Menerima kontrak pekerja rumah tangga di Teluk di bawah sistem sponsor kafala vs. tetap di rumah
Jika Anda bertindak
Menerima kontrak kafala dan bermigrasi ke Teluk
47%
Jika Anda tidak bertindak
Tetap di tanah air, menolak kontrak kafala
38%
Persentase orang yang kemudian menyesali setiap pilihan. Diagram batang dan catatan lengkap ditampilkan di bawah.
Career
Terakhir ditinjau 2026-05-13
Kualitas bukti 3.75/5
Skor tinjauan delapan dimensi terhadap
rubrik kualitas
. Setiap dimensi dinilai 1–5.
D1 Verifikasi sumber
4/5
D2 Otoritas & independensi sumber
5/5
D3 Akurasi tingkat penyesalan
2/5
D4 Keterbandingan sumber
2/5
D5 Pola Gilovich
4/5
D6 Kualitas prosa
5/5
D7 Kelengkapan peringatan
5/5
D8 Kualitas sampel
3/5
Rata-rata3.75/5
Data proksi — tidak ada survei penyesalan langsung untuk keputusan ini. Tingkat diturunkan dari skor kepuasan dan data hambatan akses daripada pertanyaan yang langsung menanyakan tentang penyesalan. Lihat peringatan di bawah.
Penyesalan atas tindakan
Menerima kontrak kafala dan bermigrasi ke Teluk
47%
Bukan tingkat penyesalan terukur: tidak ada survei yang menanyakan kepada pekerja kafala apakah mereka menyesal bermigrasi. Angka ~47% adalah proxy kerugian — HRW mendokumentasikan penyitaan paspor, jam kerja berlebihan, pencurian upah, dan pelecehan sebagai hal yang rutin (dan tidak membuat klaim prevalensi populasi), bukan proporsi yang melaporkan penyesalan
Pekerja rumah tangga migran di bawah sistem kafala di negara-negara Teluk (Etiopia, Kenya, Filipina, Indonesia, Asia Selatan)
bukti dokumenter dan survei, 2018-2020
Penyesalan atas kelambanan
Tetap di tanah air, menolak kontrak kafala
38%
Bukan tingkat penyesalan terukur: tidak ada survei yang menanyakan kepada non-migran apakah mereka menyesal menolak kontrak Teluk. Angka ~38% adalah proxy struktural atas pendapatan yang hilang berdasarkan selisih upah Teluk-vs-kampung halaman, bukan penyesalan yang teramati
Orang dewasa di komunitas pengirim kafala tinggi (Etiopia, Filipina, Indonesia, Nepal, Bangladesh) yang tidak mengambil kontrak Teluk
proxy dari studi remitansi dan perbedaan pendapatan, 2020-2024
% menyesal dengan pilihan ini
Menerima kontrak kafala dan bermigrasi ke TelukTetap di tanah air, menolak kontrak kafala
47%38%
action dominates — Bertindak mendominasi — sebagian besar menyesali karena bertindak.
Keputusan terkait
Keputusan yang serupa secara semantik — area yang sama, kompromi yang berbeda.
The kafala (sponsorship) system ties migrant domestic workers’ legal status directly to their employer in Gulf Cooperation Council countries, removing the ability to change jobs or return home without sponsor permission. Human Rights Watch’s Oman investigation, based on interviews with 59 migrant domestic workers, found that almost all had their passports confiscated, most were made to work excessively long hours, many were not paid their full wages, and roughly one-quarter said their employers physically or sexually abused them — while explicitly cautioning that it “makes no statistical claims… regarding the prevalence of abuse against the total population of domestic workers in Oman.” The 47% action-side figure is therefore not a documented prevalence rate but a harm proxy: a stand-in for the share of migrants likely to experience rights violations severe enough to plausibly generate regret. The ILO’s “Domestic Workers Across the World” report sizes and legally frames the channel — it counts the domestic-work labour market and maps how far these workers are included in or excluded from working-time, minimum-wage, and maternity protections — rather than documenting Gulf recruitment abuses directly; the abuse documentation on the action side rests on HRW, not the ILO statistical report. Because the workers’ legal status is controlled by their employer and candid survey participation is structurally impossible, no direct “do you regret this decision” survey of kafala workers exists in the published literature; the harm-proxy approach is the most defensible available method.
