non dovrebbe essere letta come un'affermazione sulle condizioni in una qualsiasi specifica situazione politica in corso. Un bias di selezione influenza il campione degli emigrati: chi è emigrato era sistematicamente più giovane, più istruito e disponeva di più risorse rispetto a chi è rimasto, il che rende metodologicamente imperfetto il confronto diretto degli esiti tra i due gruppi. Il regret_delta di -0,273 è direzionale piuttosto che preciso; entrambi i proxy comportano intervalli di incertezza di circa +/- 10 punti percentuali.
