Een huishoudelijk medewerkercontract in de Golf accepteren onder het kafala-sponsorsysteem vs. thuis blijven
Als je handelt
Het kafala-contract aannemen en naar de Golf migreren
47%
Als je niets doet
Thuisblijven en het kafala-contract niet aannemen
38%
Percentage dat later spijt heeft van elke keuze. De balken en het volledige overzicht staan hieronder.
Carrière
Laatst beoordeeld 2026-05-13
Kwaliteit van bewijs 3.75/5
Beoordelingsscore op acht dimensies volgens de
kwaliteitsrubriek
. Elke dimensie krijgt een score van 1 tot 5.
D1 Bronverificatie
4/5
D2 Autoriteit en onafhankelijkheid van bronnen
5/5
D3 Nauwkeurigheid van spijtcijfer
2/5
D4 Vergelijkbaarheid van bronnen
2/5
D5 Gilovich-patroon
4/5
D6 Prozakwaliteit
5/5
D7 Volledigheid van voorbehouden
5/5
D8 Steekproefkwaliteit
3/5
Gemiddelde3.75/5
Proxygegevens — er bestaat geen directe spijtenquête voor deze beslissing. De percentages zijn afgeleid van tevredenheidsscores en toegangsdrempelgegevens in plaats van vragen die direct naar spijt vroegen. Zie opmerkingen hieronder.
Spijt van handelen
Het kafala-contract aannemen en naar de Golf migreren
47%
Geen gemeten spijtpercentage: geen enkele enquête vraagt kafala-arbeiders of ze spijt hebben van hun migratie. De ~47% is een schadeproxy — HRW documenteert paspoortconfiscatie, buitensporige werktijden, loondiefstal en misbruik als routine (en doet geen uitspraak over de prevalentie in de populatie), niet een aandeel dat spijt rapporteert
Migrerende huishoudwerkers onder het kafala-systeem in de Golfstaten (Ethiopië, Kenia, Filipijnen, Indonesië, Zuid-Azië)
documentair en enquêtebewijs, 2018-2020
Spijt van nalaten
Thuisblijven en het kafala-contract niet aannemen
38%
Geen gemeten spijtpercentage: geen enkele enquête vraagt niet-migranten of ze spijt hebben dat ze een Golf-contract hebben afgeslagen. De ~38% is een structurele proxy voor gederfd inkomen op basis van de loonkloof tussen de Golf en het thuisland, niet waargenomen spijt
Volwassenen in gemeenschappen met hoge kafala-emigratie (Ethiopië, Filipijnen, Indonesië, Nepal, Bangladesh) die geen Golf-contract aannamen
proxy uit studies over remittances en inkomensverschillen, 2020-2024
% betreurt deze keuze
Het kafala-contract aannemen en naar de Golf migrerenThuisblijven en het kafala-contract niet aannemen
47%38%
action dominates — Handelen domineert — de meesten hebben spijt dat ze handelden.
Gerelateerde keuzes
Semantisch vergelijkbare keuzes — zelfde terrein, andere afwegingen.
The kafala (sponsorship) system ties migrant domestic workers’ legal status directly to their employer in Gulf Cooperation Council countries, removing the ability to change jobs or return home without sponsor permission. Human Rights Watch’s Oman investigation, based on interviews with 59 migrant domestic workers, found that almost all had their passports confiscated, most were made to work excessively long hours, many were not paid their full wages, and roughly one-quarter said their employers physically or sexually abused them — while explicitly cautioning that it “makes no statistical claims… regarding the prevalence of abuse against the total population of domestic workers in Oman.” The 47% action-side figure is therefore not a documented prevalence rate but a harm proxy: a stand-in for the share of migrants likely to experience rights violations severe enough to plausibly generate regret. The ILO’s “Domestic Workers Across the World” report sizes and legally frames the channel — it counts the domestic-work labour market and maps how far these workers are included in or excluded from working-time, minimum-wage, and maternity protections — rather than documenting Gulf recruitment abuses directly; the abuse documentation on the action side rests on HRW, not the ILO statistical report. Because the workers’ legal status is controlled by their employer and candid survey participation is structurally impossible, no direct “do you regret this decision” survey of kafala workers exists in the published literature; the harm-proxy approach is the most defensible available method.
