Calidad de la evidencia 4.88/5
Puntuación de revisión en ocho dimensiones según la rúbrica de calidad . Cada dimensión puntuada de 1 a 5.
- D1 Anclaje en las fuentes
- 5/5
- D2 Autoridad de las fuentes
- 5/5
- D3 Aritmética
- 5/5
- D4 Incertidumbre
- 5/5
- D5 Alcance
- 5/5
- D6 Prosa
- 5/5
- D7 Honestidad sobre la percepción
- 4/5
- D8 Completitud de las advertencias
- 5/5
Cómo varía el riesgo
La cifra principal promedia situaciones muy diferentes. Así es como varía la probabilidad según el escenario o el contexto:
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Grace et al. 2024: median 5%, mean 9%, conditional on achieving human-level AI. Between 38-51% of respondents gave ≥10%.
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10% unconditional over the next century, from The Precipice (2020). Largest single contributor to his overall 1-in-6 existential risk estimate.
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Hinton: 10-20% chance of extinction within 30 years. Bengio: ~20% for AI existential risk. Both shortened their timelines post-GPT-4.
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Effectively negligible on relevant timelines. Argue current AI paradigm cannot produce autonomous goal-seeking agents. LeCun calls x-risk debate 'complete B.S.'
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Bimodal: 77% 'concerned' about AI risk to humanity (YouGov 2024), but only 4% name AI as most likely cause of extinction (Rethink Priorities). Concern conflates job loss, surveillance, and existential scenarios.
La longitud y el tono de la barra clasifican estos escenarios entre sí, no frente a otros riesgos. Las probabilidades exactas se muestran junto a cada uno.
El número más citado en el discurso sobre el riesgo existencial de la IA proviene de la encuesta de Grace et al. de 2024 a 2.778 investigadores que habían publicado en los principales foros de IA: una probabilidad mediana del 5% (media del 9%) de extinción humana o catástrofe equivalente, condicionada al desarrollo de inteligencia artificial a nivel humano. Entre el 38% y el 51% de los encuestados asignaron al menos un 10% de probabilidad. Por separado, el filósofo Toby Ord estimó una probabilidad incondicional del 10% de catástrofe existencial por IA desalineada este siglo — el mayor contribuyente a su estimación general de 1 entre 6 de riesgo existencial de todas las fuentes. Geoffrey Hinton sitúa la cifra en 10-20% en treinta años; Yoshua Bengio en aproximadamente el 20%. Por otro lado, Yann LeCun califica todo el debate de “completa tontería”, argumentando que las arquitecturas actuales carecen de la memoria persistente, el razonamiento causal y los modelos del mundo físico que requeriría la búsqueda autónoma de objetivos. El rango de opinión de los expertos —desde aproximadamente cero hasta uno de cada cinco— es en sí mismo el dato más importante.
La brecha de percepción aquí es inusual. Para la mayoría de las entradas en este sitio, el público sobreestima un riesgo bien medido. Para el riesgo existencial de la IAG, no existe un riesgo bien medido para sobreestimar o subestimar. La opinión pública es bimodal: una encuesta de YouGov de 2024 encontró que el 77% de los estadounidenses están “preocupados” por la IA como un riesgo para la humanidad, sin embargo, una encuesta de Rethink Priorities encontró que solo el 4% nombró a la IA como la causa más probable de extinción humana — la guerra nuclear lideró con un 42%. Pew Research informa que el 57% de los estadounidenses califica los riesgos sociales de la IA como “altos”, pero esta cifra confunde el desplazamiento laboral, la desinformación y la vigilancia con escenarios de extinción. La comunidad de expertos, mientras tanto, se agrupa en torno a una mediana sorprendentemente no trivial — 5% no es un número que la mayoría de la gente aceptaría para cualquier otra causa de extinción sin exigir pruebas extraordinarias. El hecho de que miles de investigadores que construyen estos sistemas asignen esa probabilidad es o bien una condena rotunda de la trayectoria de la tecnología o un reflejo de lo mal calibrados que están incluso los expertos en el campo al pronosticar eventos sin precedentes.
Esta entrada lleva la etiqueta no_reliable_estimate porque no hay una forma defendible de comprimir la evidencia disponible en una única probabilidad de por vida. El evento no tiene una tasa base. La tecnología descrita por los escenarios de riesgo aún no existe. Las estimaciones de los expertos son opiniones — informadas, consideradas, publicadas en foros revisados por pares, pero opiniones al fin y al cabo. La encuesta de Grace et al. ha sido criticada por efectos de encuadre; los encuestados son autoseleccionados entre aquellos dispuestos a especular sobre catástrofes de baja probabilidad; y la naturaleza condicional de la pregunta (extinción dada una IA a nivel humano) deja la probabilidad incondicional dependiente de una previsión de línea de tiempo que abarca décadas. Lo que se puede decir honestamente: una fracción no trivial de las personas que mejor entienden la IA cree que hay una probabilidad no trivial de que termine muy mal, y una fracción con credenciales similares piensa que la preocupación es prematura hasta el punto del absurdo. Ambas posiciones son sostenidas por laureados con el Premio Turing. La respuesta honesta es que nadie lo sabe, y cualquiera que te diga lo contrario está vendiendo algo — posiblemente una startup de seguridad de IA, posiblemente una GPU.