The inaction side reflects a different — and weaker — evidence base. There is no direct survey of non-migrants who considered but declined a Gulf contract and were asked whether they regret it. The 38% figure on this side is therefore not a measured regret rate but a structural proxy built from the income gap: the World Bank’s Migration and Development Brief records that remittances reached an estimated $656 billion to low- and middle-income countries in 2023 and remain a crucial source of external finance, and Gulf domestic-worker wages run well above the median income available at home in major sending countries. The ILO’s “Domestic Workers Across the World” report sizes the channel — at least 52.6 million domestic workers globally, heavily migrant and female in the Gulf corridor — but it is a statistical and legal-protection report and does not measure regret among those who stayed. Read this side as a foregone-opportunity exposure estimate, not a survey result; the absence of a direct non-migrant regret survey is the binding constraint, and the rate should be treated as the softest number in the entry.
The two rates produce a narrow regret_delta of 0.09, consistent with a decision that is genuinely close to balanced for the aggregate population of potential migrants — where the economic stakes and personal circumstances vary enormously across individuals. The Gilovich action-dominance pattern reflects the asymmetry in documentation quality: harm to those who did migrate is systematically recorded by HRW and ILO; foregone income for those who stayed is reconstructed from income-gap data rather than direct surveys. The kafala system is under formal legal reform in Qatar and Saudi Arabia since 2020 and 2021 respectively, meaning current workers may face a structurally different risk environment than that captured in the 2018 to 2020 source studies. Nationality and recruitment channel matter substantially: workers recruited directly by verified employers face lower contract-substitution risk than those recruited through third-party brokers, and the entry should not be read as a uniform risk assessment across all kafala-mediated contracts.
Sumber: tindakan
Buku besar klaim
Setiap angka di bawah ini adalah apa yang dilaporkan masing-masing sumber, dengan kutipan kata demi kata yang kami andalkan dan bagaimana kami sampai pada angka kami. Klik tautan mana saja untuk memverifikasi langsung.
1/2 sumber diverifikasi secara independen kata demi kata terhadap sumber terkutip
[1]Human Rights Watch — I Was Sold: Abuse and Exploitation of Migrant Domestic Workers in Oman
Terverifikasi
Sumber referensi
In interviews with 59 female migrant domestic workers in Oman, HRW found almost all had their passports confiscated, most were made to work excessively long hours, many were not paid their full salaries, and roughly one-quarter said their employers physically or sexually abused them. HRW explicitly makes no statistical prevalence claim for the total worker population.
Kutipan
“Human Rights Watch makes no statistical claims based on these interviews regarding the prevalence of abuse against the total population of domestic workers in Oman. [...] Roughly one-quarter of the domestic workers Human Rights Watch interviewed said that their employers physically or sexually abused them. [...] Almost all the domestic workers Human Rights Watch interviewed said their agents or employers had confiscated their passports. [...] Most of the domestic workers who spoke to Human Rights Watch said their employers required them to work for excessively long periods, and many said their employers did not pay their full salaries.
”
Data sumber dari
2016-07-13
Diakses
2026-05-13
Verifikasi
Kutipan diambil ulang secara independen dan dikonfirmasi kata demi kata terhadap sumber terkutip selama audit pendasaran kami.
Perhitungan
Human Rights Watch, "I Was Sold" (2016), an Oman investigation based on interviews with 59 female migrant domestic workers. This is a QUALITATIVE report: HRW states explicitly that it "makes no statistical claims based on these interviews regarding the prevalence of abuse against the total population of domestic workers in Oman." It therefore does NOT support a population prevalence rate, and the 0.47 action regret_rate is NOT read off this source. What HRW documents is that the specific abuses used as the harm proxy — passport confiscation ("almost all"), excessive hours ("most"), non-payment of full wages ("many"), and physical or sexual abuse ("roughly one-quarter") — are routine rather than exceptional among the workers interviewed. The 0.47 figure is a PROXY for harm significant enough to plausibly generate retrospective regret about migrating, not a measured regret or abuse prevalence rate; no direct "do you regret accepting this contract" survey of kafala domestic workers exists in the published literature, largely because the workers' legal status is controlled by their employer and conditions for candid survey participation are absent.