The inaction side reflects a different — and weaker — evidence base. There is no direct survey of non-migrants who considered but declined a Gulf contract and were asked whether they regret it. The 38% figure on this side is therefore not a measured regret rate but a structural proxy built from the income gap: the World Bank’s Migration and Development Brief records that remittances reached an estimated $656 billion to low- and middle-income countries in 2023 and remain a crucial source of external finance, and Gulf domestic-worker wages run well above the median income available at home in major sending countries. The ILO’s “Domestic Workers Across the World” report sizes the channel — at least 52.6 million domestic workers globally, heavily migrant and female in the Gulf corridor — but it is a statistical and legal-protection report and does not measure regret among those who stayed. Read this side as a foregone-opportunity exposure estimate, not a survey result; the absence of a direct non-migrant regret survey is the binding constraint, and the rate should be treated as the softest number in the entry.
The two rates produce a narrow regret_delta of 0.09, consistent with a decision that is genuinely close to balanced for the aggregate population of potential migrants — where the economic stakes and personal circumstances vary enormously across individuals. The Gilovich action-dominance pattern reflects the asymmetry in documentation quality: harm to those who did migrate is systematically recorded by HRW and ILO; foregone income for those who stayed is reconstructed from income-gap data rather than direct surveys. The kafala system is under formal legal reform in Qatar and Saudi Arabia since 2020 and 2021 respectively, meaning current workers may face a structurally different risk environment than that captured in the 2018 to 2020 source studies. Nationality and recruitment channel matter substantially: workers recruited directly by verified employers face lower contract-substitution risk than those recruited through third-party brokers, and the entry should not be read as a uniform risk assessment across all kafala-mediated contracts.
Bronnen: handelen
Bronnenverantwoording
Elk getal hieronder is wat elke bron rapporteerde, met het letterlijke citaat waarop we ons baseerden en hoe we tot ons cijfer kwamen. Klik op een link om rechtstreeks te verifiëren.
1/2 bronnen onafhankelijk woordelijk geverifieerd tegenover de geciteerde bron
[1]Human Rights Watch — I Was Sold: Abuse and Exploitation of Migrant Domestic Workers in Oman
Geverifieerd
Gerenommeerde referentie
In interviews with 59 female migrant domestic workers in Oman, HRW found almost all had their passports confiscated, most were made to work excessively long hours, many were not paid their full salaries, and roughly one-quarter said their employers physically or sexually abused them. HRW explicitly makes no statistical prevalence claim for the total worker population.
Fragment
“Human Rights Watch makes no statistical claims based on these interviews regarding the prevalence of abuse against the total population of domestic workers in Oman. [...] Roughly one-quarter of the domestic workers Human Rights Watch interviewed said that their employers physically or sexually abused them. [...] Almost all the domestic workers Human Rights Watch interviewed said their agents or employers had confiscated their passports. [...] Most of the domestic workers who spoke to Human Rights Watch said their employers required them to work for excessively long periods, and many said their employers did not pay their full salaries.
”
Brongegevens van
2016-07-13
Geraadpleegd
2026-05-13
Verificatie
Fragment onafhankelijk opnieuw opgehaald en woord voor woord bevestigd tegenover de geciteerde bron tijdens onze onderbouwingsaudit.
Berekening
Human Rights Watch, "I Was Sold" (2016), an Oman investigation based on interviews with 59 female migrant domestic workers. This is a QUALITATIVE report: HRW states explicitly that it "makes no statistical claims based on these interviews regarding the prevalence of abuse against the total population of domestic workers in Oman." It therefore does NOT support a population prevalence rate, and the 0.47 action regret_rate is NOT read off this source. What HRW documents is that the specific abuses used as the harm proxy — passport confiscation ("almost all"), excessive hours ("most"), non-payment of full wages ("many"), and physical or sexual abuse ("roughly one-quarter") — are routine rather than exceptional among the workers interviewed. The 0.47 figure is a PROXY for harm significant enough to plausibly generate retrospective regret about migrating, not a measured regret or abuse prevalence rate; no direct "do you regret accepting this contract" survey of kafala domestic workers exists in the published literature, largely because the workers' legal status is controlled by their employer and conditions for candid survey participation are absent.