Datos curiosos relacionados
Estimacion mediana de expertos para riesgo catastrofico de AGI: ~5%. Las armas nucleares llevan 80 anos sin usarse en conflicto pese a ~13.000 ojivas. Un riesgo es teorico. El otro tiene un historial de casi-accidentes.
Registro de evidencia
Cada número a continuación es lo que reportó cada fuente, con la cita textual en la que nos basamos y cómo llegamos a nuestra cifra. Haz clic en cualquier enlace para verificarlo directamente.
2/6 fuentes verificadas de forma independiente palabra por palabra frente a la fuente citada
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[1] arXiv (Grace, Stewart, Sandbrink, Thomas, Weinstein-Raun, Brauner) — Thousands of AI Authors on the Future of AI Verificado
Thousands of AI Authors on the Future of AI- Estadística
Median 5% probability of human extinction or similarly permanent catastrophe from advanced AI; mean 9%; 38-51% of respondents assigned ≥10% probability- Extracto
“"Between 38% and 51% of respondents gave at least a 10% chance to advanced AI leading to outcomes as bad as human extinction." ”
- Datos de la fuente de
- 2024-01-05
- Accedido
- 2026-04-19 · copia archivada
- Verificación
- Extracto recuperado de forma independiente y confirmado palabra por palabra frente a la fuente citada durante nuestra auditoría de fundamentación.
- Cálculo
- Grace et al. surveyed 2,778 researchers who had published in top-tier AI venues (NeurIPS, ICML, ICLR, AAAI, IJCAI, JMLR). The survey asked for probability estimates of "extremely bad" outcomes (human extinction or equivalent) conditional on the development of human-level machine intelligence. The median response was 5%, the mean 9%. Between 38% and 51% of respondents — depending on question framing — assigned at least a 10% probability. No conversion to an unconditional lifetime probability is attempted here because the conditional (human-level AI existing) is itself deeply uncertain, and multiplying two poorly constrained quantities yields a number that conveys false precision.
- Independencia
- Largest survey of AI researchers to date. Methodologically independent of Ord's philosophical risk analysis and of public polling. The survey population overlaps with the AI safety research community but also includes many researchers with no prior engagement with existential risk discourse.
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[2] Bloomsbury Publishing (Toby Ord, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford) — The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity
The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity- Estadística
1 in 10 (10%) existential risk from unaligned AI this century — the largest single contributor to Ord's overall 1-in-6 existential risk estimate- Extracto
“"I put the existential risk from unaligned artificial intelligence at around 1 in 10 over the next hundred years. This is higher than all other sources of existential risk I consider, combined." ”
- Datos de la fuente de
- 2020-03-06
- Accedido
- 2026-04-19 · copia archivada
- Cálculo
- Ord's 10% figure is a subjective probability estimate informed by consultation with AI researchers, historical precedent in technology governance, and analysis of alignment failure modes. It is explicitly not an empirical measurement — it is the considered judgment of a moral philosopher specializing in existential risk. Ord estimates total existential risk this century at ~1 in 6 (17%), with AI contributing 10 percentage points, engineered pandemics ~3%, and other sources (nuclear, climate, asteroid, supervolcano) contributing the remainder. The 10% figure is unconditional on AGI development — it bakes in Ord's timeline uncertainty about when or whether such systems will be built.
- Independencia
- Ord's framework is a philosophical risk analysis drawing on the broader Future of Humanity Institute research program. Independent methodology from the Grace et al. survey, though Ord cites earlier versions of the same survey (2016 edition) as one input among many.
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[3] Pew Research Center — How the US Public and AI Experts View Artificial Intelligence
How the US Public and AI Experts View Artificial Intelligence- Estadística
50% of Americans are more concerned than excited about AI's increased role in daily life (up from 37% in 2021); 57% rate the risks to society as 'high'- Extracto
“"A majority of Americans (57%) rate the risks of AI for society as high, with far fewer seeing high benefits." ”
- Datos de la fuente de
- 2025-04-03
- Accedido
- 2026-04-19 · copia archivada
- Cálculo
- Pew's 2025 survey tracks general AI concern, not existential risk specifically. The 57% "high risk" figure conflates near-term harms (job loss, misinformation, surveillance) with extinction-level scenarios. A separate YouGov survey (December 2024) found 77% "concerned" about AI as a "risk to humanity," with 39% "very concerned." These figures are included to document the public perception landscape, but they cannot be compared directly to the Grace et al. conditional extinction probability because they measure different constructs. The bimodal pattern — high general concern, low salience of extinction specifically (only 4% name AI as the most likely cause of extinction per Rethink Priorities) — is itself the key finding for the perception-gap framing.