[2]International Labour Organization — Domestic Workers Across the World: Global and Regional Statistics and the Extent of Legal Protection
Sumber referensi
Statistical/legal-protection report: an estimated 52.6 million domestic workers worldwide (more than four in five women), with substantial gaps in coverage under working-time, minimum-wage, and maternity-protection laws — establishing the scale and legal vulnerability of the migration channel, not Gulf-specific abuse prevalence.
Kutipan
“[Paraphrase from ILO publication — full text available at ilo.org.] The ILO's "Domestic Workers Across the World" presents national statistics and new global and regional estimates on the number of domestic workers — an estimated 52.6 million worldwide, more than four in five of them women — and examines the extent to which they are included in or excluded from key working-conditions laws (working time, minimum wage, maternity protection), finding that substantial gaps in legal protection remain. It accompanies ILO Convention No. 189 and quantifies the labour market rather than investigating specific exploitation mechanisms such as recruitment fraud or contract substitution.
”
Data sumber dari
2013-01-09
Diakses
2026-05-13
Perhitungan
ILO global domestic worker report (2013). This is a STATISTICAL and legal-protection report — it estimates the size of the domestic-work labour market (~52.6 million workers) and maps their inclusion in or exclusion from working-time, minimum-wage, and maternity laws. It does NOT itself document Gulf recruitment fraud, contract substitution, wage theft, or excessive hours (those abuses are documented on the action side by HRW, not by this ILO report). It is cited only to establish the scale and structural legal vulnerability of the kafala-mediated migration channel. Neither the ILO nor the HRW source provides a population prevalence rate for abuse; the 0.47 action figure is a harm proxy, not a rate read off either source.
Sumber: tidak bertindak
Buku besar klaim
Setiap angka di bawah ini adalah apa yang dilaporkan masing-masing sumber, dengan kutipan kata demi kata yang kami andalkan dan bagaimana kami sampai pada angka kami. Klik tautan mana saja untuk memverifikasi langsung.
1/2 sumber diverifikasi secara independen kata demi kata terhadap sumber terkutip
[1]World Bank — Remittances Slowed in 2023, Expected to Grow Faster in 2024 (Migration and Development Brief 40)
Terverifikasi
Laporan pemerintah
Officially recorded remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries reached an estimated $656 billion in 2023, remaining a crucial source of external finance for developing countries.
Kutipan
“Officially recorded remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) moderated in 2023, reaching an estimated $656 billion. [...] Remittances remained a crucial source of external finance for developing countries in 2023, bolstering the current accounts of several countries grappling with food insecurity and debt issues.
”
Data sumber dari
2024-06-26
Diakses
2026-06-30
Verifikasi
Kutipan diambil ulang secara independen dan dikonfirmasi kata demi kata terhadap sumber terkutip selama audit pendasaran kami.
Perhitungan
World Bank Migration and Development Brief 40 (June 2024). This source establishes only that remittances are a large and crucial income source for sending countries ($656 billion to LMICs in 2023) — it does NOT measure regret among non-migrants. The 0.38 inaction regret_rate is therefore a STRUCTURAL PROXY, not a measured rate: it stands in for the foregone-income exposure faced by adults who declined a Gulf contract in communities where remittances are a primary poverty-exit pathway. No direct survey of non-migrants who specifically regret not taking a Gulf contract exists in the published literature; the regret_display and caveats state this explicitly so the proxy is not read as a measured regret percentage.
[2]International Labour Organization — Domestic Workers Across the World: Global and Regional Statistics and the Extent of Legal Protection
Sumber referensi
Domestic work is a major global employment category — an estimated 52.6 million domestic workers worldwide (excluding 7.4 million child domestic workers), more than four in five of them women — establishing the scale of the migration channel a non-migrant forgoes.