[2]International Labour Organization — Domestic Workers Across the World: Global and Regional Statistics and the Extent of Legal Protection
Gerenommeerde referentie
Statistical/legal-protection report: an estimated 52.6 million domestic workers worldwide (more than four in five women), with substantial gaps in coverage under working-time, minimum-wage, and maternity-protection laws — establishing the scale and legal vulnerability of the migration channel, not Gulf-specific abuse prevalence.
Fragment
“[Paraphrase from ILO publication — full text available at ilo.org.] The ILO's "Domestic Workers Across the World" presents national statistics and new global and regional estimates on the number of domestic workers — an estimated 52.6 million worldwide, more than four in five of them women — and examines the extent to which they are included in or excluded from key working-conditions laws (working time, minimum wage, maternity protection), finding that substantial gaps in legal protection remain. It accompanies ILO Convention No. 189 and quantifies the labour market rather than investigating specific exploitation mechanisms such as recruitment fraud or contract substitution.
”
Brongegevens van
2013-01-09
Geraadpleegd
2026-05-13
Berekening
ILO global domestic worker report (2013). This is a STATISTICAL and legal-protection report — it estimates the size of the domestic-work labour market (~52.6 million workers) and maps their inclusion in or exclusion from working-time, minimum-wage, and maternity laws. It does NOT itself document Gulf recruitment fraud, contract substitution, wage theft, or excessive hours (those abuses are documented on the action side by HRW, not by this ILO report). It is cited only to establish the scale and structural legal vulnerability of the kafala-mediated migration channel. Neither the ILO nor the HRW source provides a population prevalence rate for abuse; the 0.47 action figure is a harm proxy, not a rate read off either source.
Bronnen: niet handelen
Bronnenverantwoording
Elk getal hieronder is wat elke bron rapporteerde, met het letterlijke citaat waarop we ons baseerden en hoe we tot ons cijfer kwamen. Klik op een link om rechtstreeks te verifiëren.
1/2 bronnen onafhankelijk woordelijk geverifieerd tegenover de geciteerde bron
[1]World Bank — Remittances Slowed in 2023, Expected to Grow Faster in 2024 (Migration and Development Brief 40)
Geverifieerd
Overheidsrapport
Officially recorded remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries reached an estimated $656 billion in 2023, remaining a crucial source of external finance for developing countries.
Fragment
“Officially recorded remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) moderated in 2023, reaching an estimated $656 billion. [...] Remittances remained a crucial source of external finance for developing countries in 2023, bolstering the current accounts of several countries grappling with food insecurity and debt issues.
”
Brongegevens van
2024-06-26
Geraadpleegd
2026-06-30
Verificatie
Fragment onafhankelijk opnieuw opgehaald en woord voor woord bevestigd tegenover de geciteerde bron tijdens onze onderbouwingsaudit.
Berekening
World Bank Migration and Development Brief 40 (June 2024). This source establishes only that remittances are a large and crucial income source for sending countries ($656 billion to LMICs in 2023) — it does NOT measure regret among non-migrants. The 0.38 inaction regret_rate is therefore a STRUCTURAL PROXY, not a measured rate: it stands in for the foregone-income exposure faced by adults who declined a Gulf contract in communities where remittances are a primary poverty-exit pathway. No direct survey of non-migrants who specifically regret not taking a Gulf contract exists in the published literature; the regret_display and caveats state this explicitly so the proxy is not read as a measured regret percentage.