- Independencia
- Pew Research Center is an independent nonpartisan research organization. Its methodology (nationally representative probability sampling) is fully independent of the AI researcher survey and of Ord's philosophical analysis.
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[4] TechCrunch — Meta's Yann LeCun says worries about AI's existential threat are 'complete B.S.'
Meta's Yann LeCun says worries about AI's existential threat are 'complete B.S.'- Estadística
LeCun argues current AI systems lack key capabilities (persistent memory, reasoning, planning, physical-world understanding) and dismisses AI's existential threat as 'complete B.S.'- Extracto
“"You're going to have to pardon my French, but that's complete B.S." LeCun argued that today's large language models lack some key cat-level capabilities, like persistent memory, reasoning, planning, and an understanding of the physical world. ”
- Datos de la fuente de
- 2024-10-12
- Accedido
- 2026-04-19 · copia archivada
- Cálculo
- LeCun (Turing Award 2018, Chief AI Scientist at Meta) and Andrew Ng (Stanford, Coursera co-founder) represent the most prominent skeptical position among credentialed AI researchers. Their argument is architectural: current LLMs "manipulate language" without genuine understanding, lack persistent memory and causal reasoning, and are fundamentally incapable of the autonomous goal-pursuit that x-risk scenarios require. LeCun's blanket dismissal of the existential-threat worry as "complete B.S." is contested — the Grace et al. survey shows a median 5% extinction probability, which is not "zero." The disagreement is partly empirical (what current systems can do) and partly about extrapolation (whether scaling or architectural breakthroughs will produce qualitatively different capabilities). No probability estimate is extracted from the skeptical position because it is framed as a categorical rejection of the premise rather than a quantified risk.
- Independencia
- News reporting of LeCun's public statements. Represents a distinct intellectual position from both the Grace et al. survey respondents (who gave non-zero medians) and Ord's philosophical analysis.
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[5] Forbes, relaying a December 2024 Guardian report on Hinton's BBC Radio 4 Today programme interview — Geoffrey Hinton's Prediction Of Human Extinction At The Hands Of AI
Geoffrey Hinton's Prediction Of Human Extinction At The Hands Of AI- Estadística
Geoffrey Hinton (2018 Turing Award; 2024 Nobel Prize in Physics) raised his estimate of AI-caused human extinction within 30 years to a 10-20% range, up from an earlier standalone 10% estimate- Extracto
“"Geoffrey Hinton, often referred to as one of the 'godfathers' of artificial intelligence, believes there is a 10% to 20% chance that AI could drive humanity to extinction within 30 years." Speaking on BBC Radio 4, Hinton said: "we've never had to deal with things more intelligent than ourselves before." ”
- Datos de la fuente de
- 2024-12-29
- Accedido
- 2026-07-01 · copia archivada
- Cálculo
- Hinton gave a standalone 10% catastrophic-outcome estimate in earlier 2024 interviews; in a December 2024 BBC Radio 4 interview (first reported by The Guardian, relayed here via Forbes) he raised it to a 10-20% range for AI causing human extinction within 30 years. Cited solely to source the regional_breakdown "Hinton & Bengio estimates" row and the body-text expert-range claim; the entry's no_reliable_estimate framing continues to rest on Grace et al. and Ord, not on this single-individual estimate.
- Independencia
- News relay of a broadcast interview — a single named individual's stated view, methodologically comparable to the LeCun source above on the skeptical side rather than a systematic survey or philosophical analysis.
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[6] arXiv preprint — An International Agreement to Prevent the Premature Creation of Artificial Superintelligence Verificado
An International Agreement to Prevent the Premature Creation of Artificial Superintelligence- Estadística
Documents Yoshua Bengio's publicly stated estimate of roughly a 20% probability that advanced AI development turns out catastrophic- Extracto
“"Yoshua Bengio, a Turing Award recipient and the most cited living scientist, said he thinks there is a 'twenty percent probability that it turns out catastrophic'" ”
- Datos de la fuente de
- 2025-11-01
- Accedido
- 2026-07-01 · copia archivada
- Verificación
- Extracto recuperado de forma independiente y confirmado palabra por palabra frente a la fuente citada durante nuestra auditoría de fundamentación.
- Cálculo
- Bengio has not published one definitive percentage in his own formal writing — his blog FAQ on catastrophic AI risks instead proposes a compound formula whose component probabilities he says should be set by expert polling, and his recorded talks describe capability timelines rather than a single risk probability. The ~20% figure attributed to him is nonetheless widely and consistently reported; this arXiv paper is cited because it documents the specific figure in a dated, citable context. Used solely to source the regional_breakdown "Hinton & Bengio estimates" row and the body-text expert-range claim.
- Independencia
- Secondary academic documentation of a public statement rather than a primary interview transcript or Bengio's own published writing. Direct checks of Bengio's own blog, a TED talk transcript, and an OECD.AI incident summary did not turn up a first-party statement of this exact figure, though the ~20% number recurs consistently across independent secondary sources.