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行動 vs. 不行動:各選択の数値

結婚・出産時に正規雇用をやめる日本人女性 vs. 働き続ける

行動した場合

出産を機に退職する

47%

行動しなかった場合

出産後も働き続ける

25%

少なくとも1つの数値は間接的な推定値であり、実際に測定した後悔の割合ではありません。各数値の算出方法は下に記載しています。


キャリア

最終確認 2026-05-13

証拠の質 3.63/5

8次元のレビュー評価。基準は 品質ルーブリック 。各次元は1〜5で評価。

D1 出典の検証
3/5
D2 出典の権威性と独立性
4/5
D3 後悔率の正確性
2/5
D4 出典の比較可能性
2/5
D5 ギロヴィッチ・パターン
5/5
D6 文章の質
4/5
D7 注意事項の完全性
5/5
D8 サンプルの質
4/5
平均 3.63/5
A split image of a professional desk on one side and a domestic space with an infant seat on the other.
間接データ:この決断については、少なくとも1つの数値が、後悔を直接尋ねた調査ではなく、結果、満足度、意向といった間接的な指標、または編集部による推定に基づいています。各数値の算出方法は、下の各選択肢の注記に記載しています。

行動した場合

出産を機に退職する

47%

出産前に働いていた日本人女性の47%が、第一子の後に離職した(離職の有病率であり、自己申告による後悔率ではない)

結婚または出産時にフルタイム雇用を離れた日本人女性

遡及的調査、2020年

行動しなかった場合

出産後も働き続ける

25%

妊娠中の日本人被雇用者の25%が、職場でマタニティ・ハラスメント(マタハラ)を経験した――記録された被害の代理指標であり、自己申告による後悔率ではない

結婚と出産を経てフルタイム雇用を継続した日本人女性

男女雇用機会均等調査、2021年

各選択の数値(何を測ったかはページに明記)

関連する決断

意味的に類似する決断 — 同じ領域、異なるトレードオフ。

career

日本:終身雇用 vs. 転職

各選択の数値(何を測ったかはページに明記)

family

専業 vs 共働き

各選択の数値(何を測ったかはページに明記)

family

中国:結婚を遅らせる vs. 予定通り結婚

各選択の数値(何を測ったかはページに明記)

family

早期 vs. 晩期の親になること

各選択の数値(何を測ったかはページに明記)

career

日本の過労:留まる vs. 辞める

各選択の数値(何を測ったかはページに明記)

career

昇進追求 vs 役割受容

各選択の数値(何を測ったかはページに明記)

family

育児休業を取る vs. スキップ

各選択の数値(何を測ったかはページに明記)

career

退職

各選択の数値(何を測ったかはページに明記)

Japan’s 15th National Fertility Survey (2015) found that 46.9% of women who worked before childbirth left employment after their first child; the rate of continuing work after a first birth was 38.3% in 2010–2014, up from earlier decades. This is a departure-prevalence figure, not a self-reported regret rate — leaving is not the same as regretting leaving, and the survey does not cleanly separate a positive preference for caregiving from structural coercion (rigid hours, inflexible employers, inadequate childcare). The Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office notes that women’s labour force participation in Japan, by age group, follows an “M-shaped curve” with a dip in the thirties, a pattern most other developed countries no longer show.

Among women who continue working, a peer-reviewed cross-sectional survey of 359 pregnant employees (Kachi et al. 2021, Journal of Occupational Health) found that 24.8% had experienced matahara (maternity harassment) by supervisors or colleagues — demotion, exclusion from promotion tracks, or pressure to resign following pregnancy disclosure. Earlier government data put the figure at ~21.8% of full-time employees (MHLW 2015), consistent in magnitude. This too is a documented-harm prevalence, not a regret survey: not all women who experience matahara regret continuing to work. A separate longitudinal study of Japanese civil servants links work-family conflict to adverse health outcomes, more strongly for women — evidence that the inaction path carries real costs even for women who retain employment.

The bilateral pattern here is action-dominates — leaving employment is both the more prevalent and the more durable outcome — driven by Japan’s specific M-curve institutional structure, not by a universal regret asymmetry. The principal interpretive caveat is that neither rate is a self-reported regret instrument: the 47% measures departure prevalence and the 25% measures harassment prevalence, both honest proxies rather than regret. The M-curve has partially flattened since the Womenomics policy reforms, and women entering the workforce in the mid-2020s face somewhat different institutional conditions than those who made this decision before 2015. Japan’s record-low fertility rate of 1.20 in 2023 partly reflects women opting out of parenthood entirely as a response to the unresolved work-family conflict this entry documents — a third path not captured by the binary framing of the decision.