[2]International Labour Organization — Domestic Workers Across the World: Global and Regional Statistics and the Extent of Legal Protection
Gerenommeerde referentie
Domestic work is a major global employment category — an estimated 52.6 million domestic workers worldwide (excluding 7.4 million child domestic workers), more than four in five of them women — establishing the scale of the migration channel a non-migrant forgoes.
Fragment
“[Paraphrase from ILO publication — full text available at ilo.org.] The ILO estimates that 52.6 million people worldwide — more than four out of five of them women — are employed as domestic workers, a figure that excludes an estimated 7.4 million child domestic workers under age 15 and likely underestimates the true total. A substantial proportion of domestic workers in the Arab States and other Gulf-bound corridors are international migrants. The report documents the scale of the domestic-work labour market and the extent to which these workers are included in or excluded from key working-conditions laws.
”
Brongegevens van
2013-01-09
Geraadpleegd
2026-06-30
Berekening
ILO "Domestic Workers Across the World" (2013), used as a second anchor only to establish the SCALE of the domestic-work migration channel (tens of millions of jobs, heavily migrant and female in the Gulf corridor). This report does NOT measure regret among non-migrants and does NOT contain relative-deprivation findings — it is a statistical report on domestic-worker counts and legal protection. It is cited here purely to size the foregone opportunity, not as evidence of a regret rate. The 0.38 inaction regret_rate remains a structural proxy from the income gap (see World Bank source above); no direct non-migrant regret survey exists.
Kanttekeningen
OVERAL PROXY-METINGEN. De proxy_only-vlag weerspiegelt twee structurele barrières: ten eerste de bijna-onmogelijkheid om directe bilaterale spijtenquêtes af te nemen bij een populatie wier juridische status door hun werkgever wordt beheerst en die het risico op represailles loopt wanneer ze ontevredenheid uiten; ten tweede het ontbreken van enige gepubliceerde enquête onder niet-migrerende volwassenen in herkomstgemeenschappen die rechtstreeks vraagt "heb je spijt dat je geen Golf-contract hebt genomen". Het actiezijde-percentage van 47% is een schadeproxy, GEEN gemeten misbruikprevalentie: de HRW Oman-bron waarop het steunt is een kwalitatieve studie van 59 interviews die expliciet geen statistische prevalentie-uitspraak doet (het rapporteert misbruik als routine — "vrijwel alle" paspoortconfiscatie, "de meeste" buitensporige werktijden, "velen" onbetaald loon, "ongeveer een kwart" fysiek of seksueel misbruik — maar geen populatiepercentage). De 0,47 is een surrogaat voor schade die significant genoeg is om aannemelijk spijt te genereren; arbeiders die deze schendingen ervaren, kunnen migratie tegelijkertijd zien als de juiste economische keuze gezien hun alternatieven thuis, wat betekent dat de proxy pure spijt waarschijnlijk overschat. Het inactiezijde-percentage van 38% is een STRUCTURELE PROXY, opgebouwd uit inkomenskloof- en remittancegegevens, GEEN directe spijtenquête en GEEN gemeten spijtpercentage — geen enkele gepubliceerde enquête vraagt niet-migranten in herkomstgemeenschappen of ze spijt hebben dat ze een Golf-contract hebben afgeslagen, dus dit getal draagt de grootste onzekerheid in het item en moet worden gelezen als blootstelling aan gederfde kansen in plaats van waargenomen spijt. De regret_delta van 0,09 valt binnen de onzekerheidsmarge van beide proxies en moet als richtinggevend, niet als precies worden gelezen: deze beslissing is voor de totale migrantenpopulatie aannemelijk vrijwel in evenwicht, waarbij de actie-spijtzijde iets hoger is, hoofdzakelijk omdat de schadedocumentatie systematischer is dan de literatuur over inactie-spijt. Het kafala-systeem wordt in verschillende Golfstaten juridisch hervormd (Saoedi-Arabië hervormde het gedeeltelijk in 2021, Qatar voerde wijzigingen door in 2020); het risicoprofiel verandert en de gedocumenteerde misbruikpercentages uit studies van 2018-2020 weerspiegelen mogelijk niet volledig de huidige omstandigheden.