Kutipan
“[Paraphrase from ILO publication — full text available at ilo.org.] The ILO estimates that 52.6 million people worldwide — more than four out of five of them women — are employed as domestic workers, a figure that excludes an estimated 7.4 million child domestic workers under age 15 and likely underestimates the true total. A substantial proportion of domestic workers in the Arab States and other Gulf-bound corridors are international migrants. The report documents the scale of the domestic-work labour market and the extent to which these workers are included in or excluded from key working-conditions laws.
”
Data sumber dari
2013-01-09
Diakses
2026-06-30
Perhitungan
ILO "Domestic Workers Across the World" (2013), used as a second anchor only to establish the SCALE of the domestic-work migration channel (tens of millions of jobs, heavily migrant and female in the Gulf corridor). This report does NOT measure regret among non-migrants and does NOT contain relative-deprivation findings — it is a statistical report on domestic-worker counts and legal protection. It is cited here purely to size the foregone opportunity, not as evidence of a regret rate. The 0.38 inaction regret_rate remains a structural proxy from the income gap (see World Bank source above); no direct non-migrant regret survey exists.
Catatan
PENGUKURAN PROXY DI SELURUH BAGIAN. Flag proxy_only mencerminkan dua hambatan struktural: pertama, hampir mustahilnya melakukan survei penyesalan bilateral langsung terhadap populasi yang status hukumnya dikendalikan oleh majikannya dan yang menghadapi risiko pembalasan bila mengungkapkan ketidakpuasan; kedua, tidak adanya survei terbit apa pun terhadap orang dewasa non-migran di komunitas pengirim yang secara langsung menanyakan "apakah Anda menyesal tidak mengambil kontrak Teluk." Tingkat 47% di sisi tindakan adalah proxy kerugian, BUKAN tingkat prevalensi pelecehan terukur: sumber HRW Oman yang menjadi acuannya adalah studi kualitatif atas 59 wawancara yang secara eksplisit tidak membuat klaim prevalensi statistik apa pun (ia melaporkan pelecehan sebagai hal rutin — "hampir semua" penyitaan paspor, "sebagian besar" jam kerja berlebihan, "banyak" upah tidak dibayar, "sekitar seperempat" pelecehan fisik atau seksual — tetapi bukan tingkat populasi). Angka 0,47 adalah representasi kerugian yang cukup signifikan untuk secara masuk akal menimbulkan penyesalan; pekerja yang mengalami pelanggaran-pelanggaran ini mungkin secara bersamaan memandang migrasi sebagai keputusan ekonomi yang benar mengingat alternatif mereka di kampung halaman, yang berarti proxy ini kemungkinan melebih-lebihkan penyesalan murni. Tingkat 38% di sisi ketidaktindakan adalah PROXY STRUKTURAL yang disusun dari data selisih pendapatan dan remitansi, BUKAN survei penyesalan langsung dan BUKAN tingkat penyesalan terukur — tidak ada survei terbit yang menanyakan kepada non-migran di komunitas pengirim apakah mereka menyesal menolak kontrak Teluk, sehingga angka ini membawa ketidakpastian terlebar dalam entri ini dan harus dibaca sebagai paparan peluang yang hilang, bukan penyesalan yang teramati. regret_delta sebesar 0,09 berada dalam margin ketidakpastian untuk kedua proxy dan harus dibaca sebagai arah, bukan presisi: keputusan ini secara masuk akal nyaris berimbang bagi keseluruhan populasi migran, dengan sisi penyesalan-tindakan sedikit lebih tinggi terutama karena dokumentasi kerugiannya lebih sistematis dibanding literatur penyesalan-ketidaktindakan. Sistem kafala sedang mengalami reformasi hukum di beberapa negara Teluk (Arab Saudi mereformasinya sebagian pada 2021, Qatar memperkenalkan perubahan pada 2020); profil risikonya berubah dan tingkat pelecehan yang terdokumentasi dari studi 2018-2020 mungkin tidak sepenuhnya mencerminkan kondisi saat ini.