出典: 行動

根拠台帳

以下の各数値は各出典が報告した内容であり、引用した原文の抜粋と算出方法を記載しています。リンクをクリックして直接確認できます。

1/2 件の出典が引用元と一字一句一致することを独立して検証済み

  1. [1] BMC Women's Health / National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (IPSS) — Factors associated with occupation changes after pregnancy/delivery (citing the 15th Japanese National Fertility Survey, 2015) 検証済み
    Factors associated with occupation changes after pregnancy/delivery (citing the 15th Japanese National Fertility Survey, 2015)
    統計値
    46.9% of Japanese women who worked before childbirth retired from work after the birth of their first child; the rate of continuing work after the first birth was 38.3% in 2010–2014 (15th Japanese National Fertility Survey, 2015)
    抜粋
    “"found that the rate of continuing work after the birth of the first child was 38.3% in 2010–2014 … this survey also found that 46.9% of the women who worked before childbirth retired from work after the birth of their first child" ”
    出典データ
    2018-06-01
    アクセス日
    2026-06-30
    検証
    グラウンディング監査の際、抜粋を引用元から独立して再取得し、原文と一字一句一致することを確認しました。
    計算過程
    Source replaced 2026-06-30: the previously cited JILPT 2020 survey figures (68% quit at marriage/childbirth, of whom 49% cited "structural push factors") could not be independently verified in any English- or Japanese-language JILPT publication during grounding review, and the 49% structural-vs-preference split appears nowhere in the primary literature. They are replaced with the verifiable 15th Japanese National Fertility Survey (2015) figure: 46.9% of women who worked before childbirth left employment after their first child (continuation rate 38.3%, 2010–2014). The action-side rate (0.469) is now the DEPARTURE-PREVALENCE construct — the share of working women who leave employment at first childbirth — explicitly labelled as such in regret_display, NOT a self-reported regret rate. No direct retrospective-regret instrument exists for women who left at childbirth; the prevalence is reported honestly rather than relabelled as regret.
  2. [2] Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, Japan — Women and Men in Japan 2020
    Women and Men in Japan 2020
    統計値
    Female labour force participation in Japan, by age group, follows an M-shaped curve with a dip in the thirties
    抜粋
    “"The labor force participation rates of women in Japan by age group illustrates an “M-shaped curve” due to the burdens in the labor force participation of women in their thirties. Women’s labor participation rates in most other developed countries no longer shows M-shape." ”
    出典データ
    2020-01-01
    アクセス日
    2026-11-05
    計算過程
    URL updated 2026-05-14: the originally cited 2022 edition does not exist on the Gender Equality Bureau website; the most recent available English edition is 2020. The excerpt is quoted from the "Work" chapter of that edition (linked from this page). The 50-60% wage penalty cited in the original entry, and the later non-regular employment share and gender wage gap figures, could not be found in this publication and are not used. This source does not provide a regret rate; it documents the shape of women's labour force participation that frames the action-side figure.

出典: 不作為

根拠台帳

以下の各数値は各出典が報告した内容であり、引用した原文の抜粋と算出方法を記載しています。リンクをクリックして直接確認できます。

1/2 件の出典が引用元と一字一句一致することを独立して検証済み

  1. [1] Journal of Occupational Health (Kachi, Inoue & Eguchi, 2021) — Association between maternity harassment and depression during pregnancy amid the COVID-19 state of emergency 検証済み
    Association between maternity harassment and depression during pregnancy amid the COVID-19 state of emergency
    統計値
    24.8% of pregnant Japanese employees had experienced maternity harassment (matahara) by supervisors and/or colleagues (cross-sectional survey of 359 pregnant employees, May 2020)
    抜粋
    “"A cross‐sectional Internet survey was conducted on 359 pregnant employees (including women who were working at the time their pregnancy was confirmed) from May 22 to May 31, 2020 … Overall, 24.8% of the pregnant employees had experienced maternity harassment by supervisors and/or colleagues." ”
    出典データ
    2021-01-19
    アクセス日
    2026-06-30
    検証
    グラウンディング監査の際、抜粋を引用元から独立して再取得し、原文と一字一句一致することを確認しました。
    計算過程
    Source replaced 2026-06-30: the previously cited MHLW landing page (reputable_reference) did not contain a verifiable 31% matahara prevalence figure — no MHLW publication anchored 31%, and the closest documented government figure is ~21.8% of full-time employees (MHLW 2015). The unverifiable 31% is replaced with the directly anchored, peer-reviewed Kachi et al. 2021 (Journal of Occupational Health) figure: 24.8% of pregnant Japanese employees experienced maternity harassment. The inaction-side rate (0.248) is the MATERNITY-HARASSMENT-PREVALENCE construct — a documented workplace-harm proxy for women who continue working through pregnancy — explicitly labelled as such in regret_display, NOT a self-reported regret rate. No direct retrospective-regret instrument exists for women who continued working; the harm prevalence is reported honestly rather than relabelled as regret.
  2. [2] PubMed Central / Industrial Health — The health effects of work-family conflict in men and women Japanese civil servants: a longitudinal study
    The health effects of work-family conflict in men and women Japanese civil servants: a longitudinal study
    統計値
    In a longitudinal study of 1,808 Japanese local-government civil servants (550 women), sustained high or worsening work-family conflict was associated with poor mental health and job dissatisfaction in both sexes; in women it was most strongly linked to poor physical health (OR 2.64), in men to poor mental health (OR 2.74)
    抜粋
    “This study examined 1,808 civil servants (1,258 men and 550 women) aged 20–65 yr working in a local government in the west coast of Japan from 2003 to 2008. … This study revealed association sustained high WFC and deterioration of WFC conflict with poor mental health and poor job satisfaction for both men and women. In men high WFC conflict and deterioration was associated with poor mental health (OR=2.74). On the other hand, women had strong relationship between WFC changes and poor physical health (OR=2.64). ”
    出典データ
    2020-01-01
    アクセス日
    2026-11-16
    計算過程
    URL corrected 2026-05-14: PMC7474519 (the originally cited article) resolved to a paper about mayfly biology in a Costa Rican stream -- an unrelated article in an entirely different field. The PMC ID was fabricated. Replaced with PMC7557410, a real 2020 IJERPH longitudinal study of work-family conflict among Japanese workers (published Oct 2020). The substitute paper does not provide the exact "working mothers in Japan vs. OECD" systematic review framing of the original excerpt; that framing was removed. The substitute does corroborate the directional claim (high work-family conflict costs for employed Japanese women). This source does not independently anchor the inaction-side matahara prevalence (0.248, from Kachi et al. 2021); it supports the structural context for why employed mothers face real costs.

注意事項

Neither side of this bar is a self-reported regret rate — no direct retrospective-regret instrument exists for Japanese women who left (or stayed in) employment at childbirth, so both rates are documented proxies and are labelled as such. The action-side 47% is a DEPARTURE-PREVALENCE figure: the share of women who worked before childbirth and left employment after their first child (15th Japanese National Fertility Survey, 2015, covering 2010–2014 births). Leaving is not the same as regretting leaving; some departures are a positive preference for full-time caregiving and some are structurally coerced (rigid hours, inflexible employers, lack of childcare), but the survey does not cleanly split preference from coercion, so we do not assert a coercion share. The inaction-side 25% is a HARM-PREVALENCE figure: the share of pregnant employees who experienced maternity harassment (matahara), a documented workplace harm (demotion, exclusion from promotion, pressure to resign), not a regret survey — not all women who experienced matahara regret having continued to work, and it is measured over a COVID-era sample (May 2020, Kachi et al. 2021), which may differ from a typical year. Earlier government data put matahara at ~21.8% of full-time employees (MHLW 2015), consistent in magnitude. The M-curve has partially flattened since 2017 following the Abe administration's Womenomics policies (daycare expansion, equal opportunity enforcement, flexible working legislation); the continuation rate after first birth rose from ~28% to 38% across the 2000s, so the bilateral costs of this decision are lower for women entering the workforce in the mid-2020s than for those who made the decision before 2015. Japan's total fertility rate fell to 1.20 in 2023, a record low, suggesting that many women have responded to the unresolved work-family conflict this entry documents by opting out of parenthood entirely -- a third path not captured by this binary framing. The directional pattern (action-dominates, meaning leaving employment is the more prevalent and more durable outcome than staying) reflects the specific institutional conditions of Japan's M-curve era and may not generalise to other national contexts.

生データ: /api/decisions.json

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